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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a critical analysis and evaluation of the current Korean banking
regulatory and supervisory system. The objective is to identif' continuing structural
weaknesses of the Korean banking system and to suggest areas of regulatory and
supervisory system reform. The focus of this analysis and evaluation is centred around
the following three questions:
(1) Who should be the regulator?
(2) What substantive standards of supervision should be applied? and
(3) Administratively, in what manner should these standarus be applied?
Finally, the causes, responses, and implications for reform as to the recent Korean
financial crisis are discussed.
The Korean banking system has been characterised as a "governmental control
system" for credit allocation. This system, with lax prudential regulation and supervision,
creates inevitable problems for the banks. For example, Korean banks have been largely
precluded from true market and commercially oriented practices and have been exposed
to significant credit and other risks due to governmental policy directed lending and other
non-commercially induced banking practices.
The main theme of this thesis is that Korea's reformed and restructured regulatory
and supervisory system should be structurally removed from undue governmental and
political interference; that is, should be sufficiently divorced and protected from
governmental economic policy objectives and, more generally, from objectives that are
inconsistent with "safety and soundness" based banking regulatory and supervisory
objectives and with market oriented practices. Balancing this structural independence
and market orientation, a reformed and restructured system should provide a high degree
of transparency and accountability.
Reform should aim not only at establishing effective supervisory standards, but
also at ensuring effective monitoring and enforcement. A first step to the reform is for
the government to define and adhere to a primary policy objective of banking policy, i.e.
"financial stability" through sound and effective Korean banking regulation and
supervision. To achieve such financial stability, Korea will need to implement
appropriate measures that can ensure that the banking system is "safe and sound",
consistently with evolving international standards; that banks are free from undue
governmental and political interference and control; and that the banking system operates
within a competitive and commercially driven market environment.
The financial crisis in 1997 has demonstrated many of the current weaknesses of
the Korean financial system. The need for certainty of process, for a clear, realistic and
transparent timetable for restructuring, and for an effective exit policy for troubled
commercial banks, are some of the lessons to be learned from this crisis.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE KOREAN BANKING SYSTEM
Over the last four and a half decades, the Korean banking sector has been subject to
intensive governmental regulation and control. Moreover, such governmental control of
the banking system has created a number of weaknesses, such as moral hazard and
political loan problems.
	 The recent Korean financial and economic crisis has
demonstrated many of these current weaknesses and provided an opportunity for
fundamental reform of the banking system. In light of the need for reform and
restructuring, the basic nature of the Korean banking system should now be reconsidered.
In an attempt to identify the existing primary problem areas of the Korean banking
system, this chapter examines this system in general terms, and in the light of its
historical development. The focus of the chapter is on those aspects of the law and
practice most directly relevant to the banking regulatory and supervisory framework. By
way of background, the chapter looks at the structure and functions of banking
institutions in Korea; then, outlines the applicable banking statutes, referring to their
historical background and development; and briefly describes the institutional structures
of the previous, as well as the new banking regulatory anìd supervisory authorities.
Finally, the framework of Korean banking regulatory norms is also addressed.
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I. THE KOREAN BANKING SYSTEM
A. Development of the Korean Banking System to the 1960s
The formation of a modem banking system in Korea dates back to the Japanese invasion
and the demand for modem banking facilities to serve Japanese interests. The first
branch of a Japanese bank, the Daiichi Ginko, was opened in 1878 in Korea. Thereafter,
several other Japanese banks opened their branches in Korea over the next two decades,
mainly with a view to serving Korean-Japanese trade. Some Korean-owned banks were
also established, but by 1910 only three banks survived. Due to insufficient capital and
funds available for lending and lack of experience in banking business, until the formal
annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, the Korean-owned banks carried on limited
commercial banking business, mainly in urban areas, and did little to finance the industry
and the public sector. Other important developments were the establishment of the
Agriculturô-Industry Bank and of the Oriental Development Company. The Agriculture-
Industry Bank, a government owned and operated institution, was set up in 1906 as a
functionally specialised bank for Japanese investment finance. 	 The Oriental
Development Company was established in 1909 and served to support the Japanese
economic invasion of Korea.
In the early stages of the colonial period, in the 1910s and early 1920s, the
banking system expanded rapidly in numbers. After a fmancial crisis in the mid-1920s,
many banks were restructured or merged. By the end of the 1930s, the number of banks
had been cut down by half it decreased further during the Second World War. However,
the total number of banks' branches actually increased, and the functional specialisation
13
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of financial institutions was developed during this period. Specialised financial
institutions, such as saving banks, financial associations and trust companies, were
established. Especially, the financial associations, which engaged in short-term financing
to farmers and small firms, grew rapidly. On the whole, during the colonial period, the
Korean financial system was used to channel savings into Japanese industrial and
commercial expansion and the Japanese war effort. Koreans had some access to modern
financial institutions, particularly the financial associations, but they generally relied on
their traditional institutions, both as depositories for savings and as sources of
borrowings.'
After independence from Japan, due to the financial instability and the sharp
decline in financial operations, the specialisation of functions, which had become a
significant feature of Korean financial institutions, disappeared. The banking and other
financial institutions became ordinary commercial banks, engaging in the collection of
demand deposits and the extension of short-term loans and advances to the primary
producers, businessmen, as well as the government agencies. By the end of the 1950s, the
Korean banking system had reached a stage of stagnation.
B	 The Current Korean Banking System
1. The Bank of Korea
When the modern banking system was introduced by the Japanese banks, the central
banking functions were given to the Daiichi Ginko, which in 1905 became the currency
'D. C. Cole and Y. C. Park, Financial Development in Korea: 1945-80 (1984), p. 60.
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issuing authority within Korea. In 1909, the newly established Bank of Korea - renamed
the Bank of Chosun in 1911 - assumed the central banking functions from the Daiichi
Ginko. It remained in this role until 1945.2
In the years between independence in 1945 and the establishment of the new Bank
of Korea, Korea did not have a central bank. The U.S. Military Government and the
Ministry of Finance performed the central banking functions during this period.
The Bank of Korea (BOK) was set up as a specialist central bank in 1950, under
the Bank of Korea Act. The BOK is a special juridical person and, legally, is not a branch
of the Executive. Therefore, it acts as an independent entity and is represented by its
Governor. It initially had capital, all of which was subscribed by the government.
However, its capital soon lost all its value, due to continuous inflation. Consequently, in
1962, an amendment to the Bank of Korea Act converted the BOK to a special juridical
person without capital.
The Bank of Korea Act provided that the BOK was responsible for:
(1) maintaining the stability of the value of money in the interest of national
economic progress; and
(2) promoting economic development and the efficient use of national resources
through the sound operation and functional improvement of the nation's
banking and credit system.3
Under this and other relevant provisions, the BOK was given responsibility for regulating
and supervising banking institutions, mainly commercial banks. In addition to the
2 The old Bank of Korea also carried on normal commercial operations.
Bank of Korea Act art. 3.
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function of regulating and supervising commercial banking institutions, it exercised
numerous functions and responsibilities as central bank.
In 1997, with the enactment of the Revised Bank of Korea Act, the BOK was
confined to its functions as monetary authority only. The Revised Act mandates price
stability as the sole objective of the BOK.4 As central bank, the BOK is responsible for
the conduct of the monetary policy and controls the monetary supply; has the exclusive
right to issue currency; acts as banker for the banking sector and the government; and
conducts foreign exchange operations.
2.	 Commercial Banks
Commercial banks, called "ordinary banks" (as distinct from the specialised banks), are
financial institutions that are established under, and operate in accordance with, the
General Banking Act. They are subject to regulations, orders, and instructions issued by
the regulatory and supervisory authorities. The commercial banks can be further
classified as either domestic or foreign. A domestic bank can be a nationwide
commercial bank or a local bank, depending on its geographic business scope.
(a) Domestic Commercial Banks
Domestic commercial banks have the following features:5
First, they have nationwide or province-wide networks, comprising large numbers
' Revised Bank of Korea Act art. 1.
Bank of Korea, Financial System in Korea (1993), p. 43.
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of banking branches. Each large nationwide commercial bank has a network of over 300
branches.
Second, they primarily provide short-term financing. Even though they can
engage in long-term financing, long-term financing has not been favoured by them.
Instead, the demand for long-term funds has customarily been met by frequent rollovers
or renewals of short-term loans.
Third, they depend on amounts borrowed from the BOK to meet persistent
shortages in their loanable funds. Nonetheless, the portion of funds provided by the BOK
has decreased over the years. In the mid-1980s, more than one third of their total loans
and discounts were financed by the BOK. Thereafter, the share was reduced, reaching
about 20 per cent in the early 1 990s.
Commercial banks have played a leading role in the Korean financial market.
However, their relative importance in the financial system has gradually decreased, as
specialised banks and other non-bank financial institutions have expanded their business.
(1) Nationwide Commercial Banks. As of end 1997, there were 16 nationwide
commercial banks in Korea. Five of them were established before 1960; these banks
have retained a prominent position in the Korean financial markets. Until the early
1980s, the government held a controlling interest in these five original nationwide banks.
The process of gradual denationalisation, which started in 1972, was accelerated in the
1980s, in line with the government's financial liberalisation policy. By 1983, the
government's shares in those five nationwide commercial banks had been sold, and two
new banks had been established in order to promote competition between banking
17
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jnstitutions. 6
 At the end of 1980s, the entry barriers to the banking industry were lowered
again. Six additional nationwide commercial banks were established. Furthermore,
during the 1 990s, three previous specialised banks have been converted to nationwide
commercial bank status.7
(2) Local Banks. During the period between 1967 and 1971, ten local banks were
established under the General Banking Act for the purpose of mobilising domestic
savings, achieving a balanced dispersion of banking business, and promoting regional
economic development. 8
 One such bank was set up for each of the nine provinces, and
one for Pusan, the second largest city in Korea.9
The local banks were all privately owned from the outset, in contrast to the
nationwide commercial banks. They maintain a branch banking system like that of the
nationwide commercial banks. Initially, however, they were permitted to open branches
only within the province where their head office is located, with the exception of one
branch each in Seoul. This restriction has been gradually eased. For each local bank, ten
Seoul branches and two branches in each of the five metropolitan cities were allowed.
The branching restriction for local banks was finally removed in November 1998.
The local banks carry on the same kind of commercial banking business as the
nationwide commercial banks. However, as they originally operated within restricted
6 Ibid., p. 77. The ownership structures of those new banks presented distinctive features. One was
established by Korean immigrants in Japan. The other was set up as a joint venture with Bank of America.
The Korean Exchange Bank, concentrating on foreign and international fmancing business, the Citizen
National Bank, providing small loans to households and small-scale businesses, and the Korea Housing
Bank, providing housing related fmance, were converted in 1990,1995 and 1997, respectively.
8 Bank of Korea, Financial System, op. cit., n. 5, pp. 80-8 1.
(South) Korea is divided, in terms of administrative districts, into one Special City (Seoul), five
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geographic areas, they were subject, in certain respects, to regulations different than those
applicable to the nationwide commercial banks. For example, they were allowed to offer
slightly higher interest rates for certain types of deposits. Also, the amounts that could be
lent out of their Seoul branches were restricted, so as to prevent them from transferring
local funds to Seoul. This restriction was finally removed in April 1998.
(b) Foreign Bank Branches
Foreign banks may open branches in Korea with the approval of the regulatory
authorities. Chase Manhattan Bank first opened its Seoul branch in 1967. From the latter
half of the 1970s onwards, the number of foreign bank branches and the scale of their
business have increased substantially. Foreign bank branches were initially allowed in
order to induce foreign capital investments. They usually raised their loanable funds by
way of inter-office borrowings from their head offices in foreign countries. To increase
the inflow of foreign capital, the Korean government has given them preferential
treatment, by expanding swap facilities with the BOK, guaranteeing yields on swap
transactions and excluding them from liquidity controls, thus assuring healthy profit
margins.
Even though they are established under the General Banking Act, foreign bank
branches have not been subject to the same rules as domestic commercial banks. Since
1984, the Korean government has been gradually implementing a program of national
treatment of foreign bank branches.
Metropolitan Cities (which are relatively large cities) and nine Provinces.
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Some discriminatory regulations on their business activities have thus been lifted.
Foreign bank branches are now permitted to access rediscount facilities at the BOK for
export financing and general commercial bills; engage in the trust business; issue
negotiable certificates of deposits; and borrow funds from the BOK, in order to finance
possible shortages of reserve requirements or settlement funds.
At the same time, their business operation privileges have also been decreased.
The BOK has gradually reduced their swap facilities and lowered their guaranteed yield
on swap transactions. Starting in 1985, they are also become subject to the compulsory
lending ratios for small and medium-size firms.
3.	 Specialised Banks
In the 1 960s, seven specialised banks were established under an equal number of special
bank acts. They were created to serve in areas where the commercial banks did not meet
the growing financial needs of specific economic sectors and to offer specialised financial
services. Three of these banks were subsequently converted into commercial banks.
Currently, four specialised banks remain in existence: the Industrial Bank of Korea, the
credit and banking sector of the National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation (NACF),
the credit and banking sector of the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives
(NFFC) and its member cooperative, and the credit and banking sector of the National
Livestock Cooperatives Federation (NLCF).
The Industrial Bank of Korea was established in 1961 to provide financial support
for small and medium-size businesses, which faced difficulties, compared with large
20
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firms, in raising funds and borrowing money from the commercial banks. Most of its
capital was subscribed by the government, and the remainder, by the National Federation
of Small and Medium Industry Cooperatives. It is authorised to accept any type of
deposits which commercial banks are allowed to accept and to issue Small and Medium
Industry Finance Debentures, supported by government guarantees, up to ten times the
amount of its paid-in capital and reserves. As in the case of commercial banks, its
operational funds come mainly from public deposits. Its credit extending business is,
however, restricted to financing small and medium-size businesses by making loans and
discounts, making equity investments or underwriting debentures with the approval of the
MoFE)°
The NACF and its member cooperatives were established in 1961 to help the
agricultural program develop effectively. The NFFC and its member cooperatives were
established in 1962 to help fishermen and fisheries manufacturers. The NLCF and its
member cooperatives were established in 1981 to promote the development of the
livestock industry. The credit and banking sectors of the NACF, the NFFC and its
member cooperatives, and the NLCF are aimed to serve in the areas of farming and
agricultural projects, fishing and the manufacturing of fishing equipment, and livestock
farming, respectively. They engage in almost the same lines of business as those of the
commercial banks. Their major financial resources come from public deposits and
borrowings from the government and the BOK. Their lending to non-members is
restricted to the amount of non-member deposits, less the legal reserve requirements.
10 As an exception, the Industrial Bank of Korea is permitted to fmance local self-governing bodies, non-
profit organisation, and households, with up to ten per cent of its operational resources, less the legal
reserve requirements.
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The specialised banks have the following features:
First, they are owned by the government or by the members of associations of
cooperatives. The Industrial Bank of Korea is a government owned nk' The NACF,
the NFFC and the NLCF are owned by the members of the respective associations.
Second, the specialised banks were, in principle, directed and supervised by the
government (the Ministry of Finance and Economy, or MoFE) under the special acts by
which they were established. Under the revamped system of financial regulation,
introduced in 1998, the NACF, the NFFC and its member cooperatives, and the NLCF are
now regulated and supervised by the new financial regulatory and supervisory
authorities.' 2 The Industrial Bank of Korea was, and continues to be, legally placed
outside the jurisdiction of the financial supervisory authorities. Legally, the MoFE and
the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI)' 3 are given the job of examining its financial
position. Nonetheless, the MoFE and the BAT have delegated their powers regarding the
examination of the Industrial Bank of Korea to the Office of Bank Supervision (OBS). In
practice, the MoFE and the BAT typically examine the head office of the Industrial Bank
of Korea, while the OBS examines its branches.
Although the acts establishing the specialised banks restrict the application of
certain provisions of the General Banking Act, these institutions have been subject to the
monetary and credit policies of the Monetary Board of the BOK as far as their
11 However, under the privatisation program, the government's share of the Industrial Bank of Korea was
decreased from 99.9 per cent to 64.5 per cent in 1995.
12 Under the old system, the NACF, the NFFC and its member cooperatives, and the NLCF were regulated
by the Ministry of Finance and Economy. But the establishment acts required the Office of Bank
Supervision of the Bank of Korea to examine them.
13 The Board of Audit and Inspection, which is responsible directly to the President, carries out the
accounting audit and the business inspection of the central government and certain public organisations, as
22
Chapter One
commercial banking business is concerned.
Finally, the specialised banks, in addition to taking deposits from the general
public, can also borrow government funds and issue debentures as part of their financing
operations. In actual practice, however, the amounts of funds borrowed from the
government and debentures issued are very small compared with deposits from the
public. This indicates that the specialised banks compete directly with the commercial
banks in acquiring deposits.'4
Although the commercial banks and the special banks are separately established,
classified and regulated, the degree of functional separation has been reduced.' 5 The
specialised banks have expanded their businesses into commercial banking areas, while
the commercial banks have been required to also serve the sectors where the specialised
banks have been active. The commercial banks must provide various "policy loans",'6
and are also subject to regulations setting out lending ratios for small and medium-size
businesses. Therefore, although a relatively high proportion of the specialised banks'
lending goes to their respective sectors, there is no significant functional difference
between the commercial banks and the specialised banks.
4.	 Non-bank Financial Institutions
Korean non-bank financial institutions are non-monetary institutions, most of which were
provided by legislation.
14 Bank of Korea, Financial System in Korea, op. cit., n. 5, pp. 95-96.
See W. C. Chung, Financial Reform (1991), pp. 174-76; P. J. Kim and Y. C. Park, Korean Economy and
Finance (1984), pp. 3 84-86.16 "Policy loans" are provided under various selective credit programs, for the purpose of fostering a
specific industry or achieving a goal of economic policy. They involve advantageous conditions of
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introduced in the 1970s. During the rapid Korean economic growth, they have
significantly expanded, both in terms of numbers and of volume of funds. They have
been permitted to offer relatively higher interest rates and more autonomy in
management, compared to commercial banking institutions. Based on their business
activities, they can be broadly classified into five categories: development banks,
investment houses, savings institutions, insurance companies and other institutions.
First, development banks comprise the Korea Development Bank and the Korea
Export-Import Bank. They provide mainly medium to long-term loans and credits to the
key economic sectors, which they finance with government funds, funds from foreign
capital, or by issuing special bonds. The Korea Development Bank provides financial
assistance to the development plan and governmental industrial projects. The Export-
Import Bank of Korea engages in medium and long-term financing for export-import
transactions, overseas investment, and overseas natural resource development projects.
Second, investment houses act as financial intermediaries in the money and capital
markets. They consist of merchant banking corporations, securities investment trust
companies, and the Korea Securities Finance Corporation. The merchant banking
corporations were established in 1976.17 The six initial merchant banking corporations
were aimed at inducing and borrowing foreign currency after the first oil shock. In 1991,
nine investment finance companies,' 8 mainly based outside Seoul, converted into
financing, such as favourable interest rates and terms or collateral and preferential fund availability.
17 See B. D. Kim, "Strategic Positioning of Merchant Banks During the Restructuring Process of Financial
Industry," Korea Institute of Finance Finance Research Paper No. 97-09 (Oct. 1997), pp. 4-7.
18 The investment finance companies were introduced in 1972 for the purpose of absorbing kerb market
funds into the organised and regulated financial market. Their main business was short-term financing,
financed by means of the issuance of their own paper, as well as discounting, selling, accepting and
guaranteeing commercial paper issued by business firms.
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merchant banking corporations. The remaining fifteen investment finance companies
converted in 1996. The merchant banking corporations have engaged in short-term
finance. The securities investment trust companies engage in trust business in the
securities market. The Korea Securities Finance Corporation serves areas relating to the
securities market.
Third, savings institutions consist of the trust business of banking institutions,
mutual savings and finance companies, credit unions, mutual credit facilities, community
credit cooperatives, and postal savings. The trust business of banking institutions is
allowed as means of activities diversification. It entails receiving money in trust, which is
similar to long-term deposits, but the returns are slightly higher than the interest rates on
time and savings deposits. Mutual savings and finance companies, credit unions, mutual
credit facilities and community credit cooperatives grant small loans, with funds collected
in the form of time deposits. Postal savings entail the collection of demand deposits and
time and savings deposits by the post offices. Postal savings are free of reserve
requirements, and the government guarantees the repayment of deposits.
Fourth, insurance institutions consist of life insurance companies and the postal
insurance. The Korean insurance system is divided into life and non-life insurance. No
insurance company may engage in both businesses at the same time. Korean life
insurance has characteristics similar to savings deposits. The postal insurance entails the
provision of life insurance services by the post offices.
Finally, securities companies, investment advisory companies, non-life insurance
companies, leasing companies, venture capital companies, and instalment credit
companies are classified as other non-bank financial institutions. Although they do not
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act as financial intermediaries, these institutions do function as supplementary financial
institutions.
II. LEGAL SOURCES OF BANKING REGULATION
A. The Bank of Korea Act
1. Enactment of the Bank of Korea Act
After Korea's liberation from Japan in 1945, the sudden separation of the national
economy from the Japanese economic orbit produced serious dislocation in the financial
system.' 9 The collapse of the Japanese-run sector of the economy resulted in the
disappearance of significant sources of finance and users of funds. The Korean financial
institutions could no longer float their debentures in Japan or hold deposits of Japanese
enterprises. The Korean enterprises did not generate or require significant cash holdings.
Furthermore, the runaway inflation led to financial decline after 1945. During this period,
businesses and individuals were reluctant to hold financial assets, so the sources of bank
funds were severely limited. Since interest rates on bank loans were below the prevailing
inflation rates, borrowers were reluctant to pay back bank loans.
Faced with such economic disorder, the Bank of Chosun suggested the creation of
a new central bank in 1947. The U.S. Military Government also set up a committee for
drafting financial laws in March 1948. However, the committee was abolished five
months later, without producing any draft legislation, when the U.S. Military Government
19 See generally B. K. Kim, Central Banking Experiment in a Developing Economy: Case Study of Korea
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was abolished and a new Korean government established.
Towards the end of 1948, the Bank of Chosun again proposed the creation of a
central bank. In 1949, the newly established government organised a committee to draft a
central bank act. In the spring of 1950, the Korean government invited Arthur I.
Bloomfield and John P. Jensen, both of whom held positions in the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York. The two Americans produced a draft for a central bank act, utilising earlier
drafts produced by both the Bank of Chosun and the governmental committee. Their
draft was partially amended, and then passed by the National Assembly in April 1950.
The new central bank, the Bank of Korea, was finally established on 12 June 1950.
2. Subsequent Amendment of the Bank of Korea Act
The Bank of Korea Act envisaged the creation of a strong, relatively autonomous central
bank. 2° The BOK was intended to concentrate primarily on the conduct of monetary
policy and the supervision of banks, with a view to controlling inflation and developing
the financial system. The act created a Monetary Board within the BOK, with
responsibilities for setting monetary policy and overseeing the commercial banking
system. The Monetary Board was required to implement forceful anti-inflationary
policies and to create stable conditions, favourable to financial growth and further
institutional reform.2'
These initial goals of the Bank of Korea Act were not achieved. Within two
weeks from the establishment of the BOK, the Korean War began in June 1950. Most of
(1965), chapter 3.
20 See generally A. I. B loonifield and J. P. Jensen, Banking Reform in South Korea (1951).
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the objectives of the act were abandoned or severely weakened in order to finance the
war. After the war, the Korean financial system was required to finance the necessary
industrial and agricultural projects for economic rehabilitation.
Following the advent of the military government in 1961, a number of reforms
were undertaken. First, the government introduced economic development plans and
restructured the financial system, turning it into a tool for supporting such plans. Second,
since the governmental economic development plans relied mainly on foreign credits, the
government also assumed additional powers with regard to foreign currency controls.
Third, in 1962, an amendment to the Bank of Korea Act entrenched the supremacy of the
government, especially the then Ministry of Finance (now the MoFE), over the Monetary
Board. 22
 Under the Bank of Korea Act of 1950, the BOK, as a quasi-autonomous central
bank, had extensive powers over monetary, credit and foreign exchange business
operations. 23
 The amendment, however, deprived the BOK of its independent central
banking powers and allowed interventions in the conduct of monetary policy and the
internal management of the BOK. 24
 In this manner, the government strengthened its
influence over the BOK. In particular, the amendment gave the Minister of Finance
powers to request the Monetary Board to reconsider resolutions it had adopted, 25 as well
as to examine the business of the BOK. 26
 The budget of the BOK also became subject to
21 Cole and Park, op. cit., n. 1. p. 64.
22 The initial Bank of Korea Act of 1950 recognised the importance of the governmental role in the
Monetary Board. For example, the government had a majority of the votes, while the Minister of Finance
was to be the chairman.
23 Bank of Korea, Commentary on the Bank of Korea Act (1986), p. 6.
24 Y. C. Park and D. W. Kim, "Korea: Development and Structural Change of the Banking System", in H.
1. Patrick and Y. C. Park eds., The Financial Development of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (1994), p. 192.
25 Bank of Korea Act art. 39, ci. 1.
26 Ibid. art. 40.
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governmental control. 27
 Furthermore, in pursuance to the Foreign Exchange Control Act,
regulatory powers over foreign exchange business were transferred to the Ministry of
Finance.
3. Revised Bank of Korea Act
In the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, the Bank of Korea Act was revised. 28 The
Revised Bank of Korea Act removes the government's control over the BOK and
designates the BOK as the monetary authority. It also mandates price stability as the sole
objective of the BOK. 29
 Under the revised act, the BOK is responsible to implement its
monetary policies in accordance with market principles and to harmonise its policies with
the government's economic policies, but only in so far as this does not conflict with the
BOK's main objective of maintaining price stability. 30
 The revised act transfers the
banking regulatory and supervisory responsibilities from the BOK to the Financial
Supervisory Commission. However, the BOK retains a limited supervisory role in its
capacity as the lender of last resort.
27 An amendment to the Bank of Korea Act in 1982 restored the budgetary powers of the Monetary Board.
28 In July 1997, the Korean government introduced a plan to reform the central banking and financial
supervisory systems and submitted thirteen financial reform bills. Due to objections from the financial
supervisory organisations, those bills were not enacted until the IMF stepped in. On 29 December 1997,
following the Stand-By Arrangement between the Korean government and the IMF that required financial
sector restructuring, the bills were finally enacted in the course of a special session of the National
Assembly.
29 Revised Bank of Korea Act art. 1.
30 Ibid. art. 4.
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B. The General Banking Act
1.	 Legislative History of the General Banking Act
The General Banking Act is the fundamental law for banking activities and operations. It
provides the principal structure of commercial banking regulation. Its primary objectives
are the sound operation of banks, the protection of depositors, and the maintenance of the
credit system in the interest of national economic progress.3'
Following the drafting of the Bank of Korea Act, it was considered necessary also
to enact laws governing commercial banks. Once more, Bloomfield and Jensen were
enlisted to make recommendations relating to the restructuring of banking institutions.
The Korean government then drafted a banking bill based on their recommendations. In
1950, the National Assembly enacted the measure, simultaneously with the Bank of
Korea Act. Unlike the Bank of Korea Act, the General Banking Act did not take effect
immediately, because the preconditions for its operation, such as the selling off of
confiscated bank shares and an increase of banks' capital, were not met before the Korean
War broke out. Therefore, the General Banking Act actually came into effect in 1954,
after the end of the war. During the intervening period, banks were regulated in
accordance with the Banking Order of the Japanese colonial rule and certain provisions of
the Bank of Korea Act, which had the same purposes as the General Banking Act.
The General Banking Act of 1950 created a regulatory framework basically aimed
at the protection of depositors by means of safeguarding banks against failure and runs in
31 General Banking Act art. 1; Revised General Banking Act art. 1.
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the context of a privately owned commercial banking system. 32 Thereafter, the General
Banking Act was amended several times, usually in tandem with amendments of the Bank
of Korea Act. During the I 960s and I 970s, the act was amended to implement tight
governmental control over the banking system with the aim of mobilising financial
savings and allocating them to support and carry out government-led development
programs. 33
 After the beginning of the financial liberalisation and bank privatisation
process, the act was amended to give banks some autonomy in their management and to
implement such measures of prudential regulation as were deemed to be necessary in the
newly liberalised, market oriented banking environment.
The General Banking Act was revised in January 1998. The revised act reforms
the commercial banking regulatory system, defines the responsibilities of banks'
management and deregulates banking operations.
2. Scope of the General Banking Act34
The General Banking Act35 applies to banking institutions operating in Korea. 36 Banking
institutions are defined as (1) all juridical persons, other than the BOK, which (2)
regularly and systematically engage in banking business. 37 In its turn, banking business is
defined as (3) the business of lending funds (4) acquired through the assumption of
32 Park and Kim, op. cit., n. 24, p. 192.
33 1'bid.,p. 193.
34 See generally Bank of Korea, Com,nentaiy on the General Banking Act (1987).
Hereinafter, references to the General Banking Act are to the Revised General Banking Act. However, in
cases where a comparison of the two versions is necessary, the Revised General Banking Act will be
specified. In the footnotes, for the purposes of such comparison, the current act is cited as Revised General
Banking Act, while the old act is cited as General Banking Act.
36 Revised General Banking Act art. 3, ci. 1.
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obligations to the public by way of accepting deposits and issuing securities or other
evidence of indebtedness.38
All four criteria must be met for an institution to fall within the definition of a
banking institution under the General Banking Act. First, a banking institution raises its
resources from either (1) accepting deposits or (2) issuing securities or debentures. A
banking institution can accept various types of deposits, comprising demand and savings
and time deposits, but it does not need to accept all types of deposits. By accepting any
deposit, this criterion will be met. 39 Issuing securities or debentures also comes within
the definition. 40 Therefore, engaging in lending business by acquiring funds through
issuing securities in domestic securities market is open only to banking institutions under
the General Banking Act, unless permitted by way of special act. 4 ' Until 1991, the
General Banking Act required the enactment of other laws for the issuance by the
commercial banks of securities or other debentures. An amendment to the General
Banking Act in 1991 required a presidential decree for the issuance of such instruments.
While the specialised banks and the foreign bank branches were permitted to issue such
instruments under their respective special acts and the foreign currency control acts, the
nationwide and local commercial banks were not generally permitted to issue securities or
debentures until the presidential decree was amended in February 1997. Under the
revised act and the current presidential decree, the total volume of debentures and other
Ibid. art. 2, ci. 1, no. 2.
38 Ibid, art. 2, ci. 1, no. 1.
Bank of Korea, Commentary on the General Banking Act, op cit., n. 34, pp. 29-30.
40 Ibid., pp. 30-3 1.
41 The Office of Bank Supervision decision, No. Kwanszm 912-1286 (15 Dec. 1977).
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bonds issued by a commercial bank is restricted to five times its equity.42
Second, a banking institution engages in lending business. This criterion does not
prohibit the banking institution from engaging in other businesses, such as securities
investment, with funds collected in the form of deposits. To constitute a banking
institution, however, an institution must engage both in acquiring funds from the public
and in lending business. An institution, which engages only in one of these activities is
not a banking institution.
Third, a banking institution must carry on its banking business, as defined,
regularly and systematically. The term "regularly" means that the banking institution
should engage in its business repeatedly and continuously. 43 Accordingly, an institution
which engages in banking business temporarily or accidentally, is not a banking
institution. A banking institution should have the operational systems and facilities, such
as management and operations personnel, capital, a business place, a business name, and
bookkeeping facilities, necessary for carrying on its business on a systematic basis.
Finally, a banking institution must be a juridical person. A natural person or
partnership of individuals cannot engage in banking business. In practice, all Korean
domestic commercial banks are limited companies, established under the Commercial
Code.
Under the General Banking Act, the credit and banking sector of the NACF, the
NFFC and its member cooperatives, and the NLCF are deemed to be banking
42 Revised General Banking Act art. 33; Enforcement Decree on the Revised General Banking Act art. 19.
'3 Bank of Korea, Commentary on the General Banking Act, op. cit., n. 34, p. 32.
Revised General Banking Act art. 4.
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institutions.45
 In addition, the General Banking Act clarifies that its provisions do not
apply to insurance companies and companies which engage exclusively in the business of
mutual savings and finance or in the trust business. 46
 Under the definition of banking
institution in the General Banking Act, the specialised banks are banking institutions.
However, the specialised bank acts which established these banks, restrict the General
Banking Act's application.47
 The General Banking Act also applies to the overseas
branches and offices of Korean banks, even though its scope is defined in terms of "any
banking institutions operating in Korea".48 Finally, the General Banking Act applies to
the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities. Even though this is not expressly
stated, the banking regulators and supervisors are required, by necessary implication, to
follow its provisions.
C. Specialised Bank Acts
Currently, there are four specialised bank statutes: the Industrial Bank of Korea Act, the
National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation Act, the National Federation of Fisheries
Cooperatives Act, and the National Livestock Cooperatives Federation Act. They
stipulate the structures of specialised banks, their ownership provisions, and the scope
and type of their businesses. In the hierarchy of Korean law, a special statutory provision
takes precedence over a more general one. As compared to the Bank of Korea Act and
the General Banking Act, the specialised bank acts are such special laws. All specialised
Ibid. art. 5.
46 Ibid. art. 6.
a See Industrial Bank of Korea Act arts. 3; Industrial Bank of Korea Act art. 52.
48 See Revised General Banking Act art. 3, ci. 1 (emphasis added).
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bank acts contain provisions which restrict the application of the Bank of Korea Act and
the General Banking Act.49
D. Act Concerning the Establishment of Financial Supervisory
Organisations
In July 1997, together with twelve financial reform bills, the government submitted a bill
Concerning the Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations. All these bills
were enacted on 29 December 1997, coming into effect on 1 April 1998. The Act
Concerning the Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations establishes a new
financial regulatory and supervisory framework. The Financial Supervisory Commission
(FSC), established under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, is responsible for
promulgating and amending supervisory rules and authorising the business activities and
operations of financial iflstitutiofls. 50
 The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) is
responsible for overseeing the securities and futures markets under the guidance of the
FSC.51
 The vice-chairman of the FSC is to hold the position of chairman of the SFC.52
Under the Act, the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) was established as a special
juridical person on 2 January 1 999•53 The FSS is responsible for inspecting, auditing, and
sanctioning financial institutions under the direction of the FSC and the SFC.54
' See, eg.. Industrial Bank of Korea Act ait 52.
50 Act Concerning the Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations art. 3; Act Concerning the
Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations art. 17. Although it is formally placed under the
Prime Minister, in accordance with Article 3 of the Act the FSC shall perform its functions independently
from the Prime Minister.
Ibid. art. 19.
52 Ibid. art. 20, ci. 2.
Ibid. art. 24; Ibid. Addenda art. 1.
Ibid. art. 37.
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E.	 Depositor Protection Act
The Depositor Protection Act was enacted in 1995 for the purpose of introducing a
deposit insurance scheme for commercial banks. 55
 A 1997 amendment to the Depositor
Protection Act, forming part of the package of financial reform bills, consolidated the
various investor protection schemes, which were already in existence for particular
groups of financial institutions, into the deposit insurance fund, the Korea Deposit
Insurance Corporation (KDIC), but retained a system of separate accounts for each group
of financial institutions.
Under the act, the KDIC is responsible for managing and operating the deposit
insurance fund; levying the insurance premiums and making payments out of the fund;
and liquidating insolvent financial institutions. 56
 The KDIC is operated by an Operation
Committee. The Operation Committee consists of the President of the KDIC; the Vice
Minister of the MoFE; the vice-chairman of the FSC; the Deputy Governor of the BOK;
the Presidents of the Korea Federation of Banks, Securities Industry, Life Insurance
Industry, Non-Life Insurance Industry, Merchant Banks, Mutual Savings and Finance
Companies, and Credit Unions; and two members appointed by the Minister of the
MoFE, on the recommendation of the President of the KDIC. 57 The MoFE is responsible
for regulating and supervising the operations of the KDIC. The MoFE also has the power
Korean deposit insurance schemes for particular sectors of the financial industry have been introduced
since 1983. Deposit insurance schemes were introduced for merchant banking corporations and mutual
savings and finance companies in 1983; for credit unions, in 1984; for insurance companies, in 1989; and
for securities companies, in 1997.
56 Depositor Protection Act art. 18.
Ibid. art. 9.
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to approve the KDIC's budget.
III. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF BANKING REGULATION
AND SUPERVISION
A. Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Structure until 1998
The previous Korean banking law system divided the banking regulatory and supervisory
functions between two main regulators, the Bank of Korea (BOK) and the Ministry of
Finance and Economy (M0FE). In the BOK, the Monetary Board and the Office of Bank
Supervision (OBS) were responsible for regulating and supervising commercial banks.
The MoFE was responsible for regulating and supervising specialised banks.58
1.	 The Monetary Board of the Bank of Korea
The Monetary Board was the supreme policy-making organ of the BOK. 59 It formulated
monetary and credit policy in Korea, and was also responsible for regulating and
supervising Korean banking institutions, i.e. the commercial banks. When the Bank of
Korea Act was enacted in 1950, the Monetary Board was the main regulator of all Korean
financial sectors, because the nationwide commercial banks comprised almost the entire
58 The MoFE was created in 1994, with the merger of the Ministry of Finance and the Economic Plaiming
Board. Before the creation of the MoFE, the Ministry of Finance was responsible for regulating and
supervising the specialised banks.
There were two conflicting views on the legal nature of the Monetary Board. See Bank of Korea,
Planning & Coordination Department, Commentary on the Bank of Korea Act by Subject (1990), PP. 62-65.
The first view was that the Monetary Board was not part of the Bank of Korea. According to this view, the
Monetary Board was an external institution, which designed policies for implementation by the Bank of
Korea and supervised it. In other words, the Monetary Board was merely physically located in the Bank of
Korea, rather than forming part of its internal organisation. The second view argued that, on the contrary,
the Monetary Board was an organ of the BOK, which was given specific responsibilities in the context of
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financial market. Establishing specialised banks in the 1970s and designating the then
Ministry of Finance as their regulator and supervisor turned the Monetary Board into the
commercial bank regulator under the Bank of Korea Act and the General Banking Act.
The Monetary Board licensed and authorised important commercial banking businesses
and activities, including branching; directed the OBS with regard to the supervision and
examination of banking institutions; and decided on the conduct of banking activities,
including minimum capital ratios, lending limits, terms and conditions of long-term
deposits, and ceilings on aggregate lending amounts. It also had the power to recommend
to a bank's general meeting of shareholders the replacement of officers who wilfully
violated banking laws and regulations; order the bank to cease or suspend its operations;
and revoke its authorisation for carrying on banking business.
The board consisted of the Minister of MoFE (the Minister), who would be the
chairman of the board, the Governor of the BOK (the Governor), and seven other
members.6° The President appointed all members. The Minister was appointed under the
Constitution Law. The Governor was appointed on the recommendation of the
Minister. 6 ' Of the other seven members, five were appointed on the recommendation of
government ministers62 and two by the Board of Representatives of Banking Institutions,
which consisted of representatives of all banking jnstjtutjons.63 The MoFE administrated
all matters relating to appointments. Legally, the President could not appoint any of the
performing its objectives.
60 Bank of Korea Act art. 8.
61 Ibid. art. 23, ci. 1.
62 Of these five members, one was recommended by the then Economic Planning Board (current the
M0FE); two, by the Ministry of Agnculture, Forestry, and Fisheries; and two, by the Ministry of Trade and
Industry.
63 See Bank of Korea Act art. 7; Enforcement Decree of the Bank of Korea Act art. 2.
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seven members without the requisite recommendation. However, in practice, no
recommendation was ever made against the President's presumed intention.
The board's resolutions were usually taken by a majority of those board members
who were present.64
 In case of a tie, the Minister, in his capacity as chairman, had the
casting vote. The Minister had the power to request the Monetary Board to reconsider
resolutions already adopted. 65
 Since there was no limit to the power to request a
reconsideration, the Minister could exercise such power whenever he disagreed with a
particular resolution. When the Minister requested a reconsideration, the Monetary Board
was bound to review its position. If a two-third majority of the board members confirmed
the resolution, the President would then make the final decision. 66
 In practice, the BOK
consulted the MoFE before planning or implementing major monetary and banking
regulation policies.67
2. Office of Bank Supervision of the Bank of Korea
The Office of Bank Supervision (OBS), established in the BOK and headed by a
Superintendent, supervised and examined commercial banks under the direction of the
Monetary Board. 68
 Even though it formed part of the BOK, the OBS was distinguished
from the other organs of the BOK.
First, the appointment procedures were different. Unlike other officers of the
64 Bank of Korea Act art. 17, ci. 2.
65 Ibid. art. 39, ci. 1. The power to request the reconsideration of resolutions was enacted in 1962.
66 Ibid. art. 39, ci. 2.
67 See Bank of Korea Research Department, The Main Points of Reshaping the Central Banking and
Financial Supervision System in Korea (Jan. 1998), p. 1.68 Bank of Korea Act art. 28; General Banking Act art. 7; General Banking Act art. 32.
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BOK, the Superintendent was appointed by the President, on the recommendation of the
Monetary Board. The Deputy Superintendent and the Assistant Superintendents were
appointed by the Monetary Board, on the request of the Governor and following a
recommendation by the Superintendent. The Directors of its departments were appointed
and removed by the Monetary Board, also on the request of the Governor and following a
recommendation by the Superintendent. Lower-ranking employees were appointed and
removed by the Governor after consultation with the Superintendent. Therefore, the
Governor participated in the Superintendent appointment process in his capacity as a
member of the Monetary Board, rather than that of head of the BOK. As for the other
senior appointments, the Governor exercised the right to request them in his capacity as
the head of the BOK. The Governor only directly appointed and removed the lower-
ranking employees of the OBS.
Second, the Governor's role over the OBS's operations was limited. The OBS
was directed and supervised by the Monetary Board. The Governor had no power to
direct and supervise its actions, which were authonsed by the Bank of Korea Act and the
General Banking Act; he could only intervene as a member of the Monetary Board.
The OBS was responsible for enforcing operating regulations. It evaluated
commercial banks' applications for authorisation by the Monetary Board; 69 it could
authorise banking activities within the powers delegated by the Monetary Board under the
Bank of Korea Act and the General Banking Act; 7° it had powers to formulate, order or
direct banking activities. It also had responsibility to inspect and examine all commercial
69 General Banking Act art. 9, ci. 1; Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking institutions
(Monetary Board), chapters 2-3.
70 General Banking Act art. 9, ci. 2.
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banks, the NACF, the NFFC and its member cooperatives, and the NLCF. 7 ' It was
required to conduct periodic examinations at least once per year, without prior notice.
For the periodic examination, the OBS examined a bank's head offices and about ten per
cent of its branches, which were specially selected every year. The scope of the periodic
examination covered all activities and operations of the bank. The OBS could also carry
out a special examination when a bank's situation raised imminent policy issues or there
were other serious problems. Following an examination, the OBS should report to the
Monetary Board on its results.
3. Ministry of Finance and Economy
The Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoFE) occupied the central administrative
position in the Korean financial system. Its main responsibilities included: the
compilation of the budget; taxation; the management of national finance; the
establishment of economic and social development policies; the regulation of the
currency and the financial system; foreign exchange control; and control of overseas
economic affairs. The MoFE drafted and presented to the National Assembly bills
concerning banking regulation. It also had powers to issue ministerial decrees.
Under the Enforcement Decree on the Organisation of the Ministry of Finance and
Economy, which was issued on the authority of the Government Organisation Act, 72 the
' The NACF Act, the NFFC Act, and the NLCF Act provide that the provisions on bank examination of
the General Banking Act also apply to the NACF, the NFFC and its member cooperatives, and the NLCF.
72 Presidential Decree No. 14,438 of 1994. By stipulating many regulatory matters as functions of the
ministry, this Presidential Decree, however, conflicted with the Bank of Korea Act. Under the Bank of
Korea Act, the MoFE should transfer all powers, duties and functions, which should consequently be
exercised by the Bank of Korea. Bank of Korea Act art. 109. The previous Enforcement Decree on the
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MoFE had powers to regulate and supervise the BOK, the financial regulation system,
and the specialised banks. With regard to the BOK, the MoFE was responsible for
approving the amendments to the Articles of Incorporation of the BOK; received the
statement of accounts of the BOK; appointed the Auditor of the BOK; and examined the
business of the BOK. 73
 With regard to commercial banking, the decree stipulated that the
MoFE was responsible for establishing and supervising the financial regulatory system
and for deciding on policy issues regarding the banking industry, as well as for exercising
control over banks' lending.
The MoFE was also responsible for directing and supervising the specialised
banks. It approved their operation plans and business activities, including fund raising
and lending plans, interest rates, and lending limits to single borrowers. It could request
reports and statistical data from the specialised banks for supervisory purposes. It also
recommended nominees for the chairmanship of the board of directors, the presidency,
and the auditorship of the Industrial Bank of Korea to the President, who had the power to
appoint these officers.
B. New Commercial Banking Regulatory and Supervisory System74
During the recent financial crisis, Korea established a new commercial banking regulatory
and supervisory system. Under the reformed system, a Financial Supervisory
Organisation of the Ministry of Finance included more explicit provisions, under which the ministry could
take direct charge of the direction of commercial banks' management. The 1994 decree removed some
direct powers from the reorganised MoFE, but the basic structure remained in place.
However, the MoFE had not exercised the business examination since 1982.
For further discussion of the new Korean commercial banking regulatory and supervisory system, see
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Commission (FSC) was established for the purpose of assuming banking regulatory and
supervisory responsibilities, including the promulgation and amendment from time to
time of supervisory rules and the authorisation of the business activities and operations of
the financial institutions. In May 1999, the FSC was also granted authority to license
commercial banks and to supervise specialised banks, in so far as prudential matters are
concerned. Under the direction of the FSC, a Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) has
been given responsibility for supervising and examining financial institutions.
As part of the revamped system, the Revised Bank of Korea Act designates the
BOK as the monetary authority and mandates price stability as its sole objective.
Regarding banking supervision, the BOK is only given a limited role as a lender of last
resort. In addition, the new system removes substantial powers from the MoFE. The
MoFE no longer retains the chairmanship of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC),
which is the policy making organ of the BOK. The MoFE's authority over banking
regulation and supervision is now limited to its representation by a member to the FSC
and a power to request data from the FSC.
IV. THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF KOREAN BANKING
REGULATION
A. Evolution and Types of Korean Banking Regulations
The Korean banking industry is one of the most extensively regulated areas of the Korean
economy. Past and current bank regulations have interfered with almost every aspect of
banking business and operation. The evolution of Korean banking regulatory norms can
Chapter Four Section V A.
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be divided into four periods based on development stages: creation period (1950-1960),
extensive regulation period (1961-1982), deregulation period (1982-1997), and reform
period (1998-present).
The creation period began with the enactment of the Bank of Korea Act and the
General Banking Act. Enacted in 1950, when the present Korean banking regulation
system was created, these two acts were initially intended, as discussed above, to create a
competitive and independent banking system, with privately owned commercial banks.
However, at this stage, the regulatory and supervisory system and detailed bank
regulations had not yet been fuiiy developed.
The extensive regulation period started when the military government came to
power in 1961 and government-led economic development plans were undertaken.
During this period, the Korean banking system came under tight governmental control
and was subjected to various types of regulatory and supervisory measures, promulgated
under the amended Bank of Korea Act and General Banking Act.
Following nationwide commercial bank privatisation in the early 1980s, the
deregulation period was launched. In this phase, as will be discussed later on, some
governmental controls and interventions were eased and several deregulation programs
were launched. At the same time, new forms of regulatory measures, such as prudential
regulations, were introduced.
Finally, the economic and financial crisis, which began in 1997, precipitated
substantial financial and banking reform, especially with regard to the regulatory and
supervisory system.
Korean banking regulations can be divided as either structural or conduct.
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Conduct regulations can be further classified as economic, allocative, prudential or
consumer protection oriented. Structural regulation comprises regulatory measures
concerned with the structure of an industry. Through such regulations, the government
decides which firms or individuals are allowed to engage in particular types of business;
which activities they can engage in; and where they engage in such activities. Conduct
regulation comprises regulatory measures concerned with how a particular industry
should conduct business in its chosen field of activity. 75
 The following sections discuss
the Korean banking regulation framework, together with its historical development, based
on the above classification. They focus on the development of banking regulations up to
1997, together with the reforms undertaken since 1998.
B.	 Structural Regulation
Korean banking structural regulations generally encompass rules on entry authorisation,
branching restrictions, banking activity limitations, and bank ownership controls.
1.	 Entry Control
Entry control is a typical example of regulatory intervention over industry structure. The
On different types of regulation, see Kay and J. Vickers, "Regulation Reform in Britain," 6 Economic
Policy 286 (1988).
The distinction between structural and conduct, however, is sometimes blurred. For example, a
restriction on banks' ability to offer a particular service might be seen as a form of conduct regulation. The
industry participants' behaviour in the market is determined by structural conditions, especially by the
conditions of entry. Moreover, those two categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In a number of
cases, structural regulation and conduct regulation are alternatives to each other. For example, entry
barriers can be lowered to combat anti-competitive behaviour. Conduct regulation can also be used to alter
the structure of the industry by encouraging new entry. Despite such blurring of conceptual lines and
overlap, the categories provide a useful way of organising and separating the types of regulatory
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traditional method of bank entry control involves the licensing or chartering of banking
institutions. By requiring entry criteria, such as minimum start-up capital requirements,
regulators can effectively shape the banking market structure, where only those who fulfil
such criteria can engage in the business. In Korea, before being able to legally engage in
banking business, an institution must obtain a charter from the appropriate authorities.
Until April 1998, the Monetary Board of the BOK had the power to charter commercial
banks. Under the Revised General Banking Act, the MoFE was responsible for the
licensing of specialised banks. The MoFE was also responsible for authorising foreign
bank branches. From May 1999 onwards, the FSC has assumed the licensing function
with regard to commercial banks in Korea.
Commercial banking business can be carried on by creating a new bank or by
converting existing non-bank financial institutions into banks. The Monetary Board used
to be responsible for deciding whether a commercial bank charter should be granted.
Before its final deliberation on the matter, the OBS of the BOK was responsible to
evaluate the application and make recommendations to the Monetary Board. The original
General Banking Act provided several authorisation criteria: 76
 the adequacy of the capital,
the integrity of the institution's founders or managing group, the contribution to the
public interests and the minimum start-up capital requirement.77
The authorisation procedure was stipulated by the Monetary Board and the OBS.
interventions.
76 General Bankmg Act art. 12; General Banking Act art. 16.
Under the Revised General Banking Act, the commercial bank chartering authorities, should check: (1)
the feasibility of the applicant institution's business plan, (2) the adequacy of its capital, the composition of
its shareholders and the subscription funds for shares, (4) the integrity and ability of its founders or
managing group, and (5) the potential contribution to public interests. See Revised General Banking Act art
8, ci. 2; Revised General Banking Act art. 9.
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An applicant was required to submit an application for preliminary authorisation. The
OBS also required the applicant to submit a statement on the activities which the
applicant proposed to carry on, an operating plan, future earnings prospects and dividend
proposals for three years after establishment, the establishment purpose or conversion
purpose, as the case might be, biographical information regarding the institution's
founders, and other information or documents that the OBS might require for the purpose
of evaluating the application. 78 After considering the propriety of the institution's
establishment, including the effects on the financial industry, the competition between
banks, its operating prospects, and the impact on the public interest, the OBS, if satisfied,
recommended the preliminary authorisation to the Monetary Board. 79 If a preliminary
authorisation was granted, the applicant began organising a banking institution or
undertaking conversion procedures. After the completion of such procedures, the final
authorisation application was submitted. Then, the Monetary Board decided whether a
full authorisation should be granted, following a recommendation by the OBS and
verification of compliance with the statutory requirements. There were no different
statutory and regulatory criteria between nationwide banks and local banks, except of the
amount of the minimum capital requirement. 8° Under the General Banking Act, local
banks were required to have only a quarter of the amount required by nationwide banks.
Before 1945, there were four commercial banks in Korea. During the creation
period, only one bank, Bank of Seoul, was authorised in 1959 as a local bank, and became
a nationwide bank in 1962. During the extensive regulation period, new entry to the
78 Detailed Enforcement Regulation for Supervision of Bankmg Institutions (OBS) art.3.
Bank of Korea, Commentaiy on the General Banking Act, op. cit., n. 34, p. 52.
80 General Banking Act art. 16, ci. 1.
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nationwide commercial banking sector was not allowed, except in the case of the Korea
Trust Bank, which specialised in trust business together with restricted commercial
banking business. 8 ' Unlike the nationwide commercial banks, all current local banks and
most of the specialised banks were established in this period. During the deregulation
period, eight nationwide commercial banks were authorised and three specialised banks
were converted into nationwide commercial banks. The lowering of the entry barriers
was claimed to promote competition between banks. In some cases, the establishment of
new banks was politically motivated and resolved. For example, the Dongnam Bank and
the Daedong Bank were authorised after one presidential candidate, who was thereafter
elected, promised to establish banks for supporting medium and small-size businesses and
the then MoF issued a guideline for establishing such banks.
2.	 Branching Restrictions
Branching restrictions contain a bank's geographic expansion. 82 Korean commercial
banks have operated with a branch banking system from the outset, even before the
General Banking Act was enacted. 83 Under the General Banking Act, the establishment,
closure, or relocation of branches by commercial banks has been subject to special
authorisation.
81 The Korea Trust Bank was established by consolidating the trust departments of the commercial banks in
1968. It was designed to focus functionally on the trust business, but was legally established under the
General Banking Act, classified as a commercial bank, and allowed to carry on commercial banking
business. It was merged with the Bank of Seoul in 1976.
82 Even branching of existing banks might be seen as an entry control. For example, in the U.S., the
McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment prohibited existing banks from branching across state lines.
State laws determine whether existing banks can branch within states.
83 See Korea Finance Association, Twenty Years of Monetary Administration in Korea (1967), P. 54.
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Under the old system, the Monetary Board had the power to authorise such
actions. However, the Monetary Board delegated this power to the OBS, except with
regard to the authorisation of the establishment or closure of foreign branches of Korean
domestic banks. The Revised General Banking Act removes the authorisation
requirement for branching. 84
 The act only requires the FSC to formulate the standards and
procedures for the establishment, closure and relocation of bank branches.
Bank branching was tightly regulated during the extensive regulation period, when
the government pursued a policy aimed at the prevention of over-competition. In 1971,
the Banking Institution Branch Adjustment Board, chaired by the Assistant Minister of
the Ministry of Finance (MoF), was created within the MoF by presidential decree. The
board controlled the establishment, relocation, closure, and merger of branches. Its
guidelines stipulated conditions and limitations for branching, especially the
establishment of new branches. This depended on the types of area (e.g., whether it was a
commercial area), the population, and the number of existing banking branches in the
area.
During the deregulation period, branching restrictions were eased and the Banking
Institution Branch Adjustment Board was abolished in May 1994. The Korean
commercial banks could branch under a guideline of the Monetary Board, which
stipulated the maximum number of branches that a bank can establish within one year,
based on its condition, including the result of an operations evaluation by the OBS, asset
condition, capital adequacy ratio, and existence of financial problems. The local banks
could branch inside the authorised business area. There were exceptions for branches in
84 Revised General Banking Act art. 13.
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Seoul, metropolitan cities, and neighbouring provinces. The Monetary Board allowed
each local bank to open seven branches in Seoul and one branch in every metropolitan
city, as well as branches in the neighbouring provinces. In November 1998, the FSC
abolished its guidelines and restrictions for commercial bank branching, thus removing
all branching restriction yet in existence.
3.	 Scope of Banking Activities
In the banking area, statutes or regulations usually define the economic scope of the
market by stipulating which activities banks are allowed to offer or, sometimes, which
prohibited activities banks cannot engage in. Broadly speaking, defining banking
activities can be a means of differentiating between various types of financial institutions
on the basis of their activities. After the banking crises of the early 193 Os, many
countries imposed strict specialisation of banking activities. 85 By ruling out mixed and
universal banks, many countries imposed a segmentation of financial intermediaries,
separating depository institutions from non-depository institutions. Moreover, in some
cases depository institutions were sub-divided into different types of specialised
institutions, for example, commercial banks and saving banks.86
The Korean financial sector has been generally designed based on the theory of
functional separation. In principle, banking business is separated from insurance
business, securities business, and trust business. The separation of banking from
insurance business is required by the General Banking Act and the Insurance Business
85 See M. Dewatripont and I. Tirole, The Prudential Regulation of Banks (1994), pp. 18-19.
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Act. 87 The Insurance Business Act provides that insurance companies are prohibited
from engaging in other types of financial business. 88 The Securities and Exchange Act
prohibits, in principle, banks from engaging in securities business other than operations
authorised by the MoFE. 89 Moreover, banks should obtain authorisations from the MoFE
and the FSC to engage in the trust business.90
During the creation period in Korea, banking operations were underdeveloped and
commercial banks only engaged in limited operations. In the extensive regulation period,
the functions and operations of commercial banks were restricted to the mobilisation of
savings and the administrative allocation of credit to strategic industries. Since 1982,
several new banking activities were introduced in order to diversif' the business of
commercial banking.
Apart from the prohibitions under the insurance, securities, and trust laws, the
scope of banks' activities is generally determined by the General Banking Act. Under the
act, Korean commercial banks can engage in any operations relating to banking business
permitted under the General Banking Act and other laws. 9 ' The General Banking Act
does not, however, define what banking business is. The OBS was empowered to decide
what is the nature of banking business. 92 Under the revised act, the MoFE was to define
the range of banking operations. 93 Therefore, the practical scope of banking business
86 Ibid.
87 General Banking Act art. 4; Revised General Banking Act art. 6. This provides that insurance companies
are not deemed to be banking institutions.
88 Insurance Business Act art. 9.
89 Securities and Exchange Act art. 29.
90 Trust Business Act art. 3.
91 General Banking Act art. 18, ci. 1; Revised General Banking Act art. 27 cl. 1.
92 General Banking Act art. 18, ci. 2.
Revised General Banking Act art. 27, cl. 2.
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activities depends on the interpretations based on banking institutions' traditional
functions, the General Banking Act, and other related legislation.
Under the old system, the OBS classified commercial banks' permissible activities
into two groups:94 primary (or essential) activities and incidental activities. The primary
activities consisted of taking deposits, issuing securities and other debt instruments,
lending funds, discounting bills, and exchanging credits. 95 The incidental activities
included (1) guaranteeing liabilities and accepting bills, (2) mutual instalment savings
business, (3) securities investment, lending and selling, (4) underwriting, selling and
subscribing securities under the Securities and Exchange Act, (5) sales of government and
public bonds on repurchase agreements, (6) factoring business, (7) safe deposit business,
and (8) brokerage of mergers and acquisitions.96
Apart from banking operations, commercial banks can engage in other activities
(concurrent business), which are not considered to be banking business, subject to
authorisation by the MoFE and the regulatory authorities of the proposed operation.97
Currently trust business and credit card business are allowed.98
Under the General Banking Act, banks could engage in any banking business without authorisation.
However, the OBS required banks to apply for its permission whenever they wanted to carry on an activity
other than the activities stipulated as banking businesses.
Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions (Monetary Board) art. 28. Under the
Foreign Currency Control Act, the foreign credit exchange business is subject to the MoFE's approval.
96 [bid.
' Revised General Banking Act art. 28. Under the old system, the Monetary Board authorised the
concurrent business. General Banking Act art. 25.
98 The specialised banks' activities are subject to the acts under which these are established. The
specialised bank acts generally set out the permissible acts and empower the MoFE to approve further
activities for the purpose of carrying out the respective bank's purpose.
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4.	 Ownership Restrictions
After Korea's independence from Japan, Japanese property in Korea was confiscated.
The confiscated bank shares were transferred to the Korean government in 1948. At the
end of 1953, just before the General Banking Act came into effect, the government owned
about seventy per cent of bank shares. In 1954, the government began selling off the
bank shares; the process was completed in 1957. The sale of bank shares created a
banking industry owned and controlled by several conglomerates. At the beginning of the
extensive regulation period, the nationwide commercial banks were renationalised by the
government. The government confiscated the bank shares of those who had allegedly
amassed wealth illegally. Moreover, in June 1961, the Temporary Law for Financial
Institutions was introduced to restrict the voting rights of the private majority
shareholders.
During the privatisation of nationwide commercial banks, an ownership ceiling
was introduced in 1982. This aimed at preventing industrial conglomerates from
controlling banks and impeding any further concentration of bank credits to them. This
ownership ceiling was tightened in 1994. A single person was prohibited from owning or
actually controlling shares in excess of four per cent (previously, eight per cent) of voting
stock. 99
 For local banks, a fifteen per cent ceiling was applied. As an exception, in 1994
an amendment to the General Banking Act allowed a single person who only engages in
financial businesses to acquire, with the permission of the OBS, up to twelve per cent of
General Banking Act art. 17.3. Article 5 of the Enforcement Decree of the General Banking Act
provided the scope of the term "single person". An institutional investor who had no intention of
controlling a bank's management was allowed to acquire up to eight per cent. A joint venture bank was
excluded from this regulation.
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the voting stock of a nationwide commercial bank.'°°
The Revised General Banking Act maintains the principle of the four or, for local
banks, fifteen per cent ownership restriction. The revised act, however, allows
participations in commercial banks to exceed the ownership ceilings under certain
conditions. A person or an organisation can own up to ten per cent of a nationwide
commercial bank's voting stock by reporting to the FSC. 10 ' A person or an organisation
can own more than ten per cent of a nationwide commercial bank's, or fifteen per cent of
a local bank's, voting stock with the approval of the FSC. 102 The approval process must
take place for every new acquisition which brings the total ownership interest of the
person in question above ten, twenty-five and thirty-three per cent. 103 The Enforcement
Decree on the Revised General Banking Act also restricts the range of persons who can
own more than four or fifteen per cent of a nationwide or local commercial banking
institution, respectively)04
C. Conduct Regulation
1.	 Economic Regulation
Economic regulations include reserve requirements, credit and deposit ceilings, and
interest rate controls. Interest rate controls may be imposed on deposits and/or loans.
Regulators set interest ceilings or limits for different classes of deposits, and differentiate
100 Ibid. art. 17.4.
101 Revised General Banking Act art. 15, cI. 2; Revised General Banking Act art. 15, cl. 4
102 Ibid. art. 15, ci. 3.
103 Ibid. art. 15, cl. 3, no. 3.
104 Enforcement Decree on the Revised General Banking Act arts. 5-7.
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among institutions on the basis of location or type of depositors.'° 5
 In Korea, economic
regulations comprise reserve requirements and interest rate controls.
(a) Reserve Requirements
Reserve requirements on Korean banking institutions are imposed on the deposit
liabilities, demand deposits, and time and savings deposits, by the MPC under the Bank
of Korea Act and other banking laws. The requirements apply to all banking institutions,
including commercial banks, specialised banks and branches of foreign banks, as well as
the Korea Development Bank and the Korea Long Term Credit Bank.'°6
 The
requirements are applied uniformly to all similar deposits of banking institutions, at the
reserve ratio not exceeding fifty per cent.'° 7 Until they were unified in July 1981, the
reserve requirement ratios were different for demand deposits and time and savings
deposits.'°8
 In periods of accelerating inflation, the MPC can impose marginal reserve
requirements, directing banking institutions to hold minimum reserves of up to 100 per
105 For example, in the U.S., the Banking Act of 1933 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act prohibited the
explicit payment of interest on demand deposits, and required the Federal Reserve to set ceilings on the
interest rates that could be paid on savings and time deposits (Regulation Q).
106 Banking institutions' non deposit liabilities, such as trust accounts, are not subject to the requirements.
Non-bank financial institutions are not subject to the MPC's reserve requirements, but they were subject to
the MoFE's payment reserve ratios, which were less stringent and relatively lower than the reserve
requirements. See B. H. Yoo and J. K. Lee, "A Proposal for Reserve Requirement System Reform," Bank
of Korea Monthly Bulletin (Sept. 1994), p. 19; B. C. Aim, I. S. Kim, and S. Y. Kang, "Suggestions for the
Improvement of the Reserve Requirement System," Bank of Korea Monthly Bulletin (May 1990), pp. 26-
28.
107 Bank of Korea Act art. 57, ci. 2; Revised Bank of Korea Act art. 56, ci. 2.
During the period between September 1968 and June 1981, the Monetaiy Board applied
preferential ratios to the NACF and the NFFC for increasing financial support for the relatively
underdeveloped agricultural and fisheries sectors. Under the NACF Act, the Monetary Board was
authorised to impose different ratios to the NACF, but the Monetary Board lacked similar authority for the
NFFC, since the NFFC Act did not provide for any derogation from the uniform application rule.
108 The Monetary Board actually imposes lower ratios to specific long-term time and savings deposit
accounts.
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cent of any increase in deposits.'°9
 The reserve requirements are held in the form of
deposits with the BOK."° The MPC can allow banking institutions to hold vault cash as
part of their reserves.'11
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the reserve requirements were imposed depending
on the banking institutions' profitability and their availability of funds, rather than for
monetary control purposes." 2
 In the mid-1960s, when a surplus in the balance of
payments generated excess liquidity in the financial markets, the reserve requirements
were raised to thirty-five per cent for demand deposits and twenty-five per cent for time
and savings deposits. Moreover, marginal reserve requirement ratios of fifty per cent for
incremental increases in demand deposits and forty-five per cent for increases in time and
savings deposits were temporarily imposed from October 1966 to March 1967. In the late
1960s and 1970s, when the imposition of monetary controls became necessary, the
Monetary Board depended on changes in the reserve requirement ratios. In this period,
the reserve requirement ratios were relatively high, at between twelve per cent and thirty-
five per cent.
High reserve requirement ratios, however, reduced the profitability of banks. in
many cases when banks were not able to meet the required reserves due to the high ratios,
they usually made up the reserve deficiency through general loans from the BOK. This
practice weakened the effectiveness of the instrument. Due to this problem and the
current account deficit in the early 1980s, the Monetary Board lowered the ratios.
Afterwards, the ratios remained between 3.5 per cent and 5.5 per cent, until the late
109 Revised Bank of Korea Act art. 57.
110 Ibid. art. 55, ci. 2.
Ibid.
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1980s. The Monetary Board raised reserve ratios again to control the excess liquidity
supplied by the foreign sector after the current account shifted into surplus in the middle
of I 980s. In April 1989, the Monetary Board introduced marginal reserve requirements at
thirty per cent on the average incremental increases in demand deposits and time and
savings deposits, in order to cope with the rapid growth of money demand from the
private sector. This marginal ratio was lifted in February 1990, when the reserve
requirement ratios were raised. The current reserve requirement ratio is five per cent,
except for several types of long-term time and savings deposits.
(b) Interest Rate Controls
The MPC can set ceilings on the deposit and lending rates of banking institutions.113
Until the official interest rate liberalisation in 1988, the maximum interest rate on each
type of deposit was set by the Monetary Board and interest rates on loans were subject to
guidelines set by the Governor of the BOK, to whom this task was delegated by the
Monetary Board.
In 1965, the government introduced a major interest rate reform, doubling the
nominal rate so as to yield a high real return and, thereby, increase domestic resource
mobilisation. By 1972, however, the government had returned to the previous low
interest rate policy. The interest rate remained negative for most of the rest of 1970s.
Until the early I 990s, the maximum interest rates set by the Monetary Board and the
Governor became the actual interest rates of banks due to the excess demand for credit
112 Korea Finance Association, op. cit., n. 83, p. 147 and pp.167-168.
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and the prevailing negative interest rates. Furthermore, in practice the then MoF and the
Monetary Board decided all interest rates of deposits and loans, and then notified
accordingly the banking institutions, which would uniformly follow the relevant
decisions."4
In December 1988, the government undertook an official liberalisation of the
interest rates of banks and non-bank financial institutions. However, inflation in 1989
caused a significant rise in interest rates under the liberalised regime and led to the
reimposition of interest rate controls through window guidance. In August 1991, the
government reverted to the liberalisation policy and introduced new plans for this
purpose. The plans intended to gradually deregulate short term lending rates and rates on
deposits with long maturity.
2.	 Allocative Regulation
Allocative regulations include selective credit programs, compulsory investment
requirements, and preferential interest rates. The allocative regulations control the
direction of credits, either to ensure that a particular activity or industry receives at least
as much funding as the government desires or to prevent banks from financing activities
that the government considers undesirable.
113 Revised Bank of Korea Act art. 28, no. 12; Revised Bank of Korea Act art. 28, no. 13.
114 Chung, op. cit., n. 14, p. 288.
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(a) Policy Loans
As part of the centrally controlled economic development process, the Korean
government introduced various types of instruments to control a company's access to
bank credits and lending and to ensure industry's compliance with the government's
official plans." 5
 The priorities of credit allocation policy in Korea changed from
fostering export industries in the 1960s, to developing heavy and chemical industries in
the 1 970s, to promoting small and medium-size firms in the 1980s.116
Credit allocation was justified on the ground that bankers could not carry out the
economic development plans without the government's
	
1 The most important
credit allocation instrument of the Korean government was the "policy loan".'18
However, as policy loans were generally funded by recourse to the rediscount facilities of
the BOK, which operated automatically within pre-decided amounts, they reduced the
effectiveness of monetary controls.
Policy loans included various types of loans based on supporting programs and
fund resources. As of 1981, there were 183 types of policy loans out of a total of 257
types of bank loans." 9
 During the period between the 1960s and 1980s, more than half of
all bank credits were allocated through policy loans.' 20
 Even if the BOK's rediscount
115 Y. J. Cho, "The Effect of Financial Liberalization on the Efficiency of Credit Allocation: Some
Evidence from Korea," 29 Journal of Development Economics 101 (1988), p. 102.
116 D. Vittas and Y. J. Cho, "The Role of Credit Policies in Japan and Korea," 31 Finance & Development
10 (March 1994), p. 11.
117 S. Koh and Z. Res, Capital Markets in Korea and the Far East (c. 1993), p. 53.
See Chapter Three Section III C 2 (b).
See Kim and Park, op. cit. n. 14., p. 352 (Table 2).
120 Y. J. Cho and T. Hellmann, The Government's Role in Japanese and Korean Credit Markets: A New
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facilities also performed liquidity control' 2 ' and lending of last resort functions, they were
primarily utilised for funding policy loans, and their interest rates were lower than banks'
lending rates. Since the 1960s, the financing of the export industry in the form of a
commercial bill rediscount system has been an important instrument for policy lending.
More specifically, banks financed qualified international traders for trade purposes within
the required amounts, and then the BOK rediscounted automatically between thirty and
fifty per cent of the lending amount. Preferable lending rates were also applied to export
finance. To support other industrial sectors, the Monetary Board introduced guidelines
regarding the eligibility of commercial bills for rediscount. In addition, general loans
were provided for small and medium-size firms and equipment loans for export oriented
industries. The BOK automatically rediscounted a certain percentage of banks' lending
amounts, on the basis of policy loan outcomes.
During the deregulation period, export finance was reduced. 	 The large
corporations, the major beneficiaries of the policy loans, were excluded from financial
support in the form of rediscounts. Since, however, the support to small and medium-size
industries increased and emergency financial support was provided for industrial
restructuring and for troubled investment trust companies, policy loans did not decrease.
In 1994, the Monetary Board introduced a ceiling system on the BOK's lending to the
commercial banks. This system abolished the automatic rediscount system in connection
to policy loan activities. Under the new system, the total amounts of BOK lending to
banks are decided by the MPC.
The Korean government's interventions in the banking industry produced
Institutional Economics Perspective, PR Working Papers, WPS 1190, The World Bank (1993), pp. 1-2.
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inefficiencies and distortions in the allocation of credit. Since the policy loans were
assigned based on a firm's activities, rather than on its financial situation and overall
economic prospects, a firm could raise bank credits for its operations by increasing its
involvement in activities qualifying for policy loans, instead of improving its underlying
economic conditions, e.g., its capital structure. Moreover, since the policy loans were
assigned mainly to the conglomerates,' 22
 the latter could easily divert the credits to
finance its more profitable lines of business or firms, rather than using them for
expanding the areas of activity designated by the government.'23
(b) Principal Transaction (Main Credit) Bank System
To correct problems arising from the policy loans system, the principal transaction bank
system was introduced.' 24
 This system was designed to control bank credits extended to
large conglomerates by their principal transaction banks.
Thus, in 1974, under the Agreement of the Council of Banking Institutions,' 25 all
companies of industrial conglomerates were subjected to monitoring by banks. A bank
having major business relationships with the principal company of a conglomerate,
became the principal transaction bank for the conglomerate. The principal transaction
bank was assigned major functions with regard to: the improvement of the
121 During the creation period, the BOK's rediscount facilities were utilised for liquidity control purposes.
122 The Korean industrial conglomerate, chaebol, is a group of companies usually controlled by a family. A
conglomerate usually had a central financial department that controlled all its member companies' financial
affairs.
123 See Cole and Park, op. cit., n. 1, pp. 178-182.
124 See S. W. Nam and D. W. Kim, "The Principal Transactions Bank System in Korea," in M. Aoki and H.
Patrick eds., The Japanese Main Bank System (1994), pp. 450-480.125 The agreement was entered into under the government's administrative guidance.
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conglomerate's capital structure;' 26
 setting credit ceilings on operating capital; and
consulting on new credits from non-principal banks. The principal transaction bank
system was strengthened in 1976. The principal transaction banks supervised the overall
borrowing practices of large conglomerates and gave managerial guidance to their
companies. In 1978, the principal transaction banks' roles were again strengthened.
Under a revised agreement, the conglomerates should now consult with their principal
transaction bank before borrowing more than a specified amount from non-principal
transaction banks. Dividend plans also became subject to consultation with the principal
transaction bank. During the deregulation period, the principal transaction banks focused
on preventing the conglomerates from real estate acquisitions and business expansion into
new industries.
Even though the principal transaction bank system had its formal origin in a
voluntary agreement among banks, in practice the OBS controlled the system. The lack
of legal authority for this purpose precipitated increasing opposition on the part of the
conglomerates, especially because the government forced them thereby to sell their real
estate and remove some member companies. The agreements also raised anti-trust
questions under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. Those problems were
solved by an Amendment to the General Banking Act in 1982. Under the amendment,
the Monetary Board was given powers to restrict the extension of bank credits to any
individual business group by fixing ceilings.' 27
 Under the Monetary Board's regulations,
126 In Korea, the conglomerates have, on average, a liability ratio of over 400 per cent. See B. H. Koo,
"Industrial Policy and Financial Reforms in Korea," in S. Faruqi ed., Financial Sector Reforms in Asian
and Latin American Countries: Lessons of Comparative Experience, ED! Seminar Series, The World Bank
(1993), p. 169.
127 General Banking Act art. 30.2.
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any large conglomerate, defined as a "large interlinked business group," 28
 with an
aggregate volume that exceeded 250 billion Korean won, became subject to the principal
transaction bank system controls.' 29
 The principal transaction banks were required to
manage corporate information; promote capital structure improvement; and lead crisis
30
The FSC changed the name "principal transaction bank" to "main credit bank,"
and later on to "key bank." Currently, the key bank system focuses on corporate
restructuring.
3.	 Prudential Regulation
Even though the General Banking Act was ostensibly enacted with the philosophy that the
bank regulatory system should protect depositors by safeguarding banks against
failures,' 3 ' there were only nominal provisions to uphold that purpose. They included
single borrower lending limits and restrictions on insider lending. During the extensive
regulation period, prudential regulations were also nominal. Since allocative control was
the priority and the government controlled every aspect of the banking institutions, the
supervision of banking institutions focused on examining whether the banks complied
with the government's economic policy directions, rather than strictly enforcing the
prudential regulations. After privatisation and liberalisation of bank operations during the
deregulation period, the government's formal control over structural and functional
128 The large interlinked business groups are determined on the basis of their assets by the Monopoly
Regulation and Fair Trade Act.
129 Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions (Monetary Board) art. 32.
130 Ibid. art. 33.
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regulation has been gradually eased. At the same time, several prudential regulatory
measures have been introduced. Some of the current regulations include single borrower
lending limits, a system of ceilings on the size of large loans, lending and management
restrictions on transactions between banks and their subsidiaries, restrictions on insider
lending, and standards regarding bank management.
The limit to loans to a single borrower was in place from the outset. This
limitation prohibits banking institutions from lending to any single individual or juridical
person amounts in excess of fifteen per cent of their equity.' 32
 In addition, guarantees of
the obligations of any single individual or juridical person are restricted to thirty per cent
of a bank's equity.' 33
 The Revised General Banking Act also restricts the total amount of
outstanding guarantees of commercial banks.
The commercial banks are also subject to a similar lending limit with respect to
any interlinked business group.' 34
 Loans and guarantees of obligations to any interlinked
business group taken as a whole should not exceed forty-five per cent of a bank's
equity.'35
An amendment to the Revised General Banking Act, enacted in 1999 and taking
effect on 1 January 2000, provides that the outstanding amount of credits (loans and
guarantees) of a banking institution to any single individual or juridical person should not
131 Park and Kim, op. cit., n. 24, p. 192.132 Revised General Banking Act art. 35, ci. 1.
B Ibid. art. 35, ci. 2. The General Banking Act provided for restriction of the total amounts of bank
guarantees or assumptions of obligations. The revised act removed the assumption of obligations from the
scope of the restrictions.
134 Ibid. art. 35, ci. 4.
135 Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions (FSC) art. 58, cI. 1.
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exceed twenty per cent of its equity.' 36 This amendment also prohibits banking
institutions from granting credits to any interlinked individuals or juridical persons in
excess of twenty-five per cent of their equity.'37
Moreover, a 1994 amendment to the General Banking Act empowered the
banking regulators to set ceilings on the aggregate amount of outstanding loans and
guarantees or assumptions of obligations from a banking institution to single individual or
juridical persons or interlinked business groups when the amounts exceed fifteen per cent
of the institution's equity.' 38 A banking institution's aggregate amount of large
outstanding credits should not exceed 500 per cent of its equity.'39
Banking institutions may own subsidiaries, but this is subject to various
restrictions imposed by the FSC. In 1991, an amendment to the General Banking Act
erected "firewalls" between the commercial banks and their subsidiaries.' 40 The FSC
imposes various restrictions on the aggregate amount of loans and other credits provided
by banking institutions to their subsidiaries.' 4 ' The banks are also subject to limits on the
loans they are allowed to extend to the officers or employees of their subsidiaries.'42
Furthermore, a bank's officer or employee is prohibited from concurrently acting as an
officer or employee of a subsidiary, unless the FSC approves of jt.'
To ensure sound management of banks, banking institutions are subject to
136 Revised General Banking Act art. 35.1, ci. 3.
Ibid. art. 35.1, ci. 1.
138 Ibid. art. 35, ci. 6.
' Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions (FSC) art. 60, ci. I.
Revised General Banking Act, art. 37, ci. 3.
Ibid. art. 37, ci. 3, no. 1.
142 Ibid. art. 37 ci. 3, no. 3.
3 Ibid. art. 20, ci. 2.
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industry standards set forth by the General Banking Act)" First, banking institutions
should maintain a minimum eight per cent, risk-weighted capital ratio, based on the Basle
Committee capital adequacy standards. Second, they are required to maintain a liquidity
ratio of more than thirty per cent of their deposit liabilities. Finally, they are required to
maintain a ratio of loans to deposits and capital available for lending of less than 100 per
cent.
D. Consumer Protection Regulation
In 1991, an amendment to the General Banking Act created the Financial Disputes
Settlement Committee (FDSC).' 45
 The FDSC was established within the OBS to
deliberate and resolve customer disputes resulting from banking operations. The Act
Concerning the Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations places the FDSC in
the FSS structure and changes its composition.' 46
 Under the act, the FDSC consists of the
chairman and less than thirty members.' 47
 The Superintendent of the FSS nominates one
of the Deputy Superintendents as chairman of the FDSC.
A person who is a party to a financial transaction may request the FSS to mediate
in a dispute arising out of the operations of a financial institution. t48
 Upon a mediation
request, the Superintendent can recommend to the parties to settle their dispute
amicably. 149 If the parties fail to reach a settlement within thirty days after the receipt of a
Ibid. art. 45, ci. 1; Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions (FSC) chapter 5.
General Banking Act art. 40.4.
146 See Act Concerning the Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations arts. 51-52.
147 Ibid. art. 52.
148 Ibid. art. 53, ci. 1.
Ibid. art. 53, ci. 2.
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mediation request, the Superintendent must, without delay, refer the case to the FDSC.'5°
The FDSC makes its recommendation within sixty days.' 51
 If any of the parties initiates
court proceedings at any time during the mediation procedure, the Superintendent
terminates the mediation process.' 52
 The Superintendent may recommend and advise the
parties to agree to settlement terms suggested by the FDSC.' 53
 If accepted by the parties,
the settlement terms suggested by the FDSC acquire the same force and legal effect as a
court settlement.'54
The amendment to the General Banking Act of 1994 also requires banking
institutions to report to the FSC the contractual provisions of their standardised contracts
when they intend to originally adopt or amend them.' 55
 The FSC can recommend to
banking institutions the amendment of such provisions, in order to protect the good order
of financial transactions.'56
V. GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED BANKING SYSTEM
The Korean banking system has acted as a significant tool for the development of the
national economy in accordance to governmental plans. Under the governmental
economic development plans, Korea's banking system was intended to give preference in
its lending operations to those sectors of the economy that the government had selected.
Korea's relevant banking acts (the Bank of Korea Act and the General Banking Act) were
Ibid. art. 53, ci. 3.
Ibid. art. 53, ci. 4.
152 Ibid. art. 56.
'53 Ibid. art. 53, ci. 4.
Ibid. art. 55.
155 Revised General Banking Act art. 52, ci. 1.
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adopted with an eye to subjecting the bank regulatory and supervisory authorities (the
Monetary Board and the OBS) and the commercial banks to continuing governmental
control.
This government controlled banking system created an environment in which the
banking regulatory and supervisory authorities are guided by the government and subject
to its interventions. As a result, the regulated banking sector has been largely precluded
from developing genuinely market and commercially oriented practices.
In the next two chapters, Korea's government controlled banking system will be
analysed and evaluated in detail, with a view to suggesting proposals for a reformed
banking system. In Chapter Four, the recent Korean financial and economic crisis will be
examined, with an emphasis on the following issues: how the weaknesses of the
government controlled banking system caused the crisis, and what further reforms Korea
needs in light of the suggestions made in Chapters Two and Three.
156 Ibid. art. 52, ci. 2.
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INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMERCIAL
BANKING REGULATOR AND SUPERVISOR
Having examined the basic nature of the Korean banking system, Korea's institutional
arrangement of banking regulatory and supervisory authorities has had an important role
in shaping Korea's "government controlled" banking system and creating weaknesses in
both regulatory and supervisory systems and the banking sector. The previous Korean
banking regulatory and supervisory structure (regulation and supervision by the Bank of
Korea) allowed the government's control over and intervention in the banking sector.
It is necessary to consider in further detail the institutional structure of the Korean
commercial banking regulator and supervisor, in order to identify the sorts of problems
and weaknesses which arose; how the government controlled and intervened in the
Korean banking system through the regulatory and supervisory structure; and what
structural arrangement can correct these problems and weaknesses.
This chapter seeks to answer the question of who should be the Korean banking
regulator and supervisor. This chapter takes a comparative approach by utilising relevant
practices in the regulatory and supervisory systems of several countries, such as the U.S.,
U.K., and Japan, in order to make a more detailed and critical analysis of the banking
regulatory and supervisory problems and weaknesses in Korea. The major objects of this
comparative analysis are directed towards the institutional arrangement of banking
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regulatory and supervisory authority. The chapter concentrates on the institutional
structure and role of bank regulatory and supervisory authorities, analysing the strength
and weakness of each approach, i.e. whether the government, the central bank, or the
independent agency has the power to regulate and supervise.
The issue of the relationship between the government and the central bank is
examined and analysed, as is the problem of unfettered government intervention in bank
regulatory and supervisory powers. This chapter also notes the relationship between the
regulatory and supervisory authorities, the government, the monetary authorities, and the
judicial system. This chapter suggests a proper structure and role of banking regulation
and supervision in Korea. Finally, this chapter assesses the structure of the new Korean
banking regulatory and supervisory authorities (the Financial Supervisory Commission).
I. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE KOREAN
COMMERCIAL BANKING REGULATOR AND SUPERVISOR
A. Bank of Korea
After the second world war, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System of the
U.S. (FRB) assisted in the drafting of new central banking legislation in some developing
countries, such as Paraguay, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, and
Ceylon.' Those central banking systems which were established after the assistance
provided by the FRB had two important features. First, a committee type organ of central
bank, called monetary board, had the supreme decision-making power for the policies of
See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bulletin (March 1946), p. 259 (for Guatemala); Federal Reserve Bulletin (Sep.
1950), p. 1133 (for Ceylon).
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the central bank. Second, the central bank had the responsibilities for banking regulation
and supervision through its bank supervision department, headed by the Superintendent,
which was directly accountable to the monetary board.2
The original structure and functions of the Bank of Korea (BOK) followed the
central baking system adopted in the above developing countries. 3 In 1949, the Korean
government requested the FRB to advise and assist in a reorganisation of the central bank
and other financial institutions. Bloomfield and Jensen of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York4 studied the structure, operation and policies of the Korean banking system
and examined all aspects of the Korean economy and finances bearing upon the special
problems. They submitted their recommendations for banking reform in Korea including
drafts of the central banking and the general banking statutes. With some amendments,
most of which related to the wording and arrangement of certain articles, two banking
drafts, submitted by them, were passed by the National Assembly.
The Bank of Korea Act has been amended several times afterwards. The first
amendment in 1962 was the most significant because it set up the banking regulatory and
supervisory structure until 1998. The following sections discuss the development of the
BOK's institutional structure. They also focus on the problems of government's control
over and intervention into the BOK.
2 B. S. Lee, Central Banking System (1994), pp. 84-85.
3 Arthur I. Bloomfield and John P. Jensen, Banking Reform in South Korea (1951), p. 5. The differences
between the Korean system and other systems were the BOK's loans to the government and the
government agencies, and the foreign exchange operations and policies.
Arthur I. Bloomfield was the Chief of the Balance of Payments Division. John P. Jensen was the
Assistant Chief of the Auditing Division.
Although it did not change the overall structure of the BOK, the amendment reduced the functions of the
BOK, and changed practical way of banking regulation and supervision.
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1. Monetary Board
Under the Bank of Korea Act, 6
 the BOK had four organs: the Monetary Board, the
Governor, the Office of Bank Supervision, and the Auditor. The Monetary Board was
the supreme organ of policy making and the regulator and supervisor over commercial
banks.
Until the Bank of Korea Act was enacted in 1950, the Financial Institution Bureau
of the Ministry of Finance was responsible for bank supervision and examination in
Korea. According to Bloomfield, the transfer of bank supervision function to the BOK,
specifically to the Monetary Board was "in keeping with the modern trend in banking
legislation, which favours an integration of activities of bank supervisors and central
banks in the interests of a more effective and unified control of commercial banks." 7 The
initial Monetary Board was composed of seven (titular) members and seven alternates.
The initial members were the Minister of Finance, 8
 the Governor of the BOK, two
members elected by the banking institutions, one member recommended by the Korea
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, one member recommended by the Minister of
Agriculture and Forestry, and one member recommended by the Economic Board of the
Office of Planning. 9
 The seven alternate members were the Deputy Minister of Finance,
the Chief Deputy Governor (the Ranking Deputy Governor) of the BOK, and five
6 The Bank of Korea Act was revised in December 1997 and the revised act came to effect on 1 April 1998.
In Chapter Two, the old act which was revised in December 1997 is cited as the Bank of Korea Act. The
current act is cited as the Revised Bank of Korea Act.
See Arthur I. Bloomfield, Report and Recommendations on Banking in South Korea (1952), cited in B. K.
Kim, Central Banking Experiment in a Development Economy (1965), p. 70.
8 Until 1994, the Economic Planning Board and the Ministry of Finance were major executive departments
concerning economic matters. The two ministries were merged to the Ministry of Finance and Economy.
When discussing structural matter, the Ministry of Finance and Economy will be usually used rather than
the Ministry of Finance, except focusing of the role of the Ministry of Finance.
Bank of Korea Act of 1950 art. 8.
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members who elected or recommended in the same way as titular members.'° All
members and alternates, except the Minister and the Deputy Minster of Finance and the
Chief Deputy Governor of the BOK, 1 ' were appointed by the President subject to the
confirmation of the National Assembly.
The composition of the initial Monetary Board had two features. First, it was
intended to compromise the various interests of national economy. The Monetary
Board's diversified representation was based on the principle that "a central bank is much
too strategic and vital a factor in a country's financial and economic welfare to be guided
by any one man or any one group." 2 Second, it allowed the government the majority
vote in the Monetary Board. Even though, in their view, the failure of the Bank of
Chosun (the Korean central bank before the BOK) to perform its roles had been due to a
lack of appropriate control powers, Bloomfield and Jensen accepted the principle that the
government should be entitled to have the majority vote, where an economy was heavily
dominated and controlled by the government.'3
Together with the government's majority vote, the importance of the Minister of
Finance (Minister) had been recognised from the outset by the Bank of Korea Act. The
Minister was given the chairmanship of the Monetary Board. The presence of the
Minister in the Monetary Board was conceived as the chief instrument for achieving a
close co-ordination and integration between policies of the government and the Monetary
O Ibid. art. 8. The alternate members were entitled to attend the Board's meeting without votmg right. In
the time of accident over the titular member, the relevant alternate member (e g., the Deputy Minister of
Finance for the Minister of Finance) took the full member's role, such as voting.
The Chief Deputy Governor was appointed by the Monetary Board. In 1962, the title of the Chief
Deputy Governor became the Deputy Governor and those of Deputy Governors became the Assistant
Governors.
12 Bloomfield and Jensen, op. cit., n. 3, p. 44.
' Ibid., pp. 43-45.
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Board, by acting as an avenue of communication between the government and the
BOK. 14 The Monetary Board was designed to allow for compromise between the various
interests of national economy. The Minister as the chairman was also aimed at
arbitrating the conflicts between financial industry and the other industries in the
diversified representations.15
After the military revolution in 1961, the government needed a banking system to
support its economic development plans. The government amended the Bank of Korea
Act in 1962. The amendment to the Bank of Korea Act in 1962, drafted by the Ministry
of Finance, increased the power of the President and the Minister. Under the amendment,
the supremacy of government, especially the Ministry of Finance, over the Monetary
Board was clearly established,' 6 with the intention to reduce the powers of the Monetary
Board. First, even if the English name of the Monetary Board was not changed, the
amendment changed its Korean name. The initial Monetary Board's Korean name would
be translated as "the Finance and Monetary Board." The term of "operation" was added
into its name by the amendment. Therefore, it would be translated as "the Financial and
Monetary Operation Board." This implied that the operational role of the Monetary
Board was emphasised rather than its role of national monetary and financial policy
making. The Ministry of Finance and the Economic Planning Board, which engaged in
budgetary matters and overall economic plans, were given ultimate powers to formulate
economic policies including the banking area. The government established and decided
national economic policies and was responsible for all financial affairs.' 7 Therefore, the
Kim, op. cit., n 7, p. 77.
15 See Bank of Korea, A History of the Bank of Korea (1955), p. 15.
16 Kim, op. cit., n. 7, pp. 86-87.
See Bank of Korea, Commentwy on the Bank of Korea Act (1986), p. 7.
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Monetary Board was to perform its monetary function and banking regulatory and
supervisory function in accordance with the government's policy decisions.
Second, the amendment discarded the system providing for alternate members.
The alternate member system had served the dual functions of enabling representatives
from a variety of industries to attend the meetings of the Monetary Board and eliminating
the risk of lacking a quorum. However, it was possible that the responsibility of the
Monetary Board could be ambiguous when the alternate members voted against the
intention of their titular members. 18 It is unclear that the alternate member system
actually provided the ambiguity of responsibilities. By abolishing alternate members,
however, the government removed three alternative members elected or recommended by
the private sectors (banking institutions and the Korea Chamber of Commerce and
Industry). Instead of eliminating the alternates, the number of members increased to
nine. Among the members, only two members were recommended by the banking
institutions. -
Third, the Minister remained as the chairman and was granted more powers to
control the Monetary Board. The Minister was given powers to (1) request the Monetary
Board to reconsider resolutions it adopted;' 9 (2) administer the appointment process of
other members; (3) appoint the Auditor of the BOK; and (4) carry out business
inspections of the BOK. Furthermore, in the appointment process of the Monetary Board
members, the amendment did not require the National Assembly's confirmation when the
President appointed the members of the Monetary Board and the Governor of the BOK.2°
18 Ibid., p. 40.
19 The power to request reconsider made the Mimster the controller of the Monetary Board rather than the
arbiter of different interests during the policy making.
20 See Bank of Korea Act art. 8; Bank of Korea Act art. 23.
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The President could appoint all members at a whim. 2 ' The Bank of Korea Act did not
limit the power to remove.22 It only provided restrictions against appointees. 23
 A
member could be removed for the restrictions provided by Article 15.24 It may be argued
that the Article 15 of the Bank of Korea Act stipulated the limitation of removal power.
Therefore, the members of the Monetary Board could not be removed without cause,
provided the Article 14 as appointment restrictions. 25 However, without the explicit
provision which limits removal power, it is difficult to protect the full terms, especially
when the appointment is at the President's whim. In the history of the BOK, of 19
Governors, only four actually completed their tenures of office. The other Governors
usually resigned when there was conflict between the BOK and the government.26
Fourth, the amendment transferred the foreign currency operation function to the
Minister. It reduced the Monetary Board's monetary control power, where the exchange
rate policy was very important because of the export-led economic development with
foreign currency credits.
2.	 Governor
The Governor, assisted by the Deputy Governor and five Assistant Governors,
represented the BOK, administered and directed its operations, and implemented the
monetary policies formulated by the Monetary Board. The majority of the departments
21 In theory, the appointment process with recommendation system can check the presidential power.
However, it is not practical that ministers, who can be removed at the president's pleasure, act against his
intention.
22 For example, the members of U.S. independent regulatory agencies can be removed for cause.
23 Bank of Korea Act art. 14.
24 Ibid. art. 15.
25 Bank of Korea, Commentary on the Bank of Korea Act, op cit., n. 17, p. 57.
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of the BOK were under direction of the Governor. Those departments included the
Planning and Co-ordination Department for annual and long-term strategic planning,
organisational co-ordination, budget, and accounting; the Personnel Department for
personnel administration; the Research Department for researching national and world
economic activities; the Payment System Department for planning, developing, and
managing payment system including BOK-wire; the Monetary Policy Department for
formulating and implementing monetary policies, researching and analysing financial
markets.
3. Office of Bank Supervision
When the Office of Bank Supervision (OBS), the then Department of Bank Supervision,
was established within the BOK, according to Bloomfield the power of bank supervision
and examination was transferred to the OBS from the Ministry of Finance because the
bank supervision and examination by the central bank would be more effective.27
The legal responsibilities of the OBS had not changed significantly since its
establishment. But as the number of commercial banks increased and the scope of
examination expanded to the specialised banks and the non-bank financial institUtjons,28
the structure of the OBS had been expanded. 29 The initial OBS had two departments: the
Supervision Department and the Examination Department. As the operations of the OBS
26 See B. S. Lee, op. cit., n. 2, pp. 141-144.
27 See Bank of Korea, Commentary on the Bank of Korea Act, op. cit., n. 17, pp. 97-98.
28 The Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Board of Audit and Inspection delegated their power to
examine to the OBS.
29 Currently, the OBS examines all commercial banks and specialised banks, saving institutions, including
mutual savings and finance companies, credit union, and investment companies, including investment and
finance companies and merchant banking corporations.
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expanded, the Examination Co-ordination Department, the Credit Management
Department, the Consumer Affairs Department, and the Administration Department had
been established. Furthermore, the Examination Department had expanded into six
Examination Departments due to the increase of number of examination operations. The
Administration Department conducted personnel management, organisation, and
accounting affairs of the OBS. The Supervisory Policy Department was responsible for
planning and analysing banking supervision, banking affairs authorisation, and
international operations. The Credit Management Department was responsible for
planning, guiding and analysing credit operations of banks, mainly for the allocative
regulations. The Consumer Affairs Department was responsible for the consumer
protection regulations. The Examination Co-ordination Department and six Examination
Departments engaged in examining banks and other financial institutions.
4.	 Auditor
The Bank of Korea Act provided for an Auditor of the BOK and the Auditor was to set
up an assistant department for his operations. 3° The Auditor was appointed by the
Minister with the consent of the Monetary Board for term of three years, which was
renewable. 3 ' This appointment power of the Minister was established by the amendment
to the Bank of Korea Act in 1962. Prior to the amendment, the Monetary Board
appointed the Auditor. 32
 The employees for the Auditor were appointed by the Monetary
Board through the recommendation of the Governor after the consultation with the
30 Bank of Korea Act art. 22; Bank of Korea Act art. 27-3.
31 Ibid. art. 23, ci. 3.
32 See Bank of Korea Act of 1950 art. 35, ci. 1.
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Auditor. 33 The low-ranking employees were appointed by the Governor after the
consultation with the Auditor.34
B. The Financial Supervisory Commission and the Finance Supervisory
Service
Under the Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations, the
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) is responsible for regulating and supervising
the Korean financial institutions. The composition of the FSC35 demonstrates that its
main focus is regulatory and supervisory functions rather than various interests of the
national economy. Unlike the then Monetary Board of the BOK, only one member of the
FSC represents the business sector. Other members in the FSC are either from the
relevant authorities for financial matters or for supporting the FSC's regulatory and
supervisory functions as specialists.
The Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) consolidates decentralised financial
supervisory entities -- Financial Inspector of MoFE, Office of Bank Supervision,
Securities Supervisory Board, Insurance Supervisory Board, Credit Management Fund --
into a single agency under the jurisdiction of the FSC. The FSS is a special corporation
with no capital. The FSS is engaged in the supervision, examination and enforcement of
business activities of regulated financial institutions as well as matters delegated by the
FSC and the SFC. The FSS comprises departments and offices, which are divided into
3 Bank of Korea Act art 27-3, ci. 3.
Ibid. art 27-3, ci. 3; Articles of Incorporation of the Bank of Korea art. 25.
35 The FSC consists of seven members: the chairman, the vice-chairman, the Vice Minister of MoFE, the
Deputy Governor of the BOK, the President of the consolidated Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation
(KDIC), a financial expert nominated by the chairman of the FSC, an accounting specialist nominated by
the Minister of MoFE, a legal expert nominated by the Minister of Justice, and a representative of the
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five functional areas: authorisation/supervision, examination/enforcement, supervision
support, consumer protection, and administration/general affairs.
II. REGULATION BY CENTRAL BANK
A regulatory program is usually created by legislation and then delegated to an
administrator (regulator) who performs the actual implementation of the regulatory
statute through rule-makings and decisions. Within this formula, a body capable of
adequately setting in motion the regulatory programme must be identified. In the
following sections, various institutional structures for banking regulation and supervision
are examined to answer whether there are any criteria for more effective banking
regulation and supervision.
According to a survey to the IMF member countries, the institutional
arrangements for the banking regulation and supervision vary between countries. 36 Even
if the distribution of the responsibility for banking regulation and supervision is not a
clear-cut, the institutional arrangements can be divided into two groups: (1) central banks
which have monetary authority and banking regulatory and supervisory authority, and (2)
system providing for a separation of banking regulatory and supervisory authority from
central banks. This section discusses whether a central bank is more suitable for the
banking regulation and supervision than other types of institutions.
business sector nominated by the President of Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
36 See José Tuya and Lorena Zamalloa, "Issues on Placing Banking Supervision in the Central Bank," in
Tomás J. 1. Baltho and Carlo Cottarelli eds., Frameworks for Monetary Stability. Policy Issues and
Country Experience (1994), pp. 664-667.
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A. Arguments for Integration of Banking Regulatory and Supervisory
Authority and Monetary Authority into Central Bank
During the twentieth century, numerous countries have adopted central banking system.
Although subject to a great deal of economic debate, political motives and historical
events played a more important role than systematic and consistent arrangements in the
development of central banks. 37
 In Europe, central banks had the sole or principal right
of note issue and took a role as the government's banker and fiscal agent. Their initial
purpose was not to provide supervision over the banking system. Instead, governments
intended to obtain financial advantages from the relationship and support of such banks.38
Other central bank functions, such as the lender of last resort function, were developed
later in different ways. In the U.S., the central banking system, the Federal Reserve
Board, was established in 1914 after the financial panic of 19O7. 	 In contrast to the
gradual development of central banks in Europe, the Federal Reserve Board were
granted, from the outset, a monopoly of note issue and became the fiscal agent of the
government, the custodian of banking reserves, the bank of rediscount, and the lender of
last resort. 40
 This development was reflected world-wide and the resolution of the
International Financial Conference in 1920 encouraged countries which had not yet
established a central bank to do so. Since then, most countries have established central
banks. Therefore, at present there is virtually no country, which has not established its
3 Vera C. Smith, The Rationale of Central Banking (1936), pp. 1-2. The reasons for the decision in favour
of a central banking as opposed to a free banking system were not that the central banking was superior to
the free banking in economic principles.
38 Charles Goodhart, The Evolution of Central Ban/cr (1988), p. 4.
The U.S. experienced central banking before the Federal Reserve System. The First Bank of the United
States (1792-1812) and the Second Bank of the United States (1816-1830) were acting as central banks but
failed to obtain a renewal of the charters.
40 M. H. de Kock, Central Banking (4th ed., 1974), p. 8.
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own central bank.4 ' In Korea, the BOK was, from the outset, granted the power of note
issue, the roles as government's banker and fiscal agent, and the function of lender of last
resort as well as banking regulation and supervision.
Even if there are substantial differences in development, constitutional structures,
and powers between various central banks, the control of the monetary system has been
the essence of central banking. 42
 A central bank performs monetary policy either as sole
monetary authorities or as the executive agent to carry out the strategic policy decisions
by the Executive (e.g., Treasury or Ministry of Finance). Under the Bank of Korea Act,
the BOK, especially the Monetary Board and the Governor, were responsible for the
Korean monetary policies. However, the Monetary Board carried out the monetary
policy as, practically, a government agent due to the actual control of the BOK by the
government.
1.	 Closely Related
While the primary goal of monetary policy is ensuring stability of the currency, the goal
of banking regulation and supervision is, in general, ensuring the safety and soundness of
banking system. Even if the goals of monetary policy and banking regulation and
supervision are different, they are closely related each other. Their goals, therefore,
cannot be attained independently. 43
 First, monetary authorities need a safe and sound
banking system. Monetary policy can be effectively implemented when the banking
Ibid., pp. 9-12.
42 R. S. Sayers, Central Banking after Bagehot (1958), p. 1. The monetary function is a macro
responsibility relating to the direction of monetary conditions in the economy at large for maintaining the
internal and external value of the currency. See Charles Goodhart, "The Objectives for, and Conduct of,
Monetary Policy in the 1990s, in The Central Bank and the Financial System (1995), pp. 216-219.
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system is able to expand and contract its aggregate balance sheet in response to policy
initiatives without adversely affecting the efficiency of intermediation or depositor
confidence.44
 Formulating and performing monetary policy would be difficult through an
unsound banking system, because the unsound banking system affects the transmission of
the monetary policy signal. For example, banking systems characterised by a high
percentage of non-performing loans usually have a high interest rate spread that generally
translates, at least in the short run, into a high lending rate. This causes
disintermediation, and, in turn, weakens monetary controls.
The Korean banks' non-performing loans rose significantly in the first half of
1980s, and exceeded seven per cent of total assets in 1986. This significant proportion of
non-performing loans was an obstacle to the flexible implementation of monetary
policy.45
 Even if it tried to implement a stabilisation policy, the Korean government was
forced to act as the lender of last resort during the financial scandal of 1982. This
financial scandal started from a curb mark fraud, but the ongoing problems of ailing firms
and businesses resulted in the banking problems. The government, therefore, was forced
to relax monetary policy and the BOK granted loans to the banks at annual three per cent
interest rate, which was far lower than market rate.46
Second, an unsound banking system affects resource allocation, magnifies
banking crisis, and increases cost of monetary policy. 47
 An unsound bank may continue
See Tuya and Zanialloa, op. cit., n. 36, p. 668.4 Carl-Johan Lindgren, Gillian Garcia, and Matthew I. Saal, Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy
(1996), p. 63.
' See Sung-Tae Ro, "Korean Monetary Policy," in Stephan Haggard et a!., Macroeconomic Policy and
Adjustment in Korea 1970-1990(1994), p. 177.46 See Stephan Haggard and Susan Collins, "The Political Economy of Adjustment in the 1980s," in
Stephan Haggard eta!., Macroeconomic Policy and Adjustment in Korea 1970-1990 (1994), pp. 87-93.
' See Tuya and Zamalloa, op. cit., n. 36, p. 668.
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lending to insolvent debtors to prevent defaults. The extension and refinance of overdue
loans tend to limit credits to new borrowers, and to increase credit loses that would in
turn result in insolvency of the bank. 48
 Furthermore, under the deposit insurance or
guarantees, which may be either explicit or implicit, a moral hazard problem will arise
and amplify the cnsis. 49
 If banks are owned or controlled by the government, the
government will take some measures for the banks, which have large non-performing
portfolios in order to keep the banking system from collapsing. Those measures,
including non-performing loan acquisition and central bank special loan, however, will
create a government deficit growth in excess demand and instability in the economy. 50
In the Korean situation, the government's implicit deposit guarantee 5t
 and its
direct intervention in financial resource allocation allowed the banks to finance riskier
projects. The projects were usually part of the government's economic plans (e.g., the
Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan) and the Korean banks financed them without proper
loan evaluation or appropriate monitoring borrowers. When the projects failed and the
loans became non-performing, the banking system had to extend new credits to the
troubled firms to keep them alive and, thus, to secure the loans in their books rather than
write them off, with the hope that the government eventually rescues the banks and solve
48 During banking crises, even the healthy surviving banks tend to increase the share of liquidity in their
portfolios and the borrowers face unusual levels of risk premiums. See John 3. Merrick, Jr. and Anthony
Saunders, "Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy," 17 Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 691, P. 700.
See McKinnon, "Macroeconomic Instability and Moral Hazard in Banking in a Liberalizing Economy,"
in Philip L. Brock, Michael B. Connolly, and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega eds., Latin America Debt and
Adjustment: External Shocks and Macroeconomic Policies (1989), pp. 106-107
50 See Wilbert 0. Bascom, The Economics of Financial Reform in Developing Countries (1994), pp. 173-
175.
51 Until the Korean deposit insurance scheme for commercial banks was established under the Korea
Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1996, it was deemed that the government guaranteed deposits in the
commercial banks implicitly. The actual deposit insurance function started on 1 January 1997 under the
Depositor Protection Act. Furthermore, during the financial crisis started in the late 1997, the government
announced that most of deposits or the equivalent would be protected until the end of 2000.
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the economic problem. Therefore, the banking system could not serve more productive
areas where funding was needed. 52
This problem extended into non-government-led areas. The Korean government
has regarded the large conglomerates (chaebols) as pillars of the economy, and implicitly
guaranteed that they would not fail. Banks, therefore, have no qualms about lending to
them, whatever the health of underlying business. This was especially evident of loans
secured with collateral, usually real property. As of June 1997, the ratio of collateralised
commercial loans of the Korean commercial banks to total Korean won dominated loans
was 50.6 per cent.53
Third, banking regulatory and supervisory instruments impact on the operation
and effectiveness of monetary policy. 54
 Even the risk-weighted capital adequacy
requirement, which is deemed to have less direct impact on monetary policy than interest
rate control or constraints on bank business activities, also affects on the monetary policy
in the short run. It limits asset growth, distorts credit allocation, induces banks to adjust
interest rates, and thus alters the nature of bank response to monetary policy.55
On the other hand, banking regulatory and supervisory authorities are also
interested in having a stable currency. Unstable monetary policies or abrupt policy
changes increase the risk of bank failure. 56
 A high and volatile inflation may provide
inadequate market signals, causing misallocation of resources and endangering the credit
52 See II Sakong, Korea in the World Economy(1993), pp. 75-76.
K. Y. Kim, "Newly Established Banks Have More Credit Lending," Maeil Business Newspaper (8 Oct.
1997).
Kevin Davis, "Bank Capital Adequacy Requirements and Monetary Policy," The Australian Economic
Review No. 19 (2nd Quarter 1990), p. 69.
Tuya and Zamalloa, op. cit., n. 36, pp. 669-670. See also Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal, op. cit., n. 44, pp.
143-147. They argue that the prudential regulation impacts on macroeconomic policy, thus, the
implementation of the prudential policies can be adjusted accordingly.
56 See Andrew Sheng, "Role of the Central Bank in Banking Crisis: An Overview," in Patrick Downes and
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decisions of bankers. For example, due to the excessive credit demand and inflation in
the mid- and late I 980s in numerous countries, a sharp monetary policy change tightened
the money supply with much higher interest rates. This resulted the marginal borrowers
were unable to meet their servicing commitments or renew short-term loan facilities.
Accordingly, the banks were threatened by the corresponding fall in the asset and
collateral values.57
The various facets of the interrelationship between the monetary and the
regulatory and supervisory functions have been involved as a justification for locating the
banking regulatory and supervisory authority within the central bank. The Federal
Reserve Board even argues that:
A basic continuing responsibility of any central bank -- and the principal reason for the founding of the
Federal Reserve -- is to assure stable and smoothly functioning financial and payments systems...... . [un
fact, the "monetary" functions were largely grafted on to the "supervisory" functions, not the reverse.58
In Korea, during the debate of banking regulatory and supervisory structure
reform in 1997, the BOK argued that it should retain the power to regulate and supervise
under a closely related argument. Against the MoFE's proposal of removing the banking
regulatory and supervisory powers from it, the "general VjW"5 of the BOK was that it
had to retain at least the prudential regulation function because without the function it
cannot fulfil the monetary function. 6° This view was partly adopted under the Revised
Reza Vaez-Zadeh eds., The Evolving Role of Central Banks (1991), pp. 195-196.
Eddie George, "The Pursuit of Financial Stability," 9 Central Banking 22 (Winter 1993 4), pp. 22-23.58 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "The Federal Reserve Position on Restructuring
of Financial Regulation Responsibilities," Federal Reserve Bulletin (July 1984), p. 548.
This argument was not the "official view" of the BOK because the Governor agreed with the MoFE.
60 The MoFE argues that if the BOK has the supervisory power it would operate its monetary function by
the direct measure through its supervisory powers. The MoFE also argues that, without the supervisory
power, the BOK could perform its monetary operation without difficulties if it is granted the power to
request information of the commercial banks and bank examination to the supervisory authorities. The
86
Chapter Two
Bank of Korea Act and the Act Concerning Establishment of Supervisory Organisations.
The BOK has the right to request the FSS to conduct an on-site or, in conjunction with
the Bank, joint examination of specific banks. 6 ' Furthermore, the BOK may request,
from the FSS, the findings of the examinations; and, on the basis of these findings, the
BOK may ask the FSS to order banking institutions to take corrective measures. 62 In the
above situations, the FSS shall accept the requests from the BOK. 63
 The BOK can also
request information from the MoFE and the FSC when it is necessary for formulating its
monetary policies.64
2.	 Lender of Last Resort'5
As outlined above, the privilege of note issue has traditionally been associated with
central banking. 66
 The position of monopolist of note issue allowed granting the lenders
of last resort role to central banks. Under the classical doctrine of lender of last resort, in
the face of the possibility of systemic failure, a central bank should lend freely and
Ministry of Finance and Economy News Brief, "Concerning the Reform of the Central Banking System
and the Financial Supervision System" (16 June 1997).
61 Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Orgamsations. art. 62, cl. 1.
62 Ibid. art. 62, ci. 2.
63 Ibid. art. 62, ci. 4.
Revised Bank of Korea Act art. 94.
65 See generally Rosa Maria Lastra, Central Banking and Banking Regulation (1996), pp. 126-130.
66 See de Kock, op. cit., n. 40, pp. 18-2 1. The issue of note as of other currency was claimed to be a
prerogative of the state, but the state decided to hand its prerogative over to banks because of either the
need for means of facilitating the exchange of goods or the loss of public confidence in state note issue due
to the heavy depreciation. The note issue power was ultimately granted a bank which became the central
bank. The main reasons of monopoly in the note issue are that the uniformity in note circulation and its
effective supervision can be achieved desirability through the central bank; the sole right of note issue tends
to give the central bank a better opportunity of exercismg credit control over undue credit expansion by the
commercial banks; in a crisis, the concentration of note issue in one bank gives such notes a distinctive
prestige not attaching to notes issued by several banks; and, since the note issue can be a source of profit, it
appears to be more advantages for government to concentrate the note issue in one bank and provide for
participation in its profits.
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unsparingly but at a penalty rate to all sound banks. 67
 Others observe that the lender of
last resort operations have rescued insolvent banks because, in banking crises, a central
bank has difficulty in distinguishing between the illiquidity and the insolvency of
banks.68
 In any case, since the lender of last resort function provides some degrees of
insurance to the commercial banks, there are possibilities of moral hazard. 69 Even if
there are legal restrictions against granting central bank's loan, such as penalty rate, the
banks may take undue risks and careless strategies in quest of profits. This can lead to
bank failures and create systemic risk of banking system.
This moral hazard problem cannot be resolved simply by relying on the market
mechanism. 7° Availability of correct and costless information about each bank's current
portfolios and future contingent plans, on the other hand, can enforce good banking
behaviour. However, perfect and costless information is not available in practice.
Individuals as users of financial services are not likely to be able to obtain sufficient
information to protect themselves from banks with more risky strategies by inquiring the
relative credit worthiness of different banks. Thus, a consequence of those moral hazard
and information problems lead to the involvement of central banks the regulation and
supervision of banking system. 71 Accordingly, there is a case for the involvement of the
central bank in laying down minimum standards or guidelines for activities, not least
67 See Michael D. Bordo, "The Lender of Last Resort: Alternative Views and Historical Experience," 76
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review 18 (Jan/Feb 1990), pp. 19-21.
68 C. A. E. Goodhart and Dirk Schoencnaker, "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary
Agencies," (1993), reprinted in C. A. E. Goodhart, The Central Bank and the Financ,al System (1995), p.
350. They also note that, during the period between the early 1980s and early 1990s, of about 120 problem
banks of 24 countries, only one-third has been liquidated and others have been bailed out.
69 Goodhart, op. cit., n. 38, p. 7. See also George A. Selgin, "Legal Restrictions, Financial Weakening, and
the Lender of Last Resort," 9 Cato Journal 429 (Winter 1990), p. 437. He argues that the lender of last
resort function encourages banks to take on excessive risks which is leading to trouble.
70 See Goodhart, op. cit., n. 38, pp. 57-59.
71 But see Robert S. Pasley, "Consolidation of the Federal Banking Regulatory Agencies," 9 Annual
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where it is difficult for an individual to find the risk of loss in a particular transaction
andlor where the cost of being wrong might be relatively severe. 72 Moreover, when the
central bank has to decide whether to exercise its lender of last resort function, the
judgement is made more easily and more speedily if the central bank also has the
information customarily obtained from conducting supervision.73
B. Argument for Separation between Regulatory and Supervisory
Authorities and Monetary Authorities74
1.	 Cost of Bank Rescue
In general, in the management of banking crisis, the central bank's lender of last resort
role is limited by the size of its available fund. 75 The central bank can generate cash
without limit by its open market operations, but the size of losses it could absorb is
limited. Consequently, the central bank's role in crisis may be a leader of organising
rescue operations with other commercial banks able andlor willing to provide necessary
funding. 76 Moreover, if the crisis can not be solved by the scale of funding from the
central bank and commercial banks, the government and eventually the taxpayers must
pay the final cost. 77 Therefore, as rescues are increasingly being financed by the
Review of Banking Law 255 (1990), pp. 296-301.
72 c• W. McMahon, "The Business of Financial Supervision," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (1984),
p. 48.
Brian Quinn, "The Bank of England's Role in Prudential Supervision," (Speech to a conference
organised by Westminster and City programs 'Re-examining City Regulation, 24 March 1993), BEQB
(1993), p. 263.
See generally Goodhart and Schoenmaker, op. cit., n. 68.
Ibid., pp. 334-339.76 Ibid.
In Korea, the MoFE also argues that normally the government involves the ailing bank rescue and pays
the cost. The rescue cost can be financed by issuing high-powered money by the BOK or the government
budget account. Both methods are paid eventually by the tax-payers. Therefore, the government has the
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government, the responsibility for regulation and supervision of banking system has been
passing more and more from the central bank to separate agencies established under the
aegis of the authorities.78
This argument has some merit for Korea's bank rescues in the 1980s. The BOK
Special Loan (Special Loan) was introduced in August 1972 and disused in April 1982.
In July 1985, the BOK reintroduced it. There were three kinds of Special Loans to the
commercial banks: BI, Al and A2. The Bi loan was supplied when a commercial bank
had difficulty to maintain the reserve requirement due to the "relief lendings" to insolvent
companies. It was for the liquidity of commercial banks at an annual interest of eight per
cent. The Al loan was aimed for liquidating insolvent companies at an annual interest of
six per cent.
In the early 1 980s, many Korean companies, especially construction companies
working oversees and marine transportation business companies, became insolvent due to
world-wide economic slowdown. Consequently, the amount of bad loans of the Korean
commercial banks increased. The Korean government's schemes to overcome the
economic depression were outlined three measures: issuing long-term debentures,
reducing or exempting interests, and exempting the principals. All those measures made
the commercial banks more fragile because such measures forced Korean commercial
banks to absorb all losses even though the losses resulted from the government directed
financing. The BOK was forced to lend its Special Loan again. The Special Loan
provided for in 1985 was termed the A2 loan. The ostensible reason of the Special Loan
was to redeem the banks' losses and reduce the financial pressure of commercial banks,
final responsibility and judgement whether the bank is rescued. The Ministry of Finance and Economy,
Press Release, "Central Banking System and Financial Supervision System Reform" (16 June 1997).
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which suffered from the non-performing loans due to the industry reorganisation (i.e.
loans to insolvent companies under the direction of government). The A2 Special Loan
was provided to the Korean commercial banks at an annual interest of three per cent,
which was far less than market interest rates. 79
 Even if the BOK's Special Loans did not
fit in the definition of the classical doctrine of lending of last resort, they were considered
as lendings of last resort by the BOK. 8° Since the Special Loans, especially A2, were
designed for recovering banks' losses due to the government's intervention into their
lending activities and the recovery of the Special Loans depended purely on the earnings
and profits from the Special Loans, the final cost was paid by the taxpayers.
In 1997, several measures were employed jointly by the MoFE and the BOK to
rescue the Korea First Bank, one of the big Korean nationwide commercial banks. After
long debate and initial resistance, the Korean government eventually decided to grant the
BOK's Special Loan to the bank. 8 ' This was justified by the government and the BOK
justified as, unlike the A2 Special Loans in 1985, providing liquidity, not profitability, for
the bank. The BOK extended 100 billion won at an annual rate of eight per cent. The
amount was determined on the basis of the size of the bank's liquidity shortage and the
interest rate was decided at the Korean banks' average funding costs at the time. But, the
1997 Special Loans also turned out that the government eventually paid the cost as the
bank became technically insolvent.
Where the banking system and the regulation and supervision system thereof
controlled by the government, or where there is scope for government intervention (i.e.,
78 Goodhart and Schoenmaker, op. cit., n. 68, pp. 334-337.
In 1985, the annual interest rate in Korean market was 15.6 per cent.
80 See W. C. Chung, Financial Reform (1991), pp. 164-170.
81 See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "The BOK's Special Loans to Korea First Bank
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Korea's banking system and the then BOK), the "cost of rescue" argument provides a
weak ground for the separation of banking regulatory and supervisory power from the
central bank. The rescue cost problems actually come from the government's failures of
regulations and supervisions (e.g., creating moral hazard), and its inappropriate measures
for the troubled banks (e.g., providing implicit guarantee not to fail and financing
troubled banks). In this situation, the central bank (BOK), which is "legally" responsible
for regulating and supervising commercial banks and for deciding whether it exercise its
lender of last resort function, is, at best, partially responsible for the result of bank rescue.
2.	 Conflict of Interest
It is argued that a number of conflicts of interest arise when the banking regulatory and
supervisory powers are vested in the monetary authorities (e.g., central bank). 82 First, the
conflict of interest argument is based generally on the conflict of objectives between the
monetary function and the regulatory and supervisory function. The health of the
banking system, which in the concerns of the regulatory and supervisory authorities,
needs a "judicious laxity," while the monetary policy requires strict measurements. 83 In
such a situation, it is difficult to separate the mandate for a sound monetary policy from
the mandate for maintaining safe and sound banking system. In such a conflict,
regulatory and supervisory action may be delayed or not implemented so as not to
and Merchant Banking Corporations" (5 Sep. 1997).
82 See generally Goodhart and Schoenniaker, op. cit., n. 68.
83 Lawson, The View from No 11(1992), p. 409. For example, a conflict of interest may arise when the
monetary policy requires higher interest rate to bear down mflation or to reduce the pace of monetary
growth, but the regulatory and supervisory authorities oppose the high interest rate because the adverse
effects of such higher rates may have upon the bad debts, profitability, capital adequacy and solvency of
banking system. Goodhart and Schoenmaker, op. cit., n. 68, pp. 339-340.
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aggravate the impact of monetary policy actions on the banking industry.84
During the deregulation period in Korea (1982-1997), the conflict of interest
between the monetary function and the banking regulatory and supervisory function came
to the fore. While the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities advocate banking
deregulation (e.g., interest deregulation) for the health of banking system, the monetary
authorities, during the period of inflation, adapt the stability policy and they may fear the
influence of interest rate deregulation. Authorities combining monetary function and
regulatory and supervisory function may be tempted to sacrifice the financial reform for
the monetary purposes. After serious banking problem due to the policy loans and
control over banking industry, the Korean government commenced the financial reforms
in 1981 85 The reforms included bank privatisation and interest rate deregulation. In
1987, major interest rate deregulation was introduced. The preferential lending rates for
policy loans were abolished. This deregulation program was defacto abandoned because
the government feared the effects of higher interest rates on the real economy. In 1988,
the government again announced the official interest rates deregulation for most of
banking lending rates. In 1989, however, the Korean economy experienced increasingly
unfavourable macroeconomic conditions, such as declining export, rising labour costs,
and rising real estate prices. Moreover, the interest rates moved upward in response to
the deregulation. The government resumed its interest rates control by the window
guidance to prevent interest rates from rising further. 86 Afterward, the government even
84 H. Robert Heller, "Prudential Supervision and Monetary Policy," in P. Downes and R. Vaez-Zddeh eds.,
The Evolving Role of Central Banks (1991), p. 63.
85 For more Korean financial deregulation, see Ismail Dalla and Deena Khatkhate, "Regulated Deregulation
of the Financial System in Korea," World Bank Discussion Papers No. 292 (1995).
86 Jae-ha Park, "Financial Liberalization and Internationalization in Korea," in Korea Institute of Fmance,
KIF Studies in Financial & Monetary Issues (1997), pp. 5-6.
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lowered banking lending rates.
	 -
Second, a central bank, carrying out both monetary and regulatory functions,
might use instruments intended for the protection of bank depositors to carry out its
monetary control activities because the conventional tools for monetary purposes have
shown themselves to be either ineffective or too painful in their effects on the economy.87
A conflict of interest could also arise from balance sheet ratios, imposed ostensibly for
prudential reasons, being relied upon to implement a restrictive monetary policy.88
Therefore, if the central bank has both monetary and regulatory functions, it has to
consider the banking system stability when determining monetary policy. 89 In Korea, this
was one of the MoFE's justifications for separation between the BOK and the banking
regulatory and supervisory authorities.90
However, some commentators argue that if the conflict of interest does arise, 9 ' it
cannot be resolved by institutional separation. 92
 The main issue is one of efficiency
rather than of principle. 93
 Folkerts-Landau and Garber argue that the integration of
monetary policy and banking regulatory and supervisory role into the European Central
87 Quinn, op. cit., n. 73, p. 261.
88 United Kingdom House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee, The Role of the Bank of
England (Vol. I) (1993), p. XXV.89 See the US. example in less developed countries (LDC) debt problem. Goodhart, op. cit., n. 78, p. 341.
It is believed that the Federal Reserve was under pressure to abandon the non-borrowed reserve base
scheme in Summer Autumn 1982 because of the effects of the level/volatility of interest rates upon both
LDC debt problem and the solvency of major money-market commercial banks in the U.S.
90 5ee Ministry of Finance and Economy News Brief, op. cit. n. 60.
91 But see U.K. House of Commons, op. cit., n. 88, p. XXV. Witnesses before the Committee argue either
that there is not any conflict of interest or that the conflict has been never experienced even if there is
possibilities.
92 See David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber, "The ECB: A Bank or a Monetary Policy Rule?" in
Matthew B. Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli, and Paul R. Masson eds., Establishing a Central Bank. Issues in
Europe and Lessons from the US. (1992), pp. 101-103.
Quinn, op. cit., n. 73, p. 262.
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Bank would avoid inter-agency conflict of interest. 94
 They explain that such conflict
would arise if the central bank puts its resources at stake, while another agency is
responsible for establishing the solvency of central bank debtors.
III. REGULATION BY THE EXECUTIVE
One alternative arrangement for the banking regulation and supervision is the Executive
of government. In the institutional arrangements for banking regulation and supervision
by the Executive, two types of regulators and supervisors can be distinguished: executive
branch (e.g. the finance ministry), and regulatory agency within the executive branch.
Regulatory agency, established within an executive branch, basically consists of a
hierarchical organisation and is under the direct control of the head of the Executive.95
The head of the Executive has ultimate responsibilities through the regulators who are
usually the heads of the executive departments or the agencies within the departments.
Therefore, the head of the Executive may appoint and remove the regulators at his
discretion. These types of regulators, especially the heads of the executive departments,
are usually political appointees rather than experts.96
A. Regulation by Executive Branch: Japanese Banking Regulation and
Supervision Structure
A good example of bank regulation by the executive department was Japan's bank
Folkers-Landau and Garber, op. cit., n. 92, PP. 101-103.
The head of the Executive can be the president or the prime minister. In Korean administrative structure,
the President is the head of the Executive.
96 See Damodar Gujarati, Government and Business (1984), p. 53.
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regulation structure before June 1 998. Historically, the Japanese banking system was
developed under the direction of government. Furthermore, the government's
department, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), assumed the banking regulatory and
supervisory role when the modem banking system was introduced and organised.98
Commercial banks and special banks were established for efficiently serving the needs of
rapid industrialisation and national finance. The MOF, created in 1869, was granted legal
authority to regulate and supervise banks in 1890 under the National Banking Act.99
During this period, the Japanese government was only interested in establishing a
financial structure, not in regulating the internal operations of the banks)°° This lack of
banking regulation and supervision enabled the banks to engage in unsound financial
practices.'°' Partly as a consequence thereof, Japan experienced a financial crisis in
1927. The crisis caused widespread bank runs and fears of a financial collapse. In
response to the financial crisis, the Banking Law of 1927 laid the foundation for the
Japanese bank regulation not only in the pre-second world war period, but also for the
However, the Bank of Japan began examining banks in 1928 on the basis of its contractual agreements
with client banks. In 1942, the Bank of Japan Law gave the Bank of Japan the mission of maintaimng and
fostering a safe and sound financial system. Currently, the Bank of Japan performs some of the supervisory
functions in the areas of bank information reporting and analysis, bank inspections and examinations,
failure resolution, crisis management, and payment clearance system. Since it is not a governmental entity,
in order to its responsibility stipulated in the Bank of Japan Law, the Bank of Japan has contractual
arrangements with all commercial banks as well as other financial institutions, that allow it to examine
these institutions and provide advice.
In June 1998, the Financial Supervisory Agency took over banking supervision and inspection
from the Ministry of Finance.
98 The Japanese banking system was established under the government's policy of importing Western
model of financial institutions to support rapid industrialisation during the Meiji period (1868-1912). See
William M. Tsutsui, Banking Policy in Japan: American Effort at Reform during the Occupation (1988), p.
99 United States General Accounting Office, Bank Regulatory Structure: Japan (1996), p. 24.
100 Even if the MOF was responsible to regulate and supervise the banks, there were actually no legal
means for the regulation and supervision. The government only controlled the special banks directly and
the commercial banks indirectly, not regulated or supervised. See Tsutsui, op. cit., n. 98, pp. 3-4.
101 The Japanese banks engaged in speculative advances, made extensive loans to directors, and
concentrated their lending on one customer. Furthermore, while vast majority of banks were poorly
capitalised, they tended to extend loans beyond their financial capacity. See ibid.
96
Chapter Two
post-war period.' 02
 The bank act designated the MOF as main bank regulator. A
significant feature of the MOF's regulatory and supervisory powers was a large degree of
discretion in carrying out bank regulatory policy, since the act did not state the details of
bank regulations explicitly.' 03
 The large degree of discretion of the government
regulatory body could be utilised for implementing government policies.'04
After the second world war, the Japanese banking system was reorganised. The
U.S. officials in Japan concluded that the problems of Japanese banking practices had
stemmed from the zaibatsu banks'°5
 and the government's financial administration. The
intention of the reorganisation of the banking system was to encourage competition by
abolishing the zaibatsu banks as well as to create a firewall between the banks and the
securities industry. However, no significant changes in the banking regulatory and
supervisory system were implemented.'° 6
 Since there was no significant legal reform, the
Japanese post-war banking regulatory system was similar to the wartime system and
102 Kazuo Ueda, "Institutional and Regulatory Frameworks for the Main Bank System," in Masahiko Aoki
and Hugh Patrick eds., The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and Transforming
Economies (1994), P. 90.
103 Ibid., p.91.
104 During the Second Word War, Japanese financial institutions, including banks, were under tight control
by the government for the purpose of channelling funds into military industries and financing large
government budget deficits.
105 In Japan, the zaibatsu were vast horizontal conglomerates, presided over by semi-feudal family
dynasties, each with a holding company, trading firm, and bank at the centre of an extended group
encompassing numerous sectors of industry, commerce, and finance. Banks which associated with the
zaibatsu were called the zaibatsu banks. They were a central and vital component of each zazbatsu by
supplying capital to associated enterprises and employing excess combine funds in productive uses. See
Tsutsui, op. cit., n. 98, pp. 5-6.
106 The reform of government financial regulation was studied by C. E. Cagle, a senior analyst from the
U.S. Federal Reserve Board on loan. His reform plan of the regulator was heavily influenced from the
structure of the Federal Reserve Board. He proposed the Banking Board to establish a new and
autonomous power centre in the Japanese government with full responsibility for the regulation of banking
and a commitment to sound democratic pnncipals. One of the main reasons not to adapt his reform plan
was that the priority of the U.S. were to temper the inflation as quickly and thoroughly as possible, and to
reorganise banking industry on a peacetime basis. The U.S. authority did not view that the militarist
administration had been 'fundamentally' responsible for Japan's 'undemocratic' economic development.
The U. S. only offered a suggestion that the discretion which the laws entrust to the MOF should be greatly
reduced. However, this suggestion was not implemented either. See ibid., pp. 76-81.
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structure in many respects. The "paternalism," the most important feature of the Japanese
banking regulation by the MOF, was not changed either. During the economic
development period between 1945 and the 1970s, the major goal of the financial system
was shifted to aiding the reconstruction of economy and later to promoting high growth
from backing the government's war effort during the second world war.
Between 1981 and June 1998, the Japanese primary law governing banking
regulation and supervision was the Banking Law of 1981 which was complete revision to
the Banking Law of 1927. Under the act, the MOF was regulator and primary
supervisory authority of the banking industry as well as other financial industries
including insurance industry.' 07
 The MOF consisted of one secretariat and seven
bureaus. The seven bureaus were Budget, Tax, Customs and Tariff, Financial, Securities,
Banking, and International Finance. The Banking Bureau had responsibility for
regulating and supervising the Japanese banks through its three divisions -- the
Commercial Banks Division, the Special Banks Division, and the Small Banks Division.
The Securities Bureau was responsible for supervising banks' securities activities as well
as securities firms. The International Finance Bureau had responsibility for supervising
the foreign activities of Japanese banks. Bank inspections were conducted separately by
the individual bureaus prior to 1992. Afterward, the Financial Inspection Department of
the Secretariat was responsible for conducting all inspections.'08
The Japanese banking regulatory and supervisory arrangement had several
advantages. The MOF, as the executive department, had capacity to ensure speedy
107 See generally United States General Accounting Office, Bank regulatory Structure: Japan, op. cit., n.
99.
108 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
98
Chapter Two
implementation of legislative instruments. 109 The broad powers and responsibilities for
formulating and cartying out policies relating to banks, together with the Japanese
attitude giving government ministries considerable latitude in their interpretation and
implementation, could help the MOF to adjust any changes and to act against banking
problems. On the other hand, an executive department, as a bank regulator and
supervisor, is more likely to loose its ability to act independently, particularly when the
government stands to bear the costs of bank closures or other supervisory actions. For
example, in response to the problems of jusen (housing loan companies) established by
the Japanese banks and other financial institutions such as insurance companies and
securities finns, the Japanese government employed rescue pian aiming at preventing a
chain reaction of withdrawals from the financial institutions, including banks, which had
providing financing to the jusen companies.
B. Reguiation by Autonomous Agency within Executive Branch: U. S.
Office of Comptroller of the Currency
The Office of Comptroller of the Currency (0CC), created in 1863, is the primary
regulator and supervisor of the U.S. national banks. In its structure, the 0CC is an
executive bank regulator within an executive department, the Treasury. After
experimenting twice with a central bank, the U.S. Congress passed the National Currency
Act (the National Bank Act) in 1863. 1(0 Under the act, the federally chartered national
bank system was introduced and the 0CC, as a separate bureau and the administrator of
109 Under the system of banking regulators and supervisors who have no capacity to implement legislative
instruments, the regulatory and supervisory programmes of those agencies would be delayed if there is any
conflict between the regulator and the government.
110 Until 1874, the National Bank Act was known as the National Currency Act.
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the act, was established within the Treasury." After the passage of the Federal Reserve
Act in 1913, the existence of the 0CC was in serious doubt upon the ground of
duplication of fu' 2
 First, since the Federal Reserve System carried out the
monetary policy and acted as lender of last resort to banks, the 0CC was functionally the
bank regulator without those powers. Second, from the outset, the 0CC intended to
ensure state-chartered banks to convert their status into federally chartered national
banks. Therefore, the 0CC acted as guardian of national banks who competed with state
chartered banks and other non-bank financial institutions. There was possibility that the
0CC might contribute to bank vulnerability. For example, before the bank crisis in the
1930s, the 0CC had been relatively unrestrained in chartering new banks." 3 However,
several attempts by the Congress to abolish the 0CC failed, and it remained the regulator
responsible for the supervision of federally charted national banks.
Even established within the executive branch, the 0CC has a unique position
from the outset. Unlike other agencies or executive bureaus, the discretion of the
President is limited. First, the Comptroller is appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate for five-year term. His early removal by the President is also
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Second, unlike other heads of executive
departments, the Comptroller is required to report annually to the Congress at the
beginning of its session. The reports are sent to the Congress directly, not through the
Ross M. Robertson, The Comptroller and Bank Supervision: A Historical Appraisal(1968), p. 45.
112 The bank oversight structure is still controversial within the U.S. system for banking regulation and
supervision. Some commentators argue that its structure is based on institutional type and redundant.
Others argue that the current structure encourages financial innovations and provides checks and balance to
guard against arbitrary oversight decisions or actions. See U. S. General Accounting Office, Bank
Oversight Structure: US. and Foreign Experience May Offer Lessons for Modernizing U S. Structure
(1996), pp. 36-54.
113 See Lawrence J. White, "The Partial Deregulation of Banks and Other Depository Institutions," in
Leonard W. Weiss and Michael W. Klass eds., Regulatory Reform: What Actually Happened (1986), p.
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Secretary of the Treasury. Third, the 0CC is funded through fees paid by the national
banks for supervision and administration of national banking industry, such as approving
mergers, branch offices, and other business combinations and expansions. This self-
funding status provides additional formal autonomy. Moreover, even if, according to the
National Bank Act, the 0CC is to function under the general direction of the Secretary of
the Treasury, in practice, the 0CC enjoys a high degree of autonomy from federal
government."4
However, there are certain limits to the authority of the 0CC. As an executive
bureau, until 1 989the 0CC operated to a large extent under the same rules and policies as
the Treasury Department." 5
 For example, treasury regulations on personnel caps and
salary scales for the department employees applied also to the OCC. h16 Despite the
formal distance of the 0CC from Treasury regulations, the Treasury department and the
Office of Management and Budget (0MB) have exercised their prerogative for oversight
over the OCC's activities, particularly during banking crisis in the 1980s. Thus
according to several managers, the frequency of meetings increased and the OMB's
review of the agency's congressional testimony and regulatory actions became the
fl0flTh117
The institutional arrangement of banking regulator and supervisor within the
executive may not preclude governmental intervention, especially when the regulator and
supervisor deals with banking crises. When a regulatory agency is established within the
175.
114 Maximilian J. B. Hall, Banking Regulation and Supervision: A Comparative Study of the UK, USA and
Japan (1993), p. 53.
115 A. Khademian, Checking on Banks (1996), pp. 88-89.
116 This restriction was removed in 1989 by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act.
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Executive, on a day-to-day basis, the agency can operate without interference from the
other components of the executive branch. However, a greater potential for direct control
does exist in major policy decisions by the chief executive.118
C. Problems of Government Control over Banking System
1.	 Government Control over Banking Regulator and Supervisor
In Korea, the government controlled the banking industry in two ways. First, the
government (especially the M0FE) had a legal and practical control over the regulator
and supervisor of the banking industry, the BOK. The MoFE's role and position in the
banking regulation and supervision were different from the MOF of Japan and the 0CC
of the U.S. Unlike the MOF, the MoFE had no legal power to regulate and supervise the
commercial banks directly. Unlike the 0CC, the Financial Policy Office of the MoFE,"9
which was the principal department for the banking sector, had no autonomy, legally
andlor practically.
The issue of independence or autonomy of central banks has long been the subject
of discussion. However, most of the debates relate to the independence or autonomy for
central banks as monetary authorities not as bank regulators and supervisors. When
analysing the autonomy of the U.S. Federal Reserve System (the Fed), Sylla provides two
117 Khadeinian, op. cit., n. 115, pp. 89.
118 Thomas W. Dunfee and Frank Gibson, Legal Aspects of Government Regulation of Business (1984), p.
58.
119 The MoFE consisted of four offices and four bureaus: Planning and Management Office, Budget
Office, Tax and Customs Office, Financial Policy Office, Economic Policy Bureau, Treasury Bureau,
International Economic Policy Bureau, Welfare and Consumer Policy Bureau.
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tests for the autonomy of the system as monetary authority. 120
 The first test is whether
the authorities can, without prior approval of the Executive, the Legislative Body or any
interest group outside the authorities themselves, implement and sustain a policy not
necessarily preferred by either of these bodies. The second test concerns the ability of the
authorities to achieve their goals independently against the actions of these bodies.
Sylla's analysis and discussion are exclusively about the Fed's macro-function (i.e.,
monetary function) as the central bank of the U.S. It is also worth, however, to analyse
the micro function (i.e., bank regulation and supervision) under the same tests.
As seen in Chapter One, Korean banking regulation can be divided into four
periods: the creation period (1950-1960), the extensive regulation period (1961-1982),
the deregulation period (1982-1997), and the reform period (1998-present). In the
creation period, the banking regulatory structure was relatively independent from the
government. The Bank of Korea Act of 1950 was intended to transfer the banking
supervision power to the BOK from the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The BOK's scope of
banking regulation and supervision covered most of the Korean financial industries. In
this period, with Sylla's first test, the BOK was "structurally" autonomous because the
Monetary Board could decide its own policies against the will of the Executive, the
Legislative, or other interest groups. Even if the Minister of Finance was the chairman of
the Monetary Board and had a casting vote, the other members of the Monetary Board
could vote against the Minister. The Legislative had no practical means to check
decisions of the Monetary Board. Furthermore, there was no possibility to involve
interest groups, other than banks because the Korean financial system was not yet
120 See Richard Sylla, "The Autonomy of Monetary Authorities: The Case of the U.S. Federal Reserve
System," in Gianni Toniolo ed., Central Banks 'Independence in Historical Prospective (1988), pp. 24-26.
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appropriately evolved. Even the banks did not have power to exercise influence banking
regulation and supervision policies.
The answer to the second test is negative. The notion that the independent
Monetary Board, which was separated from the Executive (especially the M0F), was
responsible exclusively for banking regulation and supervision, turned out to be illusory
and unrealistic.' 21
 The BOK could not fully perform its role as banking regulator and
supervisor.' 22
 The Korean financial situation was in confusion after the liberalisation
from Japan and the following Korean War. The BOK's priority was control of inflation
and management of foreign currency accounts. With social disturbance and high
inflation, the Korean banks could not carry out their roles, such as intermediation.'23
Under the stability policy, the government undertook the major task of financing
industries. The government financed the industries by its budget account. The Lending
Restriction System, which controlled the banks' lending qualitatively and quantitatively,
also became the part of government's stability plan. The government also supplied the
required funds through the Korea Development Bank (KDB), the state-owned
development institution. The fact that the total amount of the KDB lending was slightly
less then the total amount of whole Korean banks' lending in the second half of 1 950s
illustrated the importance of government's role in the real economy sector.
Consequently, the government's leading position of distributing industrial funds over the
banking system did not allow the 80K to have the grounds to perform its responsibility
121 B. K. Kim, op. cit., n. 7, p. 91.
122 See S. Cho, The Dynamics of Korean Economic Development (1994), p. 111.
123 During the 1950s, the total amount of deposit in the banks was less than the total amount of the
currency issue.
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for both monetary and regulatory activities.' 24
 Under this situation, the under-developed
banking and financial system led the BOK only engaging into guiding banking and
financial developments. In this period, therefore, the OBS's priority in banking
supervision was to eliminate profit-loss branches of banking institutions in order to
improve profits.'25
In the extensive regulation period, the answers to both Sylla's tests are negative.
The extensive regulation period actually started in 1961, but the legislation for the period
was enacted in 1962. In 1962, an amendment to the Bank of Korea Act and an
amendment to the General Banking Act created the fundamental institutional structure of
the Korean commercial banking regulation and supervision for the next three and half
decades. By establishing the supremacy of government over the Monetary Board and the
Office of Bank Supervision, 126
 the MoFE intervened and controlled every aspect of their
operations. The fact that the MoFE has not exercised its power to request the Monetary
Board to reconsider its decisions demonstrates that the Monetary Board has never been
conflict with the MoFE. In this situation, the priority of the BOK was to assist the MoFE
in attempting to achieve goals of the economic plans and the financial stability plans, and
to supervise commercial banks to ensure that they operated in accordance with the
MoFE's directions.
In the deregulation period, the answers to Sylla's both tests are still negative.
Even if several deregulation measures were introduced and commercial banks were
privatised in the 1980s, the MoFE's legal, practical controls over the Monetary Board and
the OBS remained intact. The example of the BOK's Special Loan to commercial banks
124 See J. B. Choi, Korean Financial Policy after the Lzberalisatzon (1996), pp. 18-29.
125 See Bank of Korea, A Histoiy of the Bank of Korea: 1950-1960 (1960), pp. 199-215.
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well illustrates the government's control over the BOK in the deregulation period. As
will be discussed below, the origins of the commercial banks' problems was, it has been
argued, the lack of managerial autonomy of commercial banks and the fact that banks
were not allowed to decide their own lending activities. Frequently, the government was
forced to arrange rescue operations for the commercial banks when the commercial
banking industry was in trouble. On the other hand, the BOK, as bank regulator and
supervisor as well as supplier of the Special Loans, had only passive roles between the
government and the commercial banks. The BOK did not make decisions whether the
Special Loans were granted and which commercial bank should be provided.
2.	 Government Control over the Banking Industry
As seen above, in the creation period, the Korean commercial banks needed to be
developed with the government's help. The Korean government's controls over
commercial banks actually started in the extensive regulation period. In the extensive
regulation period, in addition to a reduction of the powers of the Monetary Board, the
government renationalised the commercial banks. And Korean commercial banks in
essence acted as government agents during the economic development periods, in the
1960s and 1970s, to support the government's economic development plans. The
government-led economic development plans were made and carried out by the
government's bureaucratic elite. They made decisions for entire sectors of the economy,
such as industries, foreign trading, financing, and foreign currency operations. Their
priority was to achieve the economic development as set forth in the economic plans.
126 See Chapter One Section II A.
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The government used the banking industry as a means of channelling credit to specific
economic sectors to achieve its goals.' 27
 Banks were required to supply sufficient credit
to industries that the government decided to invest in and foster. To give these selected
industries cheap capital, the government set the interest rates for them, below market
rates, at a level it thought were reasonable. The government's control over the
commercial banking industry was intensified in the late 1970s when it began promoting
heavy and chemical industries that required massive amounts of capital.
(a) Policy Loans
During that period, the government's control over the banking industry could be
characterised as credit allocation with policy loans. As part of the centrally controlled
economic development process, the Korean government introduced various types of
instruments to control a company's access to bank credits and lending to ensure the
industry's compliance with the government's official plans.' 28
 The most important credit
allocation instrument of the Korean government was the policy loan. Policy loans could
be defined as bank loans allocated for specific activities, industries, economic sectors, or
even to specific corporations with favourable interest rates and availability of funds to
support the government's objectives.' 29
 Policy loans may be viewed as subsidised loans
for specific economic sectors or industries since the banks gave priority to these loans
with more favourable financing terms than for the general loans. However, since the
127 See Chung, op. cit., n. 80, pp. 158-60.
128 Yoon Je Cho, "The Effect of Financial Liberalization on the Efficiency of Credit Allocation: Some
Evidence from Korea," 29 Journal of Development Economics 101 (1988), p. 102.
129 P.J. Kim and Yung Chul Park, Korean Economy and Finance (1984), pp. 347-48. Also see Yoon Je
Cho and Thomas Hellmann, "The Government's Role in Japanese and Korean Credit Markets: A New
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interest rates were controlled at a level below competitive market rates, except for a short
time between 1965 and 1971, and the government intervened in the general lending
practices of the banks, each loan transaction could be considered a policy loan.
Furthermore, the abolition of policy loans' preferential lending rates in 1982 blurred the
distinctions between policy loans and general loans. Thus, after 1982, the only difference
between the policy and general loans was in having priority over availability of credit.
Afterward, the Korean economic policy has focused on supporting small and medium-
size firms)3°
During the country's years of economic development, the inefficiency of
government intervention in the banking system, and especially the lending activities,
became increasingly apparent. The intervention left an inefficient and unstable banking
sector that gave inadequately secured loans to corporations. This, in turn, has led to a
highly leveraged and undisciplined corporate sector. Even with all the data that points to
the fact that only inefficiency will result from government intervention in the market,
Korean commercial banks' major activities have still been controlled even after
privatisation and deregulation in the I 980s.
(b) No Managerial Autonomy
Together with the government's control over credit allocation, banks had no managerial
autonomy. Under the Korean Commercial Code, bank presidents, directors, and auditors
are to be appointed at the general meeting of shareholders since all Korean commercial
Institutional Economics Perspective," The World Bank PR Working Papers No. WPS 1190 (1993), pp. 1-2.
130 The small and medium-size firms are generally defined as an industrial firm with less than 300
employees or a commercial firm with less than twenty employees. Small and Medium Industry Basic Act
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banks are limited corporations established under the Code. However, more often than
not, the officers would be decided unofficially by the influence from the government and
politicians before the shareholders' general meeting. The influence over appointment of
bank management by the government and politicians eliminated the managerial
autonomy of banks. This lack of managerial autonomy presents problems because it
causes the bank managers, especially the presidents who have significant power over
lending decisions, to follow the government's decisions and directions rather than do
what is financially sound for the bank.
(c) Implicit Loan Guarantees
An important aspect of Korean commercial lending activities is the practice of mutual
payment guarantees within interlinked business groups. Under this practice, companies
within a business group guarantee each other's loan payments. This practice was used to
pursue the chaebols' expansion. When the affiliated company or companies have
financial difficulties, the problems are passed on to the guarantor; and, typically, the
guarantor company is the parent company of the business group. Many of these parent
companies of the collapsed chaebols went bankrupt because of their payment guarantees
in favour of the interlinked companies in 1997.
The government has implicitly guaranteed that chaebols will not fail.
Furthermore, the government's bailout practice deepens the moral hazard problems. The
banks continue their lending to inefficient and failing businesses in the belief they will be
bailed out by the government. This has created excessive risk taking not only by the
art. 2.
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financial institutions but also by the corporations. The banks preferred to lend to big
chaebols, which were supposed to be less risky because the banks believed that the
government guaranteed the loans. The practice of lending to chaebols created a situation
in which the banks had to continue lending to highly leveraged companies even if there
was a high probability of default.' 3 ' These practices resulted in deterioration of the
health of Korean commercial banks.
During the economic development period, the government forced banks to soak
up the industrial firms' losses when the restructuring of industries was needed. 132 Having
absorbed the losses, banks would be required by the government to solve such problems
(e.g., liquidity) on its own through restructuring. If the loss was too big for an individual
bank to absorb, the government persuaded the banking industry to share the loss through
co-operative lending or joint payment guarantees. If that was inadequate, the next step
was for the BOK to provide special loans to the bank. As a last resort, the government
introduced measures such as using interest from the reserve in the BOK to cover the
losses.' 33 These government measures not only caused the banking problems, but also
compounded the corruption within the banking system.
Influence over lending by the bureaucrats and the politicians intensified the
banking problems. Interrelationships between the bureaucrats, politicians, chaebols, and
banks created political loans, motivated by political or non-business considerations. The
Hanbo scandal illustrated well the political loan problem.' 34 In January 1997, Hanbo
131 Y. Kim, "The Inefficiency of Bank Intermediation in Korea and Its Effects," Bank of Korea Monthly
Bulletin (July, 1993), pp. 10-1 1
132 J. B. Choi, op. cit., n. 124, p. 201.
133 Ibid., pp. 203-06.
See Cover Story, "Hanbo Scandal Shakes S. Korean Banks to Root," Economic Report (Mar. 1997), pp.
16-18.
110
Chapter Two
Steel, the fourteenth largest chaebol declared bankruptcy. Korea First Bank, which was
the main creditor bank of Hanbo, had lent US$ 1.3 billion,' 35
 18 per cent of which was
not collateralised. 36 Three bank presidents, four members of the National Assembly, and
one cabinet minister were found guilty of corruption in relation to the scandal.
IV. REGULATION AND SUPERVISION BY AN INDEPENDENT
AGENCY
A. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System'37
The Federal Reserve System consists of 12 regional or district banks which are
"technically owned" by the member commercial banks. The ownership is technical
because member banks subscribe to the stocks of their district banks in a fixed proportion
of their capital but the ownership does not carry proprietary rights. 138
 The Board of
Governors (FRB) is the centre of the system. Under the provisions of the original Federal
Reserve Act, the FRB was composed of seven members: the Secretary of the Treasury,
who was the ex-officio chairman, the Comptroller of the Currency, and five appointive
members. The original term of office was ten years. In 1922, the number of appointive
members was increased to six, and in 1933 the term of office was increased to twelve
years. The Banking Act of 1935 changed the name of the Federal Reserve Board to the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and dropped two ex-officio members
135 In terms of April 1997 US dollar to Korean won rate.
36 It was revealed that Hanbo had debt twenty times its equity.
The Federal Reserve Board is analysed here as an independent regulatory agency. Even if it is
functionally the central bank of the U.S., its organisation structure can be classified into an independent
regulatory agency.
138 George G. Kaufman, The Financial System: Money, Markets and Institutions (6th ed., 1995), p. 526.
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from the Board. Currently, under the Banking Act the FRB consists of seven members
appointed by the President subject to the Senate confirmation. Terms of office are for
fourteen years. Members serving a complete term cannot be reappointed; those
appointed to uncompleted terms may be reappointed to one complete term. The President
appoints one member of the board as chairman for a four-year term. The chairman may
be reappointed for additional terms within the constraints of the fourteen-year term as a
member of the FRB. The FRB has sole responsibility for all regulatory and supervisory
duties assigned to the system. The FRB is responsible for regulating and supervising
member banks of the Federal Reserve System in conjunction with other regulatory
agencies,' 39
 and regulating bank holding companies. The FRB sets legal reserve
requirements for depository institution; has sole responsibility for approving the
formation of bank holding companies, and bank and non-bank acquisitions by bank
holding companies; determines the non-banking activities in which bank holding
companies and foreign banking organisations may engage either directly or through a
subsidiary; regulates U.S. banking organisations' overseas activities and foreign banks'
non-banking operations in the U.S.; charters, regulates and supervises Edge Act
corporations; specifies pre-notification requirements for changes in the control of state
member banks and bank holding companies; and is responsible for examining state
member banks, approving mergers in which the surviving institution is a state member
bank, authorising their new branch offices and, when necessary, declaring them
insolvent.
The independence of the FRB comes from the long and staggered terms of
139 Since the Comptroller of the Currency has the primary responsibility for the national banks, the FRB is
primarily responsible to regulate state member banks.
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governors and a source of income that is not subject to congressional approval. In the
absence of resignation, the President can appoint only two governors per four-year term,
and maximum four over two four-year terms. Furthermore, unlike other commission
chairpersons who serve at the pleasure of the President in most instances, as the only
clear exception, the chairman of the FRB serves for a fixed four-year term.
The Federal Reserve System derives most of its revenues from interest income on
its large portfolio of Treasury securities purchased in the course of open-market
operation. Other revenues come from charges on bank services, such as check
clearing.' 40 Therefore, it is not subject to the review of the Office of Management and
Budget (0MB). Moreover, unlike other independent regulatory agencies, it is not subject
to audit by the General Accounting Office (GAO), the audit arm of the Congress.' 4 ' The
FRB had been subject to government audit until 1933. When the Congress created the
GAO in 1921, auditing of the FRB was transferred from the Treasury Department to the
GAO. But the Banking Act of 1933 exempted the FRB from the audit of the GAO.'42
Under the original Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the members of the Federal
Reserve Board should represent the different commercials, industrial and geographic
divisions of the country.' 43 In 1922 it was amended to the effect that, regarding the
appointment of the members of the FRB, the President shall have "due regard to fair
representation of financial, agricultural, industrial and commercial interest, and
geographical section of the nation."" This provision implies that members of the FRB
140 Kaufman, op. cit., n. 138, pp. 527-528.
141 The General Accounting Office is an independent, nonpolitical watchdog agency which assists the
Congress in carrying out its legislative and oversight responsibilities.
' 42 5ee Carl H. Moore, The Federal Reserve System: A History of the First 75 Years (1990), p. 140.
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 Sec. 10 Par. 1.
12 USC § 241.
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do not represent the experts of monetary policy or banking regulation. Under this
provision, the first appointive members of the FRB had backgrounds in business,
investment firm, railroad, bank, and professorship in finance. Thereafter, the
appointments of the FRB's members have been influenced by the political considerations
rather than their expertness. For example, in 1978, G. W. Miller was appointed as a
member of the FRB and its chairman by President Carter. By his admittance, he was not
an expert in the Federal Reserve System, and he lacked economic training and policy
experience. However, President Carter chose him for the pro-growth policies and, in
confirmation procedure, the Senate failed to resolve the question of his expertise and
experience in favour of those concerning suspected payments to foreign officials.'45
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of an Independent Agency
1.	 Expertise
Independent regulatory agencies can be created for specific regulatory purposes. A
structure of independent regulatory agencies is usually intended to create a neutral
environment of regulatory activities, free from partisan political considerations. This can
be carried out by qualified experts who are not partisan and who know well the regulated
area. Furthermore, a form of commission is considered the ideal structure of an
independent agency for regulation, since a group of commissioners will be better
equipped than a single administrator to make sound decisions, interpret the public interest
faithfully, develop staff expertise, and remain independent from both partisan politics and
See Marie McKrnney, "G. William Miller," in Bernard S. Katz ed., Biographical Dictiona'y of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (1992), pp. 234-238
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the regulated interest.' 46 An independent regulatory agency with a staff of experts can
handle new and increasingly complex form of technology in the regulatory area. Experts
of independent regulatory agency are able to give full-time attention to oversight of the
regulated area and to handle large numbers of cases rapidly and relatively economically
through specialisation of functions.'47
However, the expertise of independent agency has its limits in performing the
regulatory functions. First, experts cannot necessarily solve problems of basic policy
formation where a high degree of discretion as well as political choices are involved.
Experts tend to be influenced by the precedents through professional judgements and to
be less sensitive to subtle changes in the context and nature of regulatory problems.
Therefore, in situations where the scope of discretion is great and the complexity of
problems is considerable, the contribution of experts to the process of policy formation is
severely limited.' 48 Second, expertise of independent regulatory agency does not
automatically lead to the development of a comprehensive view of public interest in
regulation of economic affairs. Rather, expertise sometimes applies only to scientific and
technical problems.' 49 Third, the expertness of regulatory agencies lacks the capacity for
planning their long-term regulatory programs. Since the expertise is confined to specific
problem solving and rule-application in a single field, this narrow speciality creates
disadvantages in continuous long-time policy planning.' 5° Therefore, expertise in
regulatory agencies appears to be most valuable and acceptable when the agencies are
146 M. H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (1955), p. 103.141 B. M. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory
Forms (1980), p. 31.
148 Bernstein, op. cit., n. 146, p. 114.
149 Ibid., p. 115.
150 Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions (1941), p. 740.
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delegated with the responsibility for solving a range of nasrow and technically complex
problems with severely limited discretion which does not need to formulate basic
regulatory policy and to plan continuous long-time policy.' 5 ' Finally, the expertise is not
guaranteed to overcome delay. One illustrative example is the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) in the U.S. In 1972, the CPSC was established to set safety
standards for consumer goods and to ban those providing an unreasonable risk of injury.
It focused on rule-making rather than specific case determination to ensure rapid standard
setting. However experience did not prove that it performed its objectives rapidly and
effectively. For example, to establish the architectural glass standards, one of the first
products for which the CPSC issued product standards, more than four years lapsed.'52
2.	 Independence
The issue of independence raises major questions: how the concept was developed, and
the extent to which agencies are independent.
In the U.S., the first independent regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), was created in 1887. But when it was created, the ICC was not fully
independent. It was originally placed within the Department of the Interior headed by a
board with members appointed for set terms. Its budget, staff, and internal management
were under control of the Secretary of the Interior. Just two days before the inauguration
of a Republican railroad lawyer, President Benjamin Harrison, the Democratic majority
Congress significantly altered its status by lifting the ICC out of the Department of the
Interior and by granting the agency sole authority over its own budget, personnel, and
Bernstem,op. cit.,n. l46,p. 117.
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internal management. Thereafter the concept of independent regulatory commission
arose to insulate the regulatory agency from the presidential influence. 153 Under the
Congressional view, an independent commission is an arm of the Congress or a
committee of the Congress,' 54 in that, it is assumed to do things that ordinarily the
Congress is supposed to do but does not want to do because it lacks time, resources or
expertise that is required to administer the complex business of economic regulation.
Because of their independence from political pressures, independent regulatory
agencies can discharge their administrative and judicial functions with the greatest
possible neutrality; hence they can serve the public interest better. Therefore, in contrast
to the executive department or the agency within the executive department, the members
of independent agencies are usually appointed for staggered terms and the removal power
is limited for cause. The final administrative responsibility is not vested in the head of
the Executive.
In the U.K., independent regulatory agencies are developed with different
meaning of independence from the U.S. In the U.K., an independent agency takes an
important role as insulator between government and the public. The concept of "a buffer
of independence" can protect the government from the conduct of a particular activity,
which appears to be politically controversial or dangerous. Therefore, by using an
independent agency, the government is not directly responsible for a decision taken, and
so the government is protected.' 55 The government may also wish to provide an
independent point of influence and power, which can be expected to reflect, promote, and
152 Alan Stone, Regulation and Its Alternatives (1982), pp. 216-221.
153 Umted States Senate Committee of Governmental Affairs, Study on Federal Regulation. Vol. V.
Regulatory Organization (1977), pp. 26- 28.
154 Cushman, op. cit., n. 150, p. 101.
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defend a particular interest or point of view. 156
 The relation between a minister of the
government and an independent regulatory agency is characterised by the degree of
authority that is being delegated to the agency and the degree of authority that is being
reserved to the minister, for example the right of specific direction.
After the privatisation of a number of the public utilities, the U.K. established
many regulatory agencies.' 57
 These regulatory agencies were originally aimed at
administering what was conceived as a rule-based, non-discretionary approach to
regulation.' 58
 A utility regulator is usually headed by single administrator who is
responsible to the relevant minister. Another example is the Office of Fair Trading
(OFT) established in 1973. Even if the structure of the OFT resembles a government
department, it is regarded as non-ministerial department. 159
 The authority of the office is
concentrated in the Director General of Fair Trading who is an officer of the Crown.
Under the Fair Trading Act, the activities of the OFT are outside the collective
responsibility of government.'60
However, the nature of independence can be a source of ineffectiveness. Since
the governmental involvement and control in the economic sphere has been expanded,
this expansion needs an integrated national economic policy, for example, for the
prosperous and stable operation of economy. In these circumstances, the regulatory
155 R. Baldwin and C. McCrudden, Regulation and Public Law (1987), pp. 6-7.
156 Richard Wilding, "A Triangular Affair: Quangos, Ministers, and MPs," in Anthony Barker ed.,
Quangos in Britain: Government and the Networks of Public Policy-Making (1982), p. 39.
These include the Office of Gas Supply for regulation of the gas sector, the OFTEL for the
telecommunication, the Office of Electricity Regulation for electricity, and the OFWAT for water and
sewerage.
158 Cento Veljanovski, "The Regulation Game," in Cento Veljanovski ed., Regulators and the Market: An
Assessment of the Growth of Regulation in the UK(1991), p. 10.
See United Kingdom HM Treasury Cabinet Office, Non-Departmental Public Bodies: A Guide for
Departments (1985), p. 58.
160 Leonard Tivey, "Quasi-Government for Consumers," in Anthony Barker ed., Quangos in Britain.
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activities take important roles in the national economy and they are no longer involved
only in solving peculiar problems of special industries, and thus, the regulatory policies
need to be fitted into the general framework of the national economic policy. The policy
integration is difficult to achieve especially in the areas of activity occupied by an
independent agency. In the U.S., for example, the hostility between the President and the
Congress has discouraged and discredited presidential efforts in the direction of
integration. Furthermore, the Congress does not usually provide the integration of
policies because it is not organised to focus its resources and attention on broad policy
issues, rather it prefers to consider economic policy questions in bits and pieces) 6 ' It is
also uncertain that the independence of agency by its structure can always provide more
independence than the executive departments or other forms of agencies within the
executive departments. When the head of the Executive has concerns with the activities
of an independent agency, he may try to exercise more influence over the independent
agency than over an executive department or its subdivision. Thus, in fact, the executive
department can be substantially more independent from direction of the head of the
Executive than the independent regulatory agency)62
C. Accountability of an Independent Regulatory Agency
1.	 Structural Accountability
Even if an independent agency is independent from the government (usually the
Executive), it does not mean the agency is not accountable. In the U.S., the problem of
Government and the Networks of Public Policy-Making (1982), pp. 142-143.
161 Bernstein, op. cit., n. 146, pp. 164-169.
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accountability of the independent regulatory agency stems from the lack of political
accountability. Activities, especially day-to-day operations, of an independent regulatory
agency are outside of the Presidential control, and the Congress does not have time or
political will to control them.' 63
 Since administrators or commissioners of independent
regulatory agencies serve fixed terms and are not removable for reasons of political
disagreement, the independent regulatory agencies have no direct accountability to any
elected officials. It has been clajmed' 64
 claims that independent regulatory agencies
constitute "a headless fourth branch of the government." 65
 This argument is based on
the theory of democracy that the operations of government should be accountable to the
representatives over whom the people retain direct electoral control. And, in practice, the
lack of presidential accountability will lack political supports from the President. The
lack of political supports leads to political isolation but to independence at the expense of
accountability.'66
Therefore, the U.S. legislative framework focuses on accountability to the
President. The first device for the control of independent agencies by the President is the
financial accountability to the Office of Management and Budget (0MB). The 0MB,
successor of the Bureau of the Budget, is intended to control matters of fiscal policies and
governmental organisations. Regarding independent regulatory agencies, the 0MB
emphasises the management responsibilities of agencies. The budgets of independent
162 Ibid., p. 146.
163 The Congressional oversights are not systemic and the Congress has been reluctant to subject to specific
agency actions to regular review. See United State Senate Committee on Governmental Operation, op. cit.,
n. 153, p. 40.
United States President's Committee on Admirnstrative Management 1937 chaired by Louis Brownlow.
165 See Michael D. Reagan, Regulation: The Politics of Policy (1987), p. 56.
166 ibid., pp. 56-57.
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regulatory agencies are usually under review of the 0MB.' 67
 The purpose of the review
is to ensure that the 0MB, as a co-ordinator, can participate more in reviews and
evaluations of federal program performances and management processes. Therefore, its
key role is the preparation of budget and the oversight of execution by requiring that
independent agencies submit budget requests for review and appraisal. The 0MB also
has statutory authority, at Presidential discretion, to make detailed organisational studies
of the independent regulatory agencies in the interest of greater economy and efficiency.
This is justified on the grounds that there is no valid reason why all federal agencies,
including independent agencies, should not be subject to co-ordination under the Budget
and Accounting Act which authorises the OMB's functions.' 68
 Furthermore, the 0MB
has the authority to review and consider independent agency communications on
legislation before they are delivered to the Congress in light of the President's program
and priority. After its review, it may inform the agency of any considerations which it
believes the agencies should, or may wish to take into account before submitting the
communication to the Congress. As a result, as one Senator observed, the budgetary
procedure by the 0MB made independent agencies reluctant to ask for what they really
need in money and manpower. 169
 OMB's budget cuts have adverse impact on regulatory
programs and performances. It demonstrates that independent agencies are not viewed as
fully independent to the President. Instead, they must be considered subject to the
President as part of federal administration for the budget purposes.
The second structural control of independent regulatory agencies' activities is the
litigating authority. Implementation of an agency's regulatory mission often requires
167 United State Senate Committee on Governmental Operation, op. cit., n. 153, p. 43.
168 Ibid., P. 46.
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court action. But, without exemption by the Congress, the Attorney General is vested
central control of litigation for all departments and agencies. 17° In practice, there is no
general trend of exceptions for the independent regulatory agencies. But, more often than
not, the independent regulatory agencies enjoy a certain measure of independent litigation
authority on civil matters. Therefore, an independent agency without litigation power is
possibly less independent than one with the power.
In the U.K., many independent regulatory agencies are subject to powers of
direction by ministers. However, they still control their own policies and the ministers
are reluctant to use their formal ministerial powers of direction. These ministerial
attitudes may come from the concept of political buffer of the independent regulatory
agency.' 7 ' Therefore, in the U.K., the independent regulatory agency accountability is
focused on control by the Parliament. In general, the independent agencies are
accountable to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (PCA) and the
Comptroller and Audit-General (CAG), both of whom scrutinise the independent
agencies on behalf of Parliament. 	 The PCA was designed to investigate
maladministration of central government departments and certain other bodies acting on
behalf of the Crown. A number of regulatory bodies have also become subject to the
PCA. The Office of the Director General of Fair Trading and all of the new utility
regulators are subject to the investigation of the PCA.' 72 The expansion of its
investigation to independent regulatory agencies is based on the notion that means of
obtaining independent investigation of complaints should be available against non-
169 Ibid., p.47.
170 See 28 Usc § 516, 518, 519.
Baldwin and McCrudden, op. cit., n. 155, pp. 36-37.
172 See Parliament conissioner Act Schedule 2.
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departmental bodies, including independent regulatory agencies, where the functions
carried out by those bodies affect individual citizens or groups and where those functions
might, just as appropriately, be those of central government. However, not all non-
governmental bodies are subject to the investigation of the PCA. Under the Parliament
Commissioner Act, the investigation power is limited to bodies which are subject to some
degree of ultimate ministerial accountability to Parliament.' 73 The CAG is given power
to carry out examination into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of which any
department, authority or other body has used its resources in discharging its functions.
This power covers any body believed to receive more than half its income from public
funds. However, the CAG is not entitled to question the merits of policy objectives of
any such body. Another form of parliament scrutiny of independent regulatory agencies
is the select committee system. Under this system, regulators can be summoned to
appear before a select committee, required to report annually, and be publicly examined.
Even if the Parliament provides some structures of independent regulatory agency
control, the accountability through the PCA, the CAG, andlor select committees is
limited to control over independent regulatory agencies. The PCA can not control the
agencies' activities routinely because the needs to take a personal interest in complaints
restrict the number and scope of cases that the office can cover. The CAG's control is in-
depth but its action affects only the financial effectiveness not the agency objectives and
strategies. The select committee system does not provide consistent monitoring.'74
The U.K. government recently established a new single regulator for the entire
financiaL industry including the banking industry. Unlike other independent regulatory
'3 Baldwin and McCudden, op. cit., n. 155, pp. 37-3 8.
' Ibid., pp. 3 8-39.
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agencies, the government requires the new financial regulator to be accountable to the
Executive. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is responsible, as a single regulator,
for regulating and supervising the U.K. financial industry.
	 Its framework for
accountability is designed so that the FSA is to be clearly accountable to the Government
and to the Parliament. The FSA is required by the Financial Services Act and the
Banking Act to submit an Annual Report to the Treasury, which Ministers lay before the
Parliament.'75
2.	 Accountability to Due Process
The due process criterion provides a procedural accountability under the general theory
of administration law. The due process, which focuses on the procedure of an
independent regulatory agency, requires the agency to act on the basis of certain fair
procedures such as participation, consultation, and openness. The due process
encourages rationality, reduces uncertainty and abuse of discretionary powers, and leads
to better rules. However, the due process requirement has some disadvantages; it is
necessary to determine who should have participation rights and in what manner; the due
process does not guarantee to produce an efficient decision; it generates administrative
costs and delays; and it reduces the importance of independence and expert
j udgements.'7
In the U.S., the federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)' 77 requires
independent regulatory agencies to invite public participation before adopting legislative
175 Financial Service Authority, Financial Sen'ice Authority: an Outline (Oct. 1997), p. 15.
176 Baldwin and McCudden, op. cit., n. 155, p.45.
177 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b), (c).
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rules. For the non-legislative rules, under the APA, independent regulatory agencies are
not legally required to provide pre-adoption notice and comment procedure, even though
they frequently to do so.' 78 The only requirement is that they publish rules of general
applicability in the Federal Register after adoption. 179 In theory, a legislative rule is
essentially an administrative statute which is an exercise of previously delegated power to
complete an incomplete legislative action and thus it legally binds the members of the
public. However, although there is clear theoretical difference between the legislative
rule and non-legislative rule in concepts and legal effects, in practice, their consequences
are usually identical.'8°
In the U.K., the due process requirement does not extend to regulatory rule-
making. Even if there is a well-established custom of pre-adoption consultation with
interested groups and an increasing tendency for specific legislation to impose duties to
consult outside interests and to publish rules,' 8 ' there is no general obligations to this
effect, and the giving of reasons is almost never required. 182
 Under the Statutory
Instrument Act of 1946, the delegated legislation is required to be published after
adoption. Circulars and other official pronouncements, having general applicability but
not made pursuant to statutory delegations, do not need to be centrally published. But it
is unclear whether all non-delegated legislation do not have legal effect under the law.183
178 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A), (d)(2).
5 U.s.c. § 552 (a)(l)(D).180 Michael Asimow, "Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform," 1985 Duke Law Review 381,
pp. 383-384.
181 For example, the Control of Pollution Act of 1974.
182 Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994), p. 114.
183 Michael Asimow, "Delegated Legislation: United States and United Kingdom," 3 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 253 (1983), pp. 261-262.
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D. Accountability of the Bank of Korea
1.	 Accountability to Auditing and Business Inspection
(a) The Auditor of the Bank of Korea
Until 1997, the operations of the BOK were subject to auditing and business inspection
by three separate systems: the Auditor of the BOK (Auditor), the MoFE, and the Board of
Audit and Inspection (BAI).'84
The Auditor was responsible for constantly auditing and inspecting operations of
the BOK.' 85
 The scope of the Auditor's duty included the financial auditing and the
business inspection. The Auditor performed his duties through the general audit and
inspection, the special audit and inspection, and the day-to-day audit and inspection.'86
For audit and inspection, the Auditor demanded the explanation of any operations of the
BOK, any reports, other materials, and data from all departments of the BOK. The
special audit and inspection could be made at the discretion of the Auditor when
particular problem was concerned. After the audit and inspection, if any violation of laws
and/or irregularity of operations of the BOK was identified the Auditor could require
such activities to be corrected. The Auditor also reviewed financial related reports prior
to submit them to outside institutions, for example the MoFE and the National Assembly.
The Auditor was accountable directly to the Monetary Board.' 87 The Auditor was
required to report occasionally the results of audit and inspection and to submit a
184 The scope of auditing is financial areas, such as the accounting. The business inspection covers the
activities of whole areas of operations.
185 Bank of Korea Act art. 27-3, ci. 1.
186 Regulation on Office of the Audit of the Bank of Korea (stipulated by the Monetary Board).
187 Bank of Korea Act art. 27-3, ci. 1.
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comprehensive audit report to the Monetary Board each year. 188 This implied that the
scope of the Auditor's audit and inspection covered the Governor's general
administration and the OBS's bank supervision and examination operations under the
Bank of Korea Act. The operations of the Monetary Board could not included into the
scope of the Auditor's business inspection because a subordinate authority cannot
supervise superior authorities. But the Monetary Board was subject to the financial audit
of the Auditor. Therefore, the system of the Auditor was designed to control the
operations of the BOK. By appointing the Auditor, the MoFE had a structural device to
control the operations of the BOK. The Auditor could not actually ignore the intention of
the MoFE who appointed him and could reappoint him after his term. Consequently, the
MoFE could even control the day-to-day operations of the BOK through the Auditor
since the Auditor had the power to audit and inspect day-to-day operations of the BOK.
(b) Business Inspection by the MoFE
The BOK was subject to the business inspection by the MoFE at least once a year.189
This power was also granted by the 1962 Amendment to the Bank of Korea Act. The
draft of the Bank of Korea Act by Bloomfield and Jensen did not provide any business
inspection by the executive branch, except the financial audit by the Board of Audit and
Inspection. The Bank of Korea Act of 1950 only provided that the BOK was required to
prove its compliance with laws to the government. This provision was an abstract notion
and actually had a "window-dressing" role in the sense that the operations of the BOK
188 Ibid. art. 27-3, ci. 2.
189 Ibid art. 40.
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should be carried out under the rule of law.' 90
 In the line with the expanding power of
government in the financial areas, this window-dressing provision became another
practical power of the MoFE to control the BOK.
The business inspection by the MoFE covered the entire operations of the
BOK.' 9 ' Therefore, unlike the internal auditing and inspection by the Auditor, the
Monetary Board was subject to the business inspection by the MoFE. Since all
operations of the 80K were carried out under the direction of the Monetary Board, if the
MoFE's business inspection did not cover the operations of the Monetary Board,
theoretically, the business inspection could not cover entire operations of the BOK.
However, since the MoFE actually controlled the Monetary Board in practice, the MoFE
did not need to inspect the operations of the Monetary Board.
The MoFE has not exercised its power since 1983. The Board of Audit and
Inspection Regulations, adopted in March 1995, required the MoFE to consult with the
BA! prior to its business inspection unless it had special reason not to do so. The MoFE,
however, retained the possibilities to exercise its power whenever it so decided. For
example, in 1995 the MoFE threatened to exercise its power to examine the suspicion of
a cover-up by the BOK when an employee of one branch of the BOK had stolen large
amount of bank notes, which were to be destroyed. The MoFE disclosed its intention to
resume the business inspection, at least for this incident. In the end, the MoFE decided
not to exercise its power to the extent that the Board of Audit and Inspection audited and
inspected the BOK.'92
190 Bank of Korea, Commentary on Bank of Korea Act, op. cit., n. 17, p. 122.
191 See ibid., pp. 122-123.
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(c) The Board of Audit and Inspection
The BOK was also subject to an accounting audit by the BAI at least once a year under
the Bank of Korea Act.' 93
 The BAI, which is responsible directly to the President, carries
out the settlement of revenues and expenditures of government, the accounting audit of
government and organisations as provided by legislation, and the business inspection of
executive organisations and civil servants.' 94
 Under the Board of Audit and Inspection
Act, the BA! also performed business inspection of the BOK's operations, the activities
of high-ranking officers, and the activities of employees engaging in auditing affairs as
well as accounting audits. 195
 These provisions of the Board of Audit and Inspection Act
conflicted with the provision of the Bank of Korea Act which authorised the BAI to
perform only the accounting audit of the BOK. But the Board of Audit and Inspection
Act may be interpreted as that the government expanded its power to control the BOK.
The audit and business inspection by the BAT can be understood that the financial and
operational affairs of organisation which performs governmental activities should be
checked by the institution which is responsible to audit and inspect those activities.
2.	 Financial Accountability
The budget and fiscal account of the BOK were subject to approval of the Monetary
Board. 196
 At the end of the fiscal year, the Governor had to sunimit the statements of
accounts for a fiscal year, including statement of profit and loss, balance sheet and
192 Chosun Ilbo, 20 August 1995 and 23 August 1995.
193 Bank of Korea Act art. 40.
194 The executive orgamsations include the executive departments and other organizations which perform
executive roles of the government.
Board of Audit Act art. 22; Board of Audit Act art. 24.
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statement of the remainder of net profit, to the MoFE.'97
The initial Bank of Korea Act provided that the Monetary Board independently
approved the Bank of Korea's budget and fiscal account. There was no requirement to
summit the statements of the fiscal account to the government. The 1962 Amendment to
the Bank of Korea Act discarded the Monetary Board's power to approve the Bank of
Korea's budget and fiscal account. It provided that the Monetary Board should approve
the budget and fiscal account after voting in the State Council.' 98 The 1963 Amendment
to the Bank of Korea Act clarified the government's intention to control the BOK's fiscal
activities. It provided that the Monetary Board should approve the Bank of Korea's
budget and fiscal account under direction of the President after the consideration of the
State Council. Furthermore, the Government Investment Institution Budget Account Act
of 1962, which intended to control the operations of the government investment
institutions, applied to the BOK. However, its application to the BOK was not logically
correct. The BOK was not a government investment institution because it had no capital.
The purpose of the act was to control the management of profits of such institutions, but
the BOK did not aim at making profits through its operations) 99
 Even if the logic of the
act was not sound, the Monetary Board, in practice, under the act, did not have any power
to control the budgets of the BOK. The application of the act to the BOK was abolished
in 1981.
196 Bank of Korea Act art. 7, ci. 5; Articles of Incorporation of Bank of Korea art. 31, ci. 1.
Bank of Korea Act art. 7, ci. 5; Articles of Incorporation of Bank of Korea art. 37.
198 The State Council is the Korean constitutional body composed of the Prime Mimster and all Ministers
and two Ministers without portfolio headed by the President. Its function is to decide major governmental
policies. See Y.H. Park, Administration Law (II) (1997), pp. 61-64.
199 See Bank of Korea, Commentaiy on Bank of Korea Act, op. cit., n. 17, pp. 35-36.
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3.	 Accountability to Judicial Body
In the Korean judicial system, legal proceedings are divided into three major actions:
civil litigation, administrative litigation, and criminal litigation. The major difference
between civil litigation and administrative litigation in Korea was that for administrative
litigation a procedure of appeal was necessary prior to the judicial review. The subject of
the administrative litigation is the activities of administrative organisations.20°
Administrative organisations may be defined as the authorities that conduct general
exercise of public power. 20 ' These activities do not include internal decisions of
administrative organisations. Since the BOK was granted power to regulate and
supervise commercial banks under the Bank of Korea Act and the General Banking Act,
the BOK was the administration organisation in relation to banking regulation and
supervision. 202 However, all activities of the BOK were not subject to the administrative
litigation. For example, activities based on regulations on the lending operation to the
banking institutions and the open market operation were not subject of administrative
litigation. These regulations were legally binding only in relation to the BOK, not the
commercial banks.203
The activities of BOK which were subject to the administrative litigation were
orders, directions, demands, approvals, authorisations, and disciplinary actions. If those
activities were in dispute, the case had to be reviewed by a review body of the
200 See Bank of Korea, Commentary on Bank of Korea Act on Subject (1990), p. 91.
20! See Y. H. Park, op. cit., n. 198, p. 24.
Under the Administrative Tribunal Act, the administrative organisation includes the public
organisation which is granted the administrative power by the Law or the administrative order.
Administrative Tribunal Act art. 2, ci. 2.
202 See Bank of Korea, Commentary on Bank of Korea Act on Subject, op. cit., n.200, pp. 9 1-92.203 See ibid., p. 87. But the commercial banks can be bound indirectly, for example, if the banks do not
follow the regulations they can not borrow from the Bank of Korea.
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administrative organisation. Since neither the Administrative Tribunal Act nor the Bank
of Korea Act provided the procedure of appeal of the BOK, the general theory and
practice should apply to in an analysis of the process of appeal. In the BOK, the
Monetary Board would be the review body prior to the administrative litigation, because
the Monetary Board was the supreme body of the BOK. 204 After the appeal procedure,
the case could be reviewed by the High Court, the Korean appellate court. Possible
defendants was the Monetary Board, the Governor, and the Superintendent of the OBS.205
However, it was unclear who represented and controlled the litigation. Under the Bank
of Korea Act, the Governor represented the BOK in all judicial actions pertaining to the
business of the BOK. 206 As a consequence, the Governor could represent all three bodies
of the BOK. But the Administration Litigation Act provided that "the Superintendent of
the OBS shall be a party when its administrative activities are in question." 207 This
implies that the Superintendent of the OBS could represent the administrative litigation
concerning its own operations of bank supervision and examination.
4. Liability of Members of the Monetary Board
If the Monetary Board, due to unlawful or gross negligent act, caused damages to the
BOK, all members, except members who expressly register a protest, present at the
session involving the act were personally and jointly liable to the BOK, should damages
be incurred. 208 A suit for damages against the responsible members would be brought by
204 See Bank of Korea, Commentary on the Bank of Korea Act on Subject, op. cit., n. 200, p. 92.
205 See ibid.
206 Bank of Korea Act art. 25, ci. 1.
207 Administrative Litigation Act art. 13.
208 Bank of Korea Act art. 21, ci. 1.
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the Prosecutor General. 209
 Since there has been no such damage suit brought by the
Prosecutor General against the members of the Monetary Board, it is unclear what
constituted damages by the members of the Monetary Board. A possible instance was
decisions of the lender of last resort operation. When the Monetary Board determined the
scale of operation and identified the target banks, it was conceivable that the Monetary
Board failed to observe procedures or took decisions in breach of the qualifications and,
thus, that its operation damaged the BOK. For example, damages could arise when the
operation of last resort failed and the BOK needed to assume the costs. However, this
analysis is not practical because, first, it would be difficult to determine whether the
decision was one of pure misjudgement or constituted an act of unlawful or gross
negligence. Second, since the government had practised the operation under its own
decisions, there was no possibility to sue the members of the Monetary Board who
followed the government's decisions.
V. SELF-REGULATION
A. The Concept of Self-Regulation
The term "self-regulation" may be simply defined as regulation by neither the State itself
nor the public authorities. This negatively defined concept of self-regulation does not
include the concern with integrity, honour and self-discipline of an individual firm. 21 ° In
practice, self-regulation takes various forms and contents. Thus, the concept of self-
209 Ibid. art. 21.
210 A. C. Page, "Self-Regulation: the Constitutional Dimension," 49 Modern Law Review 141 (1986), p.
144.
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regulation can be described by examining and characterising its different forms.
The forms of self-regulation can be classified by characterising the term "self." If
the term "self" is interpreted as "individual," then self-regulation can be described as the
disciplining of one's own conduct by oneself as an individual (individualised self-
regulation).2 11 In this sense, the regulation is tailored to the circumstances of a particular
individual, such as a firm. One of the individualised self-regulations is Ayres and
Braithwaite's enforced self-regulation model. In their model, firms are required to write
their own set of corporate rules, which are then publicly ratified. And when there is a
failure of private enforcement of these privately written and publicly ratified rules, the
rules are then publicly enforced. 212 Another individualised example is the consensual
self-regulation. 213
 In this model, legislation lays down general regulatory goals but
specific standards are resolved by self-regulatory negotiation at shop-floor level. A
public agency plays only a residual role, monitoring agreements to ensure that they are
constituent with the statutory goals, and, if necessary, enforcing them. As Ayres and
Braithwaite noted, in most circumstances their model is not desirable as the best idea or
even as an innovation. 214 Furthermore, their model is not feasible to small firms. 215 Also
the consensual self-regulation is only feasible where the affected group, the potential
victim, is relatively homogeneous and externalities are largely absent. Thus, the
consensual self-regulation is feasible where bargaining can take place at relatively low
211 J Black, "Constitutionalising Self-Regulation," 59 Modern Law Review 24 (1996), p. 26. This
individualised self-regulation is distinguished from the individual self-control. An individual is led to
behave differently from the way it would have behaved in the absence of the individualised self-regulation.
212 Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992), p.
6.
213 See A. Ogus, "Rethinking Self-Regulation," (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 100-102.
214 See Terence Daintith, 'The Techniques of Government,' in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds), The
Changing Constitution (3rd ed., 1994), pp.222-227.
215 Ayres and Braithwaite, op. cit., a. 212, p. 101.
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cost between the risk creators and the potential victims, for example, occupational health
and safety areas.216
It follows that the collective character of self-regulation must be stressed. When
the term "self" is used to describe collective, self-regulation describes the situation of a
group of persons or bodies, acting together, performing a regulatory function in respect of
themselves and others who accept their authority. 217
 In this sense, self-regulation takes
place at the industry level as opposed to at a governmental or individual firm level. And
the primary responsibilities for formulating and enforcing the regulatory rules rest with
an industry self-regulatory body rather than with the government.218
B.	 Features of Self-Regulation
Self-regulation has several salient features. 219
 First, self-regulation is conducted by a
self-regulatory body which consists of active participants in the regulated activity chosen
by the active participants generally. 220
 Since the forms of self-regulation may vary
according to the nature of its participants, outsiders may be involved in the self-
regulatory body. Also, an increasing number of outsiders has been allowed to participate
in self-regulatory bodies. On some self-regulatory bodies, for example the Advertising
Standards Authority in the U. K., the external members are in majority. 22 ' However,
even if the majority of the body consists of outsiders chosen by outsiders, such as the
216 Ogus, op. cit., n. 213, P. 100.217 Black, op. cit., 11. 211, p. 27.
218 A. K. Gupta and L. J. Lad, "Industry Self-Regulation: an Economic, Organizational, and Political
Analysis," 8 Academy of Management Review 416 (1983), pp. 417-418.219 P. Cane, "Self Regulation and Judicial Review," 6 Civil Justice Quarterly 324 (1987), Pp. 327-328.220 Ibid.
221 R. Baggott, "Regulatory Reform in Britain: the Changmg Face of Self-Regulation," (1989) 67 Public
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government or consumer groups, active participants should be present in the self-
regulatory body.222
Second, self-regulatory bodies make rules to govern the conduct of their
activities. 223
 Even if there are various amount of external controls, as will be seen below,
the external control is not absolute over all activities.
Third, the self-regulatory bodies interpret their rules and apply them to individual
cases. 224 The rule making and rule applying functions of self-regulatory bodies usually
seek to control their own conducts, but some self-regulatory rules can actually affect the
third parties who are not represented on the self-regulatory bodies. Some self-regulatory
bodies also intentionally seek to control the conduct of third parties. For example, in
addition to regulating conducts of its own members, the London Stock Exchange also
controls certain aspects of conducts of listed companies. Companies applying for a
listing must comply with the London Stock Exchange's admission requirements. Listed
companies are required to observe the terms of listing agreement which governs such
matters as the disclosure of information and their conduct towards shareholders.225
Fourth, a self-regulatory body has its own enforcement power when the rules are
breached. 226 The power can include disciplinary action and the imposition of remedy.
Finally, self-regulation has an external control element. 227 Since the self-
regulation does not imply total absence of external control, a certain relationship with the
State can be found. Four types of self-regulation can be identified by the possible
Administration 435, p. 440.
222 Cane, op. cit., n. 219, p. 327.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
225 Page, op. cit., n. 210, p. 146.
226 Cane, op. cit., n. 219, p.327-328.
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relationship with the State. 228
 First, in mandated self-regulation, a collective group is
required or designed to formulate and enforce norms within a framework defined by the
government. Examples are the U.K. financial service regulation under the Financial
Service Act of 1986 and the London Stock Exchange. Second, in sanctioned self-
regulation, a collective group itself formulates the regulation, which is then subject to
government approval. Various codes of practice produced by U. K. trade association and
then approved by the Office of Fair Trading would be examples of sanctioned self-
regulation. Third, in coerced self-regulation, an industry itself formulates and imposes
regulations in response to threats by the government that if the industry does not has a
self-regulatory scheme, the government will impose statutory regulation. Examples are
the U. K. Press Complaints Commission and the initiation of the City Panel on Takeover
and Mergers. Lloyd's is another example of coerced self-regulation since it has been
forced to reform its regulatory methods by the threat of statutory, governmental
regulation. Finally, in voluntary self-regulation, there is no active State's involvement,
direct or indirect, in promoting or mandating self-regulation.
C. Arguments For and Against Self-Regulation
There are several grounds for and against self-regulations. 229
 With ideological view, self-
regulation is preferable to government's regulation because it allows individuals more
freedom to run their own affairs. 23° It allows market forces maximum freedom of
operation consistent with protecting the public interest in the maintenance of confidence
227 Ibid., p. 328.
228 See Black, op. cit., n. 211, pp. 26-28.
229 Cane, op. cit., n. 219, pp. 328-333.
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and in minimising the incidence of unacceptable behaviour. However, it is unclear that
what extent measures of self-regulation, introduced under threat of government
intervention or supervised by the government, would allow market forces more freedom
of operation than direct regulation introduced by the same government. There is also a
temptation for industries to introduce self-regulation as a means of insulating themselves
from competitive forces. Law makers have recognised that self-regulation can be for the
protection of commercial interests rather than consumer interests.23'
The second advantage of self-regulation is that it may have a positive cost
distribution effect. 232 Self-regulation is cheap because the regulated bear the burden of
the costs of regulation. It conserves the public resources which go into law making and
law enforcement by encouraging industries to police themselves. Under self-regulation,
the cost of day-to-day regulation and regulatory processing are paid by the industry.
The third advantage is that self-regulation enables the regulated to decide the rules
of the garrle. 233 Practitioners are usually better placed to define the questions to be
addressed and to prepare rules to prevent malpractice because they are more familiar with
the market. Rules made by a society are more likely to be accepted and followed by
those whom they are to be applied to than rules made by outsiders. 234 However, since the
rules may not properly protect the public interest in the activity or the interests of non-
participants who are directly affected by the conduct of activity, there should be certain
measures to ensure satisfactory rules. Moreover, the enforcement power of the regulatory
regime makes the regulated, who are themselves regulators, impose the most effective
230 Ibid., p. 328.231 R. Cranston, Consumers and the Law (1984), p. 60.
232 Cane, op. cit., n. 219, pp. 328-329.
233 Ibid., p. 329.
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sanctions or grant remedies. Again, because rule making and rule enforcement powers
are in the same hands, it is important to ensure open and fair procedures in exercising
enforcement functions.
Fourth, self-regulation is justified as regulation by experts who know how the
activity being regulated works and what regulatory measures are most feasible and
appropriate. 235
 However, one can argue that day-to-day regulation is better done by a
self-regulatory bodies because it is likely to be able to attract better quality staff, but the
development of regulatory policy ought to be in the hands of the government who is more
qualified for making the political value judgements required for the formation of
regulatory policy.
Fifth, self-regulatory bodies are likely to act with greater speed in decision
making than government bodies. 236
 Especially in the financial service industry,
uncertainty or delay is seen as detrimental to the proper operations of financial markets.
It is efficient because the rules are likely to be more closely adapted to the needs of an
efficient market, and they can be made more quickly and, if necessary, changed more
quickly.237
Finally, self-regulation produces greater flexibility in creation, interpretation and
application of regulatory rules than government regulators can achieve. 238 In relation to
rule making, non-statutory rules can be made and amended more quickly than those
contained in statutes or delegated legislation, which are subject to slower and more
cumbersome processes. In relation to interpretation, non-statutory rules can be drafted in
234 I. H. Davison, A View of the Room: Change and Disclosure (1987), p. 34.
235 Cane, op. cit., n. 219, pp. 330-33 1.
236 Ibid., p. 331.237 Davison, op. cit., n. 234, p. 34.
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a less detailed and precise way than a statute. By embodying general principles which
can readily be adapted to the facts of particular cases, unforeseen circumstances can be
more easily dealt with. Non-statutory rules can be applied not only according to the letter
but also according to the spirit.
D. Limits of Self-Regulation
1.	 The Free-Rider Problem
Even if, according to advocates of self-regulation, the advantages of self-regulation seem
self-evident, obstacles to self-regulation exist. The first issue is whether it is feasible to
establish a self-regulatory organisation in an industry. Since the primary object of a
business (e.g., an individual firm) is profit maximisation, as a competitor in the market
place it has an interest in minimising its own costs. However, regulations provide
collective or public goods such as a cleaner environment, a free market, or a safety in
system in financial market. As a part of an industry community, a business is likely to
take collective (or public) goods which will increase its cost. Therefore, interests of a
business as a competitor in the market place diverge from its interests as a participant of
the industry community.
Once collective goods are created by regulations, they are available to all
members of the regulated industry irrespective of whether or not a member has
contributed. As a result, each member as a competitor has a rational incentive to free ride
to leave the cost of providing collective goods to other members. This phenomenon can
238 Cane, op. cit., n. 219, pp. 33 1-333.
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be explained by three theories. Olson has argued that rational, self-interested individuals
will not act to achieve their common or group interests. 239 He identifies three groups,
then concludes that the collective goods will be provide only in a small group, the
privileged group, in which at least one member pays the entire cost for the provision of
the goods on the basis of his sufficiently great return. 240 In the second group, the
intermediate group, an individual member is so important in terms of the whole group
that his contribution or lack of contribution to the group objective has a noticeable effect
on the costs or the benefits of others in the group. In this situation, Olson concludes that
no member receives such a large benefit from the collective good that the member has an
interest in providing it, even if he has to pay the entire cost. As a result, it is
indeterminate for the intermediate group to produce collective goods. In Olson's third
group, the latent group, no single individual's contribution makes a perceptible difference
to the group as a whole. He concludes that the collective goods will not be provided
unless there is coercion or some outside inducements.
Hardin has analysed Olson's theory and has pointed out that the logic underlying
Olson's theory of collective action is identical to that of the prisoners' dilemma. Then he
concludes that in the game analysis the latent and the intermediate group are not logically
different, but rather are distinguishable only statistically. 24 ' Therefore, he suggests that,
in the latent group and the intermediate group, the strategy of not contributing toward the
cost of collective goods dominates the strategy of paying for it, in the sense that no matter
what other members do, any particular member will be better off if it does not
239 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965), p. 2.
240 Ibid., p. 44.
241 Russell Hardin, "Collective Action As an Agreeable n-Prisoners' Dilemma," 16 Behavioral Science 472
(1971), p. 479.
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contribute.242
Both Olson's theory and the prisoners' dilenmia theory have been criticised on the
grounds that their assumptions regarding human motivations are unduly strict. 243
 Runge
argues that the incentive to develop political and economic institutions lies in the co-
ordination of expectations. 244
 He suggests that members of group prefer to act together in
collective goods situation with equal contribution, whether the contribution is large,
small, or zero. This preference can be either in favour of or against contribution
depending on what is expected of others. Under the assurance problem theory, members
of a group regulate their own behaviour in some large interest so long as they are
confident that other members are doing the same. However, the ability to predict the
behaviour of others is subject to varying limits of confidence. Therefore, in large groups,
the estimates of both the probability of contribution by others and the assurance with
which these estimates are held are likely to be lower than in smaller and more
homogeneous group.
In spite of their differences, all theories of Olson's, the prisoners' dilemma, and
the assurance problem involve problems of collective action. In the cases of Olson's
theory and the prisoner's dilemma theory, the problem is that it is always in the rational
interest of each group member to put its own individual interests ahead of its collective
interests. In the case of the assurance problem theory, the problem is that of co-
ordinating members' expectations regarding fair shares.
242 Ibid., pp. 473-475.243 lan Maitland, "The Limits of Business Self-Regulation," (1985) 27 California Management Review
132, p. 134.
244 Carlisle Ford Runge, "Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action," 46
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2.	 Antitrust Problem
Even if the free rider problem is overcome and a self-regulatory organisation is
established, antitrust problems, and the legal aspects thereof, remain in self-regulatory
activities. Since self-regulation is usually carried out by agreements between industry
members who are competitors in the industry, a self-regulatory scheme can be sanctioned
or severely restricted by antitrust laws which intend to strike at monopoly and attempts
toward monopoly, and to control anti-competitive activities. This antitrust issue has been
extensively examined in the U.S. where antitrust laws, especially the Sherman Act, are
applied to voluntary self-regulation, which has no statutory recognition, as well as
government supervised self-regulation which has statutory approved structure and is
overseen by a governmental regulatory agencies. Therefore, this antitrust problem
analysis will concentrate on the U.S. experiences.
In the U.S., the traditional form of self-regulation is carried out by trade or
business associations which are non-profit institutions and usually composed of business
firms that are competitors. 245 In the area of professions, professional associations have
had same functions as those in trade and business associations. Because of the structure
of their membership, self-regulatory efforts may turn out to be little more than thinly
disguised excuses for anti-competitive conduct such as price fixing, economic boycotts or
other prohibited anti-competitive conducts.
In the U.S. the antitrust provision particularly relevant to self-regulatory activities
is Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 246 In determining whether any organised conduct, such
The Journal of Politics 154 (1984), p. 155.
245 Marshall C. Howard, Antitrust and Trade Regulation: Selected Issues and Case Studies (1983), p. 77.
246 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). It provides, "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared
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as conduct of self-regulatory institution, violates the antitrust laws, the courts will address
three questions. 247 The first question is whether the self-regulatory conduct is immunised
from antitrust laws by federal statute. The self-regulatory conduct can be immune from
antitrust review by explicit or implicit statutory languages. 248 Therefore, under the
Supreme Court's ruling, self-regulatory activities need express statutory language to be
exempt from antitrust review by courts. Without express language, the exemption will be
granted under the narrowest scope with implicit language. Voluntary self-regulatory
activities with no statutory ground cannot escape from antitrust challenge.
The second question is whether a self-regulatory activity that is not immune from
judicial review under the antitrust law does violate those laws. Certain anti-competitive
conduct is so inherently anti-competitive that it is considered a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. 249 The application of the per se rule precludes any argument that the
conduct is pro-competitive or otherwise justified. Anti-competitive conduct that is not a
per se violation of the antitrust laws is subject to the rule of reason test. The rule of
reason test determines whether the long term pro-competitive effects of conduct outweigh
the short term anti-competitive effects. If the balance is favourable, the conduct will not
be considered a violation of the antitrust laws. The rule of reason test requires the court
to analyse the ambiguous motives underlying the conduct complained of, and the
to be illegal ..."
247 See Marianne K. Smythe, "Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the
Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for and Accommodation," 62 North Carolina Law Review 479 (1984), pp.
487-492.
248 But See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). In the case of implicit statutory
grants of immunity from the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find the repeals of the
antitrust laws by implication and when found only if necessary to make the statute of self-regulation work
and then only to the minimum extent necessary.
249 See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Price fixmg, territorial agreements,
group boycotts, and tying arrangements are deemed to be per se unlawful, consequently without inquiry to
deterrnme whether putative benefits to competition of activities outweigh the harm they have caused to
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economic effects thereof, to determine whether the primarily anti-competitive or pro-
competitive.250
Group boycott cases arise most often as attempts by self-regulatory organisations
to adopt or enforce uniform regulations or standards having exclusionary potential
without the participation of government. 25 ' The group boycott cases include direct
agreements not to buy or sell, blacklists by industry groups, sanctions of members by
associations, and establishment of product or professional standards. 252 The formation
and enforcement of agreement which prohibits members from dealing with potential
competitors is deemed per se illegal. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 253 the
governing body of the New York Stock Exchange passed a rule which prohibited
members from providing direct wire communication to the floor of exchange for non-
member brokers. The Supreme Court held that the removal of wires by collective action
of the Exchange and its members was per se illegal because of its blatant anti-competitive
impact on the excluded brokers. 254 Another type of boycott activity involves a concerted
response to the conduct or qualifications of particular competitors that are deemed
detrimental by an industry group or association. When a blacklist causes competitors to
stop dealing with the blacklisted party, the conduct is per se illegal as a group boycott.255
While blacklisting targets outsiders, sanctions of members by associations focuses on
targets who are already members of the group. This type of sanction may or may not
competition.
250 James F. Ponsoldt, "The Application of Sherman Act Antiboycott Law to Industry Self-Regulation: An
Analysis Integrating Nonboycott Sherman Act Principles," 55 South Calfornia Law Review 1(1981), p. 4.
251 Ibid., pp. 6-7.252 See ibid., pp. 9-15.253 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
254 Silver, p. 347.
255 See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers 'Association v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1913).
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constitute aper se illegal group boycott, depending upon the exclusionary effect upon the
sanctioned member. For example, the suspension of competing tournament golfer by the
association, which resulted in excluding the golfer from tournament play was classified
as an antitrust boycott. 256
 But a fine imposed upon an association member would
generally not be viewed as aper se illegal boycott. 257
 The establishment of industry-wide
product standards by associations of industry members may produce similar results of
group boycott, but to be classified as group boycott activity, an intended refusal to deal
and consequent exclusionary impact must be found.258
The third question is only relevant to activities of regulatory organisation which is
overseen by the government regulator under the specific legislation. It must be
determined whether anti-competitive conduct of governmentally recognised and
supervised self-regulatory organisations is actionable under the antitrust laws. In other
words who, the court or the governmental regulator, has jurisdiction in hearing antitrust
challenges to self-regulatory conduct? In Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 259 for
example, government supervised, statutory recognised self-regulators were not accorded
immunity solely by virtue of their status as government supervised self-regulators. Nor
do they gain immunity form having received prior approval of their conduct from the
federal regulatory agency that had the statutory responsibility to review their conduct.
On the matter of jurisdiction, the role of the federal regulatory agency in adjudicating
antitrust challenges to self-regulatory conduct is limited to deciding whether the self-
256 See Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
257 See Morjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle State Ass 'n of College & Secondary School, Inc.,
432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cu.), cert. demed, 400 U.S. 965 (1970)
258 Ponsoldt, op. cit., n. 250, p. 14.
259 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
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regulator's acts has violated the regulatory statute, and to acting as a fact finder.260
E. Self-Regulation and Korean Commercial Banking
As part of a credit control system, a "principal transaction bank system" was introduced
in 1974. The system was designed to control the concentration of bank loans and the
economic power of large business groups (chaebols). But since, when created, the
system was based on agreement by the banking industry, the "principal transaction bank
system" may be analysed as self-regulatory.
In May 1974, the Korea Federation of Banks adopted the Agreement on Credit
Control to Affiliated Business Groups. The agreement was prepared with the
administrative guidance of the government. 261 In July 1976, the OBS arranged for the
Korea Federation of Banks to make the Agreement on Operation of the Principal
Transaction Bank System. 262 Finally, in June 1978, the Agreement on Credit Control of
the Principal Transaction Banks was made. The 1978 agreement combined the 1974 and
1976 agreements and expanded the role of principal transaction banks in enforcing
them.263 Under the agreement, the principal transaction banks decided the upper limit of
a working fund within which credit may be provided; supplied equipment funds; arranged
financing in co-operation with other financial institutions; guided business management;
and provided fund management after borrowers entered into credit contract with the
260 Smythe, op. cit., n. 247, P. 499.261 S. Nam and D. Kim, "The Principal Transaction Bank System in Korea," in Aoki, M. and H. Patrick
eds. The Japanese Main Bank System (1994), p. 453-454.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
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bank.2"
The principal transaction bank system had some self-regulation features. It was
conducted by the banks in accordance with the agreement made by them. The banks had
supervisory powers in the areas of real estate acquisitions and investment in other
companies. As for the external control element, the system could be classified as
mandated self-regulation. But, the government decided the details of agreement rather
than providing framework.
The "voluntary" principal transaction bank system faced two problems. First,
since it lacked the legal foundation, the discontent voiced by chaebols increased as credit
control became tighter and the government forced sales of real estate and disposal of
some of their member companies. 265
 Second, the agreement had antitrust problem under
the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. 266
 Under the act, any abuses of market-
dominating power and undue collaborative activities were prohibited. 267
 Even if there
was no challenge against the agreement, the possibility of violating the act remained.
Therefore, an amendment to the General Banking Act in 1982 transformed the system
into official regulatory system. 268
 The Monetary Board issued "Regulation on Credit
Operations of Banking Institutions." This regulation was afterward stipulated in
Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions.269
264 P. J. Park, Financial System and Policy (1961-79). An Assessment of Park's Legacy, KJF Financial
Paper No. 95-02 (1995), pp. 54-55.
265 Nam and Kim, op. cit., n. 261, p. 455.266 Ibid.
267 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act of 1980 art. 1.
268 See General Banking Act art. 30.2.
269	 Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions arts 32-34.
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VI. REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF BANKING
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN KOREA
Among the various institutional arrangements for banking regulation and supervision,
there is no theoretically "ideal" framework for general application in banking regulation
and supervision. The structure thereof has usually been developed within and on the
basis of the historic context of each country individually. Therefore, the reform of the
Korean banking regulation and supervision structure must be discussed on the basis of
the Korean situation.
A. Institutional Arrangements
An executive branch, such as a ministry of finance, can regulate and supervise banking
industry effectively. 270
 However, to acheive effective regulatory and supervisory
operations, the regulator and the supervisor should be given some degree of
independence, free from political interference and especially from governmental
objectives, which may be inconsistent with regulatory and supervisory objectives. 27 ' For
example, the 0CC has degrees of independence from the Executive (the Treasury). Its
independence is "practical" rather than "legal". The Korean banking industry has
experienced significant controls by the Executive, especially the MoFE, and the failure of
regulatory and supervisory system in 1997. First and most importantly, the reform
should be focused on ensuring that Korea's commercial banks are regulated and
270 The government-controlled structure has advantages for economic development for the developing
countries. However, the experience has not proved that all developing countries succeed the economic
development under the government guidance and the control of banking system.
271 See Bascom, op. cit., n. 50, pp. 175-177. The regulation and supervision by the Executive can be
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supervised by authorities who have appropriate legal powers. In Korea, the MoFE has
actually regulated and supervised the commercial banks without proper legal powers. It
created unfettered intervention in the BOK and the commercial banks, which in turn led
to problems of moral hazard in banking as well as in other economic areas. Second,
Korea's new banking regulator and supervisor must be free from interventions. In this
respect, "practical independence" is more important than "legal independence." To
ensure the practical independence, however, it is also important to have a legally
independent regulatory and supervisory body. Therefore, it would not be practical to
locate the regulatory and supervisory body inside the MoFE, as a separate bureau, and to
give independent status, legally or practically, such as the 0CC. It must be questioned
whether a "practically" independent bureau could be created within the MoFE. Even if
an independent bureau is established, the question of effective co-ordination with national
policy goals remains unanswered.
The first alternative is self-regulation of the banking industry. The questions are
whether the self-regulation is feasible generally in banking regulation and supervision
area, and especially in Korea. In financial areas, self-regulation has been established for
the securities industries in the U.S. and in the U.K. Would it be feasible also for the
banking industry to introduce self-regulation? In order to answer the question, the issue
of need for regulation should be addressed. One of the main arguments for the regulation
of banks is systemic risk of banking industry. 272
 Banks have liquid liabilities (deposits)
and illiquid assets (loans). Moreover, it is well established that banks' assets are
generally worth significantly less in liquidation. These facts create an inherent
utilised for the objects of the government which are not necessarily for the safety and soundness of banks.
272 Richard Dale, "Regulating Investment Business in the Single Market," Bank of England Quarterly
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vulnerability of banks. In order to prevent system risk, a deposit protection scheme
and/or other support systems, such as lender of last resort, are provided. Since such
protection may lead to moral hazard problems, regulation and supervision should be
performed by a body where the lender of last resort and the deposit insurer participate.
However, in securities industry, investment firms are generally less vulnerable than
banks. 273
 Their assets consist largely of marketable securities and, therefore, there will be
little difference between their value on a going-concern basis and in liquidation. On
liabilities side, the investments firms have much of secured funding, and, unlike bank
deposits, it can not be immediately withdrawn. Therefore, their vulnerability is less
significant than that of banks. Accordingly, investment firms do not have the need for a
lender of last resort. 274
 This different nature between the banking industry and the
securities industry illustrates why the securities industry has the self-regulatory system
but the banking industry does not.
In the Korean regulatory system, self-regulation is rare and not well developed.
To introduce self-regulation into the banking system would be perceived as radical. Even
if self-regulation were ideal structure in Korean banking regulation and supervision, in
any event, some kind of external control elements will be involved. This implies that the
public authorities, the MoFE or/and the BOK, will be involved in the self-regulatory
system, illustrated by the mandated self-regulation of the U.K. financial service
regulation under the Financial Service Act. This assumption is practical because self-
regulation does not imply total absence of external control and, thus, at least, the BOK
who is the lender of last resort will not be excluded from the banking regulation.
Bulletin (1994), p. 334.
273 Ibid.
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Therefore, if there is no significant argument for excluding the public authorities and the
advantages of the self-regulation are not decisive, there is no reason why the public
authorities should regulate the banks directly. And if the BOK or/and the MoFE is
involved in banking regulation and supervision, there is a possibility for the MoFE to
intervene in the self-regulation.
The second alternative is to make the BOK, especially the Monetary Board,
independent. An independent BOK could perform its responsibility of banking
regulation and supervision free from the problem of governmental interference.
However, it is unclear whether a central bank, which has monetary responsibility, can
always ensure the safety and soundness of banking. 275 The independent central bank
could sacrifice the independence of banking regulation and supervision at the expense of
the independence of monetary policy. In such case, the government will try to control
banking industry to influence its objects indirectly.
The third alternative is to create an independent regulatory and supervisory agent.
Its structure should be independent "legally" and "practically." To assess the feasibility
of a new regulatory and supervisory agent, current Korean administrative organisation
should be examined. In Korea, three types of administrative organisations have been
established in relation to the administrative "operations." 276 The first type the advisory
board. An advisory board can be set up by the presidential decree, usually when an
executive branch needs expert consultation for its operation or policy decision. The role
of the advisory board is purely advisory. Even if its opinions and recommendations, in
274 Ibid., p. 335.
275 See Bascom, op. cit., n. 50, p. 176. The Latin Amencan experience has indicated that, with few
exceptions, the countries that experienced the most serious financial crisis were the ones where bank
regulation and supervision was the responsibility of the central banks.
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practice, affect the decision of the government, it does not have any legal power to
enforce or implement the decisions and the government does not have any legal
obligation to accept them. Currently most committee type organisations are advisory
boards.
The second type is the administrative board. An administrative board can be
established by legislation. 277
	Administrative boards are intended to perform
governmental operations, which may be carried out by non-governmental bodies. Their
functions and structures differ according to the purposes of the establishments. An
administrative board, unlike the advisory board, is granted legislative power and/or
judicial power. 278 The administrative board has a degree of autonomy within the existing
governmental structure. Most current administrative boards in Korea are administrative
tribunals, which have judicial functions in the specific area, such as the Fair Trading
Committee.
The third type is the regulatory committee. In Korea, only two organisations, the
Election Management Committee279
 and the Monetary Board of the BOK, may be
classified as regulatory committee. The Election Management Committee is responsible
for regulating of the election process: thus, it is not the regulatory body for economic
activities. Since the Monetary Board is not a separate entity for regulation and
supervision, but a internal body of the BOK, as discussed in the Chapter One, it is not an
independent regulatory agency in the strict meaning of the word. However, due to its
276 See M. S. Park, Korean Public Administration (1990), pp. 146-148.
277 The administrative boards are established by the specific legislatures rather than the Government
Organisation Act which provides general structure of the government. For example, the Fair Trade
Commission is established by the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act.
278 The Fair Trading Committee and the Central Labour Committee are the example of the administrative
board which has legislative power and judicial power.
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structure, the Monetary Board is the only independent regulatory committee which
regulates and supervises economic activities in Korea, and it has important features of
independent regulatory agency.
To establish an independent banking regulatory and supervisory agent, the
committee type institution is more suitable than an institution controlled by a single
administrator because the committee type institution is more familiar to the Korean
administration and it can consolidate various interests. Some lessons can be learned from
the structure of the Monetary Board. In its structure, as seen, it is doubtful whether the
structure of the Monetary Board is focused solely on the expertness of banking
regulation. Actually the members of the Monetary Board had financial expertness for
their background. However, in its original structure, when the Minister of Finance was
excluded, half of the members, including the Governor of the BOK, represented financial
area and the other half represented other commerce and industry. It suggested that the
structure of the Monetary Board intended to consolidate various interests of different
industries rather than to appoint experts of monetary policy and bank regulation.28°
After the 1962 Amendment to the Bank of Korea Act, the intention of the initial
act that the members should represent different industries remained. Two members
represented financial industry, and the other five members represented various industries.
However, it is uncertain whether this industry representation system works for the
purpose of consolidating the interests of different parts of economy and industries.
Rather, the composition of the Monetary Board was viewed as an effective control
system of economy as well as financial area. The Minister of the MoFE was the head of
279 See Y. H. Park, op. cit., n. 201, p. 57.
280 See Bank of Korea (1955), p. 15.
154
Chapter Two
the financial authorities and the government representative for the financial control. The
Governor of the BOK could be another representative of financial authorities. The five
members recommended by the government ministers could act as the authorities who
control the industries. It is also doubtful whether the two members recommended by the
banking institutions would act for the interests of the banking institutions because the
appointments of most of important positions of banking institutions, for example the
presidents and the directors of the banks, were under influence of government.
B. Assessment of the Financial Supervisory Commission
1.	 Structure of the Financial Supervisory Commission
(a) Composition of the Financial Supervisory Commission
Since the Bank of Korea Act assigned the banking regulatory and supervisory power to
the BOK, the MoFE has attempted to take back the power several times. The MoFE
again introduced the financial regulatory and supervisory system bill in 1997. It intended
the separation between monetary authority and regulatory and supervisory authority for
banking industry. It was to give the BOK independent monetary power and to create a
new regulatory and supervisory agency under the Prime Minister. The new agency, the
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), would regulate and supervise banks, securities
industry and insurance industry altogether.
Under the Act Concerning Financial Supervisory Organisation, the composition
of the FSC focuses on the objectives of financial regulation and supevison. Unlike the
previous Monetary Board of the BOK, the FSC's composition does not follow the
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principle of compromising the various interests of national economy. Only one member,
who represents the business sector, is recommended by the President of Korea Chamber
of Commerce and Industry.28 ' Five members (the chairman, vice-chairman, Vice
Minister of MoFE, Deputy Governor of the BOK, and President of the Korea Deposit
Insurance Corporation) are related to governing financial matters. The other three
members are experts in financial, accounting and legal areas.
The FSC's composition can increase efficiency and expertise when each member
contributes his/her expert without seeking any control over the FSC. Within this context,
the Deputy Governor of the BOK needs to act as an avenue of communication between
the BOK and the FSC. By separating financial regulatory and supervisory authority from
monetary authorities, the conflict of interest problem is avoided. But, since there is a
close relationship between the safety and soundness of banking system and the monetary
policy, the FSC and the BOK should co-operate with each other, especially during a
financial crisis. Together with the data supply requirements, 282
 through the Deputy
Governor, the BOK will be provided with sufficient information concerning banking
system, and it can introduce its proposal for banking regulatory and supervisory matters.
The FSC will be also provided the monetary information from the BOK.
The Deputy Minister of the MoFE (Deputy Minister) needs to represent the
government's policies and obtain information about financial regulation and supervision.
But, the Deputy Minister must not seek any control over the FSC. For governing
economic matters, the MoFE needs to be sufficiently informed through the Deputy
Minister. The President of the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation needs to represent
281 Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Orgamsations art. 4, ci. 1.
282 Ibid., art. 65.
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and inform the deposit insurance operations.
(b) Appointment, Term and Removal of the Financial Supervisory
Comm ission Member
The President appoints all members of the FSC. The chairman is appointed after the
State Council deliberation. The vice-chairman is appointed on the recommendation of
the Minister of the MoFE. The chairman administrates recommendation procedures for
members of the FSC. 283 By removing appointment administration power from the MoFE,
the possibility of intervention by the MoFE over the FSC is decreased. Except the ex-
officio members (the Vice Minister, Deputy Governor and President of the KDIC), the
FSC members are appointed for three year term, which is renewable once. The
establishing act restricts the President power to remove the FSC's members. 284 A
member can be removed only when (1) the member falls under any disqualification for
membership,285 (2) the member can not perform his/her duties due to mental or physical
disability; or (3) the member becomes inappropriate to fulfil his/her duties as a member
by violating his/her functional obligations under the Act Concerning Establishment of
Financial Supervisory Organisation.
(c) Location of the Financial Supervisory Commission
Under the establishing act, the FSC is under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, but the
283 Enforcement Decree on Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations art. 2.
284 Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations art. 10, ci. 1.
285 Ibid., art. 8.
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FSC shall operate its functions independently from the Prime Minister. 286
 This
arrangement is similar to the Korea Fair Trading Committee (FTC) which is responsible
for overseeing the antitrust activities and unfair competitions. 287 The FTC is located
under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, therefore, in structure, it is separated from
the MoFE.288 It is doubtful that separation from the MoFE ensures sufficient
independence or autonomy of the FTC from the MoFE. The new institutional
arrangement of the FSC under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister may change the way
of the MoFE's influence to the FSC's regulatory and supervisory activities. Even if the
act provides the "functional independence," Korea's experiences have revealed that the
Secretariat of the President usually intervenes in most of important government's
activities including banking regulatory and supervisory activities. This arrangement
being located the FSC under the Prime Minister can not solve the problems of
government's, both the MoFE and the Secretariat of the President, intervention.
Therefore, the FSC must seek a "practical way" to have autonomy in its operations.
2.	 Accountability of the Financial Supervisory Commission
It is essential for the regulatory and supervisory authorities to be independent not only
from the government but also from the politicians to achieve credibility and stability of
286 Ibid., art. 3.
287 Antitiit and Fair Trading Act art. 1. See J. H. Chung, Korean Economic Law (1994), pp.170-176. The
FTC consists of seven members. The chairman and the vice-chairman is appointed by the President after
recommendation by the Prime Minister. Other five members are appointed by the President after
recommendation by the chairman.
288 Until 1994, the FTC was located in the Economic Planning Board, which was merged with the MoF
into MoFE.
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the banking system. 289
 Since independence does not mean that the regulatory and
supervisory authorities are not accountable to anyone, it is necessary to arrange measures
for the accountability. But the measures must not be used as means of intervention or
control under the guise of accountability.
Even if the FSC is under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, the establishing
act grants it a "functional independence." The act does not provide any explicit
accountability of the FSC. One of the possible accountability measures is "reporting."
The FSC is not required to submit any report concerning its regulatory and supervisory
operations. By requiring to submit reports to the Prime Minister, the FSC will be
accountable. But this accountability will be restricted. Under the current arrangement of
placing the FSC in jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister will review the
reports. Then the report will be published and available to the public. The Prime
Minister will have no power to intervene the FSC.
Moreover, the FSC should publish its minutes. By publishing its minutes, the
FSC can increase the transparency in decision-making processes and supervision
processes. It can also improve the FSC's independence because the transparency in the
procedures decrease the possibility of intervention from the other parts of government
and politicians.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS - INDEPENDENCE OF BANK
REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES
The Korean banking system can be characterised as a "government controlled system"
289 See Lastra, op. cit., n. 65, pp. 15 1-152.
159
Chapter Two
for credit allocation for government objectives through legal and practical means. This
system provided weak bank regulation and supervision when the government pursued
objectives which were inconsistent with "safe and sound" banking regulatory and
supervisory objectives.
The most important aspect of a new reformed banking system should be an
appropriate structural arrangement for bank regulatory and supervisory authorities in
Korea. This structural arrangement can ensure that possibilities of undue governmental
and political interference are removed. This aim can be achieved by giving "legal and
practical" independence to the bank regulatory and supervisory authorities (the FSC).
Despite the "legal and practical" independence of the FSC, however, further areas
of reforming the Korean banking system remain with regard to effective supervisory
standards, monitoring and enforcement. The significant problems in the Korean banking
regulatory and supervisory system are lax and inadequate prudential regulation and
supervision, and forbearance policies in enforcement. The further issues which arise with
regard to prudential standards, monitoring and enforcement are considered in Chapter
Three.
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PRUDENTIAL STANDARDS, MONITORING AND
ENFORCEMENT OF KOREAN BANKING REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION
Although new banking regulatory and supervisory authorities may secure their "legal and
practical" independence, such "independence" will not remove all possibilities of
"control and interference" by the government. Banking regulatory and supervisory
authorities, while technically independent, may nevertheless follow government
objectives that are inconsistent with "safe and sound" banking regulatory and supervisory
objectives. In such a case, the regulatory and supervisory authorities may try to control
or otherwise interfere in the banking sector. This practice will create a "regulatory
controlled" banking system.
A "regulatory controlled" banking system creates the same problems and
weaknesses in the banking sector that a "government controlled" banking system does.
This leads to issues of primary policy objective, prudential standards, monitoring and
enforcement, which restrict the operations of banking regulatory and supervisory
authorities.
In the search for an adequate policy objective, this chapter first discusses the
objectives of Korean banking regulation and supervision. This discussion focuses on the
areas of capital adequacy, loan classification, loan loss provisions and internal control
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systems for establishing appropriate reforms that can ensure that the Korean banking
system is "safe and sound" consistent with evolving international standards. This chapter
further discusses issues related to effective monitoring and enforcement practices
designed to ensure that banks apply and maintain relevant regulatory and supervisory
standards.
I. OBJECTIVES OF KOREAN BANKING REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION
A. National Economic Progress
1.	 Legal Interpretation of Banking Acts
In Korea, the objectives of banking regulation and supervision can be found in the
General Banking Act and the Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory
Organisations. The General Banking Act, which is the primary act for regulating and
supervising commercial banks, provides:
[t]he purpose of this Act shall be to contribute to the national economic progress by directing the sound
operation of banking institutions, protecting depositors, and maintaining the order of the credit system.1
Under this article, four objectives of the Korean banking regulation and supervision can
be identified: (1) contribution to the national economic progress, (2) sound operation of
banking institutions, (3) depositor protection, and (4) maintenance of the order of the
credit system. The Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory
General Banking Act art. 1. This article was enacted in 1982. Before the amendment to the General
Banking Act in 1982, there was no explicit provision for its purposes and objectives.
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Organisations, which establishes Korea's new financial regulatory and supervisory
framework provides:
[t]he purpose of this Act shall be to establish the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Financial
Supervisory Services in order to contribute to the national economic progress by establishing the order of a
sound credit system and fair fmancial business practice, and protecting financial users, such as depositors
and investors.2
The act also outlines four objectives for financial regulation and supervision: (1)
contribution to the national economic progress, (2) order of a sound credit system, (3) fair
financial business practice, and (4) protection of financial users.
The legal interpretation of those two provisions, if interpreted word for word, is
that "contribution to the national economic progress" is the primary goal of the General
Banking Act and the Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory
Organisations. Accordingly, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and the
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), as new Korean banking regulatory and supervisory
authorities, should achieve "national economic progress" through their operations. The
remaining objectives, (1) sound operation of banking institutions, depositor protection,
and maintenance of the order of the credit system in the General Banking Law, and (2)
order of a sound credit system, fair financial business practice, and protection of the
financial users in the Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory
Organisations, are thus "subordinate" to the objective of contribution to national
economic progress. Although the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities should
still make their efforts to achieve the "subordinate objectives," their "primary objective"
is the national economic progress. According to this interpretation, when there are
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conflicts between the national economic progress and other subordinate objectives, the
subordinate objectives must be conceded to the primary objective of national economic
progress. Thus, the subordinate objectives, such as sound operation of banks, could be
restricted and damaged. In practice, this argument has been used as justification for
controlling the banking industry in order to support the growth of the real sector economy
during the economic development period and even after the deregulation period in
Korea.3
2.	 Problems of Legal Interpretation
The interpretation that "contribution to the national economic progress" is the primary
objective of Korea's banking regulation and supervision raises two questions: (1) what is
the definition of the national economic progress? and (2) who shall define it? First, the
meaning of national economic progress is very broad and abstract. In the 1 960s and
1970s, the growth of the real economy was considered national economic progress in
Korea. In the 1990s, however, it is unclear whether the real sector growth is still
assumed to be national economic progress.
Second, there is no ultimate authority to define what is "national economic
progress." Nevertheless, a number of Korean acts relating to economic activities
generally provide that "the national economic progress" or "contribution to the national
economic progress" are the objectives of their enactment.4 According to the literal
2 Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisation art. 1.
See W. C. Chung, Financial Reform (1991), p. 38.
See for example, Bank of Korea Act; Act of Managing Bad Assets of Financial Institutions and
Establishing Korea Asset Management Corporation; Labour Act; Export Act; Securities Investment and
Trust Business Act; Futures Trading Act; Small- and Medium-size Business Basic Act; Foreign Exchange
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interpretation, "the contribution to national economic progress" is the primary objective
of each of the acts. Under the acts, authorities who are responsible for enforcing them are
given the power to define the meaning of national economic progress. Moreover, the
authorities form their policies and official decisions according to how "national economic
progress" is defined. When conflicts arise between the definitions, authorities must take
action to harmonise the definitions. 5
 For example, the Ministry of Finance and Economy
(MoFE), the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), the Bank of Korea (BOK),
and the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) have the power to define separately
what is "national economic progress." If there is any significant discrepancy between the
definitions, then obvious conflicts over the policies and decisions will likely arise. In
such a case, the MoFE might try to intervene in the decisions of other authorities, such as
the FSC, under the guise of economic progress. In such a situation, it is possible that the
FSC might bend to the political pressure applied by the MoFE. If this happens, then the
MoFE will prevail over the FSC. If the MoFE can successfully exert its political
influence over the FSC, it would diminish or destroy the independence of the FSC. On
the other hand, if the independence of the FSC is firmly established and the MoFE can
not intervene in the FSC's decisions, "national economic progress" could have more than
one definition and this could lead to policy confrontations between the MoFE and the
FSC due ta their differing views or interests.
Management Act; Credit Card Business Act; Long-Term Credit Bank Act; Insurance Business Act; Korean
Export Import Bank Act; Credit Insurance Fund Act; Securities and Exchange Act. But see Financial
Industry Restructuring Act; Depositor Protection Act; Merchant Banking Corporation Act; Trust Business
Act. Those acts do not provide "national economic progress" as their objectives.
5 It is possible that the courts can make the definition ultimately. However, the courts can not guarantee the
consolidated definition since the conflicts usually arises in detailed, specific cases. Furthermore, it is
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3.	 National Economic Progress as General Purpose
Even if the Korean economic related acts provide in their context that "contribution to the
national economic progress" is the primary objective, "contribution to the national
economic progress" should be interpreted as a general purpose rather than a specific
purpose. Under this interpretation, Korea's economic related acts would pursue the
national economic progress with regard to the specific objectives of each act. Those
specific objectives are the substantial objectives which the acts try to eventually achieve
respectively. In such an interpretation, any substantial objective can not be restricted or
damaged in the guise of national economic progress, because without achieving the
substantial objectives, the objective of national economic progress can not be achieved
either. Therefore, the substantial objectives of the General Banking Act are the sound
operation of banking institutions, depositor protection, and maintenance of the order of
the credit system, which will eventually contribute the national economic progress.
Equally important, the order of a sound credit system, fair financial business practice, and
protection of financial users are substantial objectives of the Act Concerning
Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations.
difficult for the courts to solve the conflicts when the urgent decision is needed, since the courts tend to
have long procedures.
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B.	 Implementation of Substantial Objectives in the Korean Banking
Regulation and Supervision
1.	 The Sound Operation of Banking Institutions and Fair Financial
Business Practice
The objectives of sound operation of banking institutions and fair financial business
practice have as their focus the immediate need of ensuring that individual banks operate
in a prudent manner and with fair business practices.
The objectives of sound operation of banking institutions and fair financial
business practice are embodied into various structural and prudential regulations in
Korea. In relation to the structural regulations, when the FSC authorises a banking
institution's charter, the FSC will examine whether the bank applying for the charter has
sufficient starting capital with which it can operate business prudently and efficiently.6
The General Banking Act prohibits bank shareholders from compelling or exercising
influential power over the banking institution to commit any action prejudicial to the
soundness of the financial business order. 7 Furthermore, any person who poses a threat
to the sound management of a banking institution is prohibited from being appointed as a
bank officer.8
The objectives of sound operation of banking institutions and fair financial
business practice also play a role in Korea's prudential regulations. In conducting its
banking business, a banking institution shall ensure the soundness of its management.9
6 Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions art. 4 no. 1.
General Banking Act art. 16 ci. 8.
8 Ibid. art. 18. ci. 2.
Ibid. art. 45 ci. 1.
167
Chapter Three
The FSC establishes and imposes management guidelines in order to secure the
soundness of banking institution management. When a banking institution seriously
threatens the soundness of its management by failing to comply with the management
guidelines, the FSC may require the banking institution to take corrective actions such as
increasing its capital or restricting dividends in order to improve its management status.10
For example, when a banking institution's financial status is unstable, such as when its
capital adequacy ratio is below the required level, the FSC may order the banking
institution to undertake "management improvement measures."t1
2.	 The Order of the Credit System
The objective of maintaining the order of the credit system is concerned with the stability
of the Korean credit or financial system in general. Before authorising a banking
institution's merger or financial institution's transfer to a bank, regulatory authorities will
consider whether the merger or transfer might damage the order of the credit system.'2
When it is necessary to preserve the order of the credit system, the FSC may impose on a
banking institution "management improvement measures" or a "management
improvement order." 3 Under the Depositor Protection Act, the Korea Deposit Insurance
Corporation (KDIC) can request the FSC to examine any financial institution, including
banks, when the KDIC deems it is necessary to maintain "the stability of financial
system."l4
t0 lbid. art. 45 ci. 3.
1 Financial Industry Restructuring Act art. 10 ci. 1.
12 Ibid. art. 4 ci. 3 no. 1.
t3 Ibid. art. tic!. I.
14 Depositor Protection Act art. 21 ci. 3.
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3.	 Depositor Protection
When the financial conditions of a banking institution seriously threatens the interests of
depositors (such as when the bank is facing bankruptcy or insolvency in regard to its
deposit liabilities), the FSC may order the banking institution to restrict its acceptance of
deposits and granting of credits, or to suspend repayment of all or part of its deposit
liabilities, or take any other actions deemed necessary.' 5
 Those actions include
"management improvement measures" and a "management improvement order." The
KDIC can request the FSC to examine banks when the KDIC deems it is necessary to
protect depositors' interests.'6
C. The Need for New Objectives in Korean Banking Regulation and
Supervision
1.	 The Failure of Banking Regulation and Supervision
The Korean government's control over the banking industry and corporations, especially
with respect to lending activities, has led to problems of moral hazard. 17
 Furthermore,
the government's bailout practices have only increased the potential for moral hazard.
Korean banks have historically extended their loans under the directions of the
government. Even after the partial deregulation in the 1 990s, which gave Korean banks
increased autonomy in their lending activities, the Korean banks' lending practices
15 General Banking Act art. 46.
16 Depositor Protection Act art. 21 ci 3.
169
Chapter Three
remained the same. The banks continued to lend to inefficient and failing businesses,
confident that the government would eventually come to the rescue in times of trouble.
This assumption of eventual government assistance has led to excessive risk-taking not
only by the banks but also by the corporations. Banks have traditionally preferred to lend
to big chaebols which were presumed to be less risky because the banks believed that the
government would essentially guarantee the loans. The practice of lending mainly to
chaebols has led to overexposure to this borrower sector. Such overexposure has meant
that in many cases banks have had no other option a situation in which the banks had to
continue lending to highly leveraged companies even if there was a high probability of
default) 8 Such practices have resulted in a marked deterioration of the health of Korean
commercial banks.19
While the government's control over the Korean banking industry focused on the
credit allocation of banks, the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities failed to
implement or enforce adequate regulation and supervision. Despite Korean commercial
banks having a crucial role in the financial market infrastructure, they had lax lending
standards and inadequate regulation and supervision of their activities. This situation is a
substantial cause of the systemic nature of the banking crisis.20
Even though the General Banking Act was enacted with the ostensible philosophy
that the bank regulatory system should protect depositors by safeguarding banks against
17 Korea's credit policy involved significant subsidisation of the cost of borrowing and encouraged firms to
enter particular industries. See Dmitri Vittas and Yoon Je Cho, "Credit Policies: Lessons from East Asia,"
World Bank Working Paper No. WPS 1458 (1995), p. 18.
18 Y. Kim, "The Inefficiency of Bank Intermediation in Korea and Its Effects," Bank of Korea Monthly
Bulletin (July 1993), pp. 10-11.19 See also Chapter Two Section III C 2 (c).
20 See Alan Greenspan, "Statement," before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services of United
States House of Representatives (30 Jan. 1998).
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failures, 2 ' there were only nominal provisions in the act to uphold that purpose. Once the
privatisation and liberalisation of bank operations were completed, the government's
formal control over structural and functional regulations were gradually eased. At the
same time, several prudential regulatory measures were introduced. However, these
regulatory measures have been unable to provide a safe and sound banking system. For
example, even when Korean commercial banks conducted business through trusts, their
trust accounts were not subject to the single borrower credit ceilings. This permitted the
banks to breach the single borrower lending limit by lending through trust accounts. In
February 1997, after the Hanbo scandal, the Office of Bank Supervision (OBS)
investigated four commercial banks and the Korea Development Bank. That
investigation revealed that one commercial bank had lent in excess of the lending limit to
the Hanbo Iron & Steel Company, the principle company of the Hanbo group. It is
unclear whether the bank maintained the limit on its banking account book because the
OBS did not publish the separate ratios. However, the OBS pointed out the problem of
trust account lending.22
2.	 Deregulation
Financial industries over the world have undergone extensive structural change,
domestically and internationally, as a result of regulatory reforms and technological
21 P. J. Kim andY. C. Park, Korean Economy and Finance(1984), p. 192.
22 See Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Special Examination relating to Hanbo Iron & Steel
Co." (Feb. 21, 1997); see also Office of Bank Supervision, "The Bankruptcy of Hanbo Iron & Steel Co.
and the Measures to Banks," Supervision Report, No. 175 (15 Mar. 1997), p. 8.
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innovations. 23 An increasing ineffectiveness of direct controls forces financial systems to
shift to be more market-oriented and regulatory authorities to implement liberalisation
measures. 24 With regard to the banking industry, deregulation includes the areas of
interest rate controls, quantitative investment restrictions, line-of-business regulations and
restrictions on ownership linkages, restrictions on foreign bank entry, and capital
controls. 25 In the emerging market economies, the financial and banking reforms are
generally aiming to remove "financial repression."26
Deregulation has led to major economic consequences. In the OECD countries,
deregulation has created structural changes in financial markets; changed the internal
efficiency and resources allocation; and affected financial stability and macroeconomic
policies. 27 The structural changes have led to competition and greater use of
securitisation techniques. 28 Deregulation also causes banks to be more cost-conscious as
profits margins decrease. 29 However, deregulation in the banking sector also appears to
be linked to the instability of banking sector. 30 In emerging market economies, banking
sector liberalisation and reform may increase financial market fragility. A number of
23 See Malcolm Edey and Ketil Hviding, "An Assessment of the Financial Reform in OECD Countries,"
OECD Economic Department Working Papers No. 154 (1995), p. 4. See also Alan Greenspan, "Remarks,"
at the Conference on Bank Structure and Competition of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (1 May
1997). Greenspan observes that the financial market transformation, for the most part, has not been
propelled by legislative reforms but by technological changes.
24 Edey and Hviding, op. cit., n. 23, p. 4.25 See ibid., pp. 5-10.26 See generally Ash DemirgUc-Kunt and Ennca Detragiache, "Financial Liberalization and Financial
Fragility," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1917 (1998).
27 See Edey and Hviding, op. cit., n. 23, pp. 13-21.
28 OECD, Banks under Stress (1992), pp. 12-13. The structural changes also create the increased
internationalisation of financial markets, especially m the OECD countries. See Edey and Hviding, op. cit.,
n. 23, p. 14.
29 OECD, op. cit., n. 28, p. 13.
30 DemirgUc-Kunt and Detragiache, op. cit., n. 26, p. 11.
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banking problems and crises have emerged after deregulation. 31 In a liberalised,
deregulated banking system, the banks must operate in highly volatile environments, such
as with interest rate volatility. Deregulation also increases the opportunity for banks to
take on risks where the government implicitly or explicitly guarantees to bail out the
troubled banks (moral hazard problem).32
Since the early 1990s, Korea's banking and financial refonns have focused on
financial liberalisation and financial market opening. 33 The financial liberalisation
reforms include interest rate deregulation, fund operation, fund-raising deregulation,
business scope deregulation, and lowering entry barriers. 34 Korea's interest rate
deregulation began in 199	 Under the four-step interest rate deregulation plan, interest
rates for lending rates and long-term interest rates have been deregulated. By 1996, all
other interest rates except demand deposit rates were officially deregulated. As official
policy loans have been phased out, Korean commercial banks have been able to expand
their operations to high-yield but high-risk areas, such as securities investment and credit
card related lending. 36 Fund-raising deregulation allows banks to increase their share of
marketable financial products, such as Certificate of Deposits. At the same time fund-
31 See generally 0. Capiro and D. Klmgebiel, "Dealing with Bank Insolvencies: Cross Country
Experience," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1620 (1996), and C. J. Lindgren, G. Garcia
and M. Saal, Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy (1996). Cf, Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache,
op. cit., n. 26, pp. 5-7.32 See Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, op. cit., n. 26, pp. 11-12.
See Kang-Nam Lee, "Financial Reform in Korea: Its Impact on the Financial Sector and the Policy
Implication," 12th Pacific Basin Central Bank Conference (Nov. 1996), pp. 2-3.
3' See M. S. Kang, "Financial Liberalisation and Financial Supervision," Korea Development Institution
Research Report 96-03 (1996).
In December 1988, the Korean government announced interest rate deregulation. But in practice, the
government influenced interest rate decisions afterward. The government decided to deregulate the interest
rate again in 1991.
36 See Junggun Oh, "Financial Reform and Central Banking Policies in Korea," paper prepared for third
International Conference on Annual Review of Central Banking Policies in the Asia-Pacific Basin (June
1997).
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raising deregulation has induced large firms to increase direct financing. Pursuant to
business scope deregulation and lowering entry barriers, Korean commercial banks and
non-bank financial institutions are allowed to expand their scope of operation scope with
newly introduced financial instruments.37
While the deregulation policies were formulated to promote a market-oriented
banking system, deregulation in Korea has increased the fragility in the banking system.
First, business scope deregulation, lowering entry barriers, and interest rate deregulation
have all led to increased competition in the financial industries. Rapidly growing non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs), especially merchant banking corporations, were an
important source of competition to the commercial banks in Korea. 38
 Since the NBFIs
were generally less regulated and subject to weaker supervision than Korean commercial
banks,39
 their growth exacerbated problems with the commercial banks' market shares
and profitability. In response to this competition, Korean commercial banks have
focused on increasing their volumes of deposits and loans. As the competition among the
commercial banks and between the commercial banks and the NBFIs increased, the
commercial banks were forced to offer more attractive terms to depositors. This volume-
focused practice increased the ineffectiveness in management and hampered their
profitability. 40 For example, Korea's commercial banks recorded lower returns compared
to U.S. commercial banks before the liberalisation. 41
 After the deregulation, the lower
3 See J. B. Choi, Korean Financial Policy after the Liberalisation (1996), pp. 223-232.
38 See Pedro Mba and et al., "Volatility and Contagion in a Financially-Integrated World: Lessons from
East Asia's Recent Experience," paper presented at the PAFTAD 24 conference, "Asia Pacific Financial
Liberalization and Reform, Chiangmai, Thailand (20-22 May 1998), p. 12.
The NBFIs usually offer higher returns to their funding sources than the commercial banks.
O See C. K. Lee, Korean Finance (1996), pp. 125-132.
41 See generally D. H. Chi, "Profitability of Korean and American Commercial Banks," KIF Financial
Research Paper (1997).
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returns continued and returns during the period between 1991 and 1995 actually
decreased.42
Second, with unresolved and mounting non-performing loan problems resulting
from the policy loans,43
 the increased competition induced Korean commercial banks to
pursue risky investment strategies. For example, the Korean commercial banks'
securities investments increased significantly. In 1994, the rate of increase was 73 per
cent. 44
 This rate of increase fell to 33.8 per cent and 32 per cent in 1995 and 1996
respectively, but the ratios were still significantly higher than the rate of lending
increases.45
3.	 Financial Globalisation
Financial globalisation and integration result from two important financial reforms:
internationalisation of financial services and capital market liberalisation.
	 The
internationalisation of financial services eliminates discrimination in treatment between
foreign and domestic financial services providers and removes barriers to the cross-
border provision of financial services. 46
 The internationalisation of financial services, in
the emerging market economies, has had a substantial impact on their domestic financial
markets. For example, lowering entry barriers to foreign banks and granting national
42 Ibid.
For example, Korea's five large nationwide commercial banks had been forced to involve the policy
loans and the industrial restructuring programs and had large non-performing loans as a result. The non-
performing loans became the major negative factor against their profitability. See B. Y. Kim, "Earning
Structure of Korean Commercial Banks: Diagnosis and Prescriptions for Improvement," KJF Financial
Paper (1997), pp. 5-10.
See Oh, op cit., n. 36.
See Bank of Korea, "Commercial Banks' Operation in 1996," Bank of Korea Monthly Bulletin (April
1997), p. 46.
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treatment for existing foreign banks has allowed greater competition in the domestic
banking market. The increasing number of foreign banks in emerging market economies
reduces profits of domestic banks.47
Capital market liberalisation involves a process of removal of capital controls and
restrictions on the convertibility of currency. 48	Internationally, capital market
liberalisation in the industrialised countries has facilitated a greater flow of funds to
emerging markets. 49 In the emerging market economies, many countries have relaxed
controls on international capital movements and have experienced significant capital
inflows. Indeed, private capital flows to developing countries increased six-fold over the
years 1990-1 996.°
In Korea, the financial reforms on market opening5 ' include the foreign exchange
system,52 foreign investment, opening the securities market, 53 and foreign financial
46 Stijn Claessens and Tom Glaessner, "Internationalization of Financial Services in Asia," World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper WPS 911 (1998), p. 3.47 See Stijn Claessens, Ash Demirguç-Kunt, and Harry Huizinga, "How Does Foreign Entry Affect the
Domestic Banking Market?," World Bank Working Paper No. 1918 (1998).
48 Claessens and Glaessner, op. cit., n. 46, p. 3.
' See Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis," Harvard Institute
for International Development (March 1998), p.9.
50 Alba and et a!., op. cit., n. 38, p. 2. For boom in capital inflows to Asian emerging market economies,
see IMP, International Capital Markets: Developments. Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, World
Economic and Financial Surveys (1998), pp. 40-44.
See generally R. Barry Johnston, Salim M. Darbat, and Claudia Echeverria, "Sequencing Capital
Account Liberalization: Lessons from the Experiences in Chile, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand," IMF
Working Paper No. WP 97 157 (1997). In 1994, Korea's financial market opening was accelerated for
joining the OECD.
52 In March 1990, a Market-Average Foreign Exchange Rate (MAR) System was introduced. This system
allowed the Korean won to U.S. dollar rate to be determined on the basis of underlying demand-supply
conditions in the domestic inter-bank market. Furthermore, in September 1992, a negative-list system for
the management of foreign exchange replaced the positive-list system.
53 In January 1992, foreign investors were permitted to by domestic shares directly in Korean domestic
market, subject to a certain overall limit on their total holdings of a company's shares. In the bond market,
non-guaranteed convertible bonds and long-term bonds issued by small- and medium-sized companies, and
non-guaranteed convertible bonds issued by large-sized companies have been allowed to be purchased.
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institutions' entry into the domestic market. 54
 After opening its financial markets, Korea
experienced a large inflow of capital. 55
 Korea's total external liabilities increased from
US$ 67 billion in 1993 to US$ 170.6 billion as of 30 September 1997. 56 The capital
inflows into Korea have had a distinctive feature. Unlike other East Asian countries,
capital inflows have been mainly related to portfolio investments and interbank loans
rather than foreign direct investments in Korea. 57
 Of all total external liabilities, the
Korean financial institutions, including commercial banks, were responsible for more
than sixty-five per cent. 58
 The foreign liabilities of the Korean banking system more than
doubled from 4.5 per cent of GDP in 1993 to 9.5 per cent of GDP in mid-1997.59
Moreover, the structure of external liabilities revealed that short-term liabilities were
more than sixty per cent of the total liabilities.60
The economic needs test, which had been used in evaluating foreign financial institutions' branch
opening application, was also abolished.
The Korean government's high-interest rate and tight monetary policy, which set domestic real interest
rates way above world markets encouraged foreign borrowings.
56 According to Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data, international bank lending to Korea was
about US$ 103.4 billion in mid 1997. Bank for International Settlements, The Maturity, Sectoral and
Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending: First Half 1997 (1998). This official figure was
revised in December 1997 following the growing international pressure over Korea's indebtness. The
Korean government and the IMF agreed with new definition of external liabilities. The definition of the
total Korean external liabilities is the liabilities including the external debt as defmed by the IBRD,
offshore borrowings of Korean banks, borrowings of overseas branches and subsidiaries of Korean banks,
excluding borrowings of overseas branches and subsidiaries of Korean enterprises, and deposits in overseas
branches and subsidiaries of Korean banks. For more Korean external liabilities figures, see BIS Monetary
and Economic Department, The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International Bank
Lending: First Half 1997 (Jan. 1998); Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Agreement on
External Liabilities between Korean Government and JMF" (30 Dec. 1997); Ministry of Finance and
Economy Press Release, "The Government Releases Figures on the Total External Liabilities of Korea as
of the end of 1997" (5 Feb. 1998); IMF, "Republic of Korea: Statistical Appendix," IMF Staff Country
Report No.9873 (1998).
See Pablo Bustelo, "The East Asian Financial Crises: An Analytical Survey," ICEI Working Paper
(1998), p. 73, Table B.9.58 See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Agreement on External Liabilities ...," op cit., n.
56.
Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects,"
Harvard Institute for International Development (April 1998), pp. 14-15.60 See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Agreement on External Liabilities ...," op. cit., n.
56.
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Under financial globalisation, macroeconomic instability can be increased by
sudden changes in macroeconomic policies, accumulation of unsustainable fiscal and
current account imbalances, heavy reliance on volatile short-term external financing, or
defence of exchange rates that is out of line with fundamentals. 6 ' Financial globalisation
makes some countries vulnerable to a loss of investor confidence and reversal in capital
flows, when the countries fail to provide regulatory controls and sufficient transparency
to allow markets to recognise and correct the problems of excessive risk-taking.62 First,
the high levels of capital inflows place new pressure on under-developed financial
systems. In both commercial banks (which are intermediating rapidly growing levels of
financing), and banking regulatory and supervisory authorities (which are trying to
regulate and supervise rapidly growing activities), the institutional changes generally
cannot keep pace with the high levels of international capital flows. 63 Countries with
weak financial system, particularly in terms of supervision, have sometimes experienced
financial distress following a period of rapid inflows of foreign capital associated with
the earlier removal of controls on international capital movements.
Second, excessive capital inflows resulting from globalisation create conditions
for excessive risk taking, poor banking judgement, and even outright fraud. Moreover,
moral hazard problems occur when banks and other financial institutions are able to
borrow with implicit or explicit guarantees from the government on their liabilities.
61 See Working Party on Financial Stability in Emerging Economies, "Financial Stability in Emerging
Market Economies: A Strategy for the Formulation, Adoption and Implementation of Sound Principles and
Practices to Strengthen Financial System" (April 1997) (hereinafter sited as Financial Stability in Emerging
Market Economies), p. 12.
62 Alba and eta!., op. cit., n. 38, P. 11.
63 Radelet and Sachs, op. cit., n. 49, p. 10.
See Patrick Honohan, "Banking System Failure in Developing and Transition Countries: Diagnosis and
Prediction," BIS Working Paper No. 39 (1997), p. 4.
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When the financial system is undercapitalised and/or weakly regulated, banks and other
financial institutions tend to make excessive, overly risky investments. Foreign as well
as domestic creditors went along with this risky behaviour, as they were confident that
the government or international financial institutions would bail them out if problems
arose. 65
The Korean banking system became more fragile as a result of financial
globalisation. After Korea removed capital controls, the banking regulatory and
supervisory authorities failed to provide appropriate regulatory and supervisory measures
to deal with the high level of capital inflows and its impact on the economy. As a result,
the undisciplined foreign lending and volatile international flows deteriorated the
international liquidity position of the financial system. 66
 Furthermore, the weak banking
regulatory and supervisory system induced the Korean banks to borrow excessively from
abroad and finance unprofitable projects with excessively high exchange risk.67
D. Financial Stability as a Goal of Banking Regulation and Supervision
Every banking system is prone to problems and fragility. Such banking problems and
fragility come from various factors, such as macroeconomic shocks, structural
characteristics of the banking sector, and vulnerability to sudden capital outflows, that
lead to systemic banking sector problems and, ultimately, increase the probability of a
65 See Paul Krugman, "Fire-Sale FDI," paper prepared for NBER conference "Capital Inflows to Emerging
Markets (1998).
66 See generally Robert Chang and Andrés Velasco, "The Asian Liquidity Crisis," Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta Working Paper 98-1 1 (1988).
67 See in particular, Paul Krugman, "What Happened to Asia?," MIT (1998). Between 1990 and 1996, the
ratio of bank lending to GDP grew around 15 per cent in Korea. See Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti and
Nouriel Roubini, "What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis? Part I: A Macroeconomic
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crisis.68
 In the environment of deregulation and globalisation, not only individual banks
but also the banking system as a whole becomes vulnerable. A troubled banking system
tends to misallocate capital and encourage excessive risk taking. 69
 Furthermore, if a
banking crisis occurs and the banking system becomes insolvent, the cost of banking
system failure is high, such as severe reduction in real economic activity. 70
 Therefore,
banking regulators and supervisors need to provide protection against systemic instability
in the banking system.
In Korea, one of the major causes of the 1997 financial crisis was the unfettered
government intervention in the banking system. 71
 To establish a safe, sound, and
effective banking system, Korea needs an approach that removes the government's and
the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities' interventions which deprive banks of
commercially-oriented, effective business operations. This approach gives banks greater
incentive to act independently in their market operations. For example, non-intervention,
incentive-oriented regulatory and supervisory practices improve banks' autonomy in their
lending activities and can avoid policy-induced non-performing loans. However, it is
equally important to ensure that investors, creditors, owners and managers, in the pursuit
of their private interests, pay heed to the consequences of their actions and take necessary
precautions in the face of risks. Together with the risks from deregulation and financial
globalisation, the increased autonomy of banks will likely create more instability in the
banking system unless the appropriate measures are implemented. Therefore, in the
Overview," paper presented at the CEPRJWorId Bank conference "Financial Crises: Contagion and Market
Volatility," London, 8-9 May 1998 (1998).
68 See Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal, op. cit., n. 31.
69 See Gerard Caprio, Jr., "Safe and Sound Banking in Developing Countries: We're Not in Kansas
Anymore," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1739 (1997), pp. 4-9.
70 See ibid.
180
Chapter Three
interest of preserving the stability of the financial system in Korea, especially with regard
to the banking sector, the Korean banking regulatory and supervisory authorities need to
provide the financial stability in the Korean banking system.72
Korea's current banking regulatory and supervisory objectives are inadequate for
maintaining the stability of the Korean banking system. Even if the Korea's new banking
regulatory and supervisory authorities, FSC and FSS, operate with the mandates of
maintaining sound operation of banking institutions and fair financial business practice,
order of the credit system, and depositor protection, those mandates can not ensure
Korea's financial stability. The current substantial objectives are more oriented towards
individual banks than to the banking system as a whole. As Korea's recent experience
shows, individual bank oriented objectives can create moral hazard, which allows the
troubled banks to stay in the banking system and, ultimately, results in banking system
instability. An important goal of financial stability should be to remove the moral hazard
problem by allowing certain banks to fail as long as such failure will not lead to systemic
instability. In most case, an individual bank can fail without causing system instability,
and the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities should not intervene in the
individual case.73
 However, banking regulation and supervision should ensure that the
banking system is stable. A stable and robust banking system can lower the risk that
problematic real economic conditions will lead to financial crisis, as well as reduce the
71 For the causes of Korean financial crisis, see Chapter Four Section II.
72 See Basic Committee on Banking Supervision, "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision"
(Sep. 1997) (hereinafter sited as Basic Core Principles), p. 8.
The Basic Core Principles supports the notion that "supervision cannot, and should not, provide an
assurance that banks will not fail. In a market economy, failures are a part of risk-taking." Basic Core
Principles, ibid., p. 9. Alan Greenspan also observes that occasional failures are an important and normal
part of the market process because they promote market disciplines, provided that the failures do not lead to
more systemic consequences. Alan Greenspan, "Opening Remarks," at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City symposium "Maintaining Financial Stability in a Global Economy" (28-30 Aug. 1997).
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damage from a crisis if it occurs. The banking regulation and supervision should contain
the systemic risk by reducing financial fragility with appropriate prudential standards,
monitoring and enforcement. Accordingly, the financial stability objective does not
eliminate the need for current substantial banking regulatory and supervisory objectives,
but instead calls for such objectives to be strengthened for the purpose of banking system
stability. Moreover, the new objective of preserving financial stability should be codified
in the General Banking Act and the Act Concerning Establishment of Financial
Supervisory Organisations. Clear objectives and responsibilities will ensure and
strengthen the independence of the regulators and supervisors in order to formulate
effective regulation and supervision. This is especially important in Korea where the
government has historically had extensive controls in the banking system.74
In order to achieve the goal of financial stability, banking regulators and
supervisors should establish a comprehensive set of prudential standards. Financial
deregulation and globalisation create a situation in which the banks are often induce to
take more risks. Unless this incentive is controlled through effective prudential
regulation and supervision, the increased risk taking due to moral hazard can become a
source of banking fragility. 75 The Korean banking regulatory and supervisory authorities
therefore must establish standards to resolve the current financial and economic crisis and
to promote safety and soundness in the banking system in order to avert or mitigate future
problems. To meet those goals, Korea should improve prudential regulation and
supervision. Together with the non-intervention, incentive approach, adequate prudential
regulatory and supervisory standards for individual banks and the banking system as a
See Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies, op. cit., n. 61, p. 39.
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, op. cit., n. 26, p. 11.
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whole are the answer. The focus of Korea's current prudential regulations must shift
from the health of individual banks to the stability of the banking system as a whole. The
goal of prudential regulation and supervision should be to identify weak banking
practices early so that emerging problems can be addressed before they become large and
costly to the banking system as a whole.76
II. PRUDENTIAL STANDARDS OF KOREAN BANKING
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
To achieve financial stability in the Korean banking system, Korea needs to review the
current banking regulatory and supervisory standards and establish new standards for the
restructured banking system after the financial crisis. The new banking regulatory and
supervisory standards should (1) prevent the government, especially the Ministry of
Finance and Economy, and the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities from
exercising "unfettered and unreasonable" controls, (2) give more autonomy and
responsibilities to the banks, and (3) enhance the prudential measures. However, it is
important to ensure that the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities have powers
to review and assess the standards and intervene to prevent any imprudent practices of
banks.
The areas of improving prudential standards include the capital adequacy
standards, loan classification standards, loan loss provisions, and internal control systems.
76 See Susan M. Phillips, "Testimony," before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, United States House of Representatives (8
Oct. 1997).
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A. Capital Adequacy Standards
1.	 The Concept of Capital Adequacy Standards
The capital adequacy measures for banking institutions are a cornerstone of prudential
regulation and supervision, designed to ensure that banking institutions do not take
imprudent risks and that they manage their assets and sources of funds in a prudent and
honest manner in both domestic and international contexts. 77 In the domestic banking
area, capital adequacy measures are generally justified under reasons of safety and
soundness, and also competitive equality and transparency. 78 Under the safety and
soundness justification, capital adequacy measures (1) establish adequate solvency 79 and
public confidence; 8° (2) provide general supervisory and examination tools for internal
regulatory purposes; 81 (3) provide a degree of governmental insulation for deposit
insurance funds; 82 and (4) provide an effective tool for monitoring and instilling bank
management discipline. 83 Capital adequacy measures also remove uncontrolled
competitiveness in a deregulated banking environment and establish a "level playing
field" where every affected party can access information and evaluate his economic
For the justifications and criticisms of bank capital adequacy standards, see Joseph Norton, Devising
International Bank Supervisory Standards (1995), pp. 22-36.
78 See ibid., pp. 23-3 1.
9 Capital is a necessary cushion to absorb unexpected losses or sustained losses. Lacking adequate capital,
the banks' potential for failure is enhanced. See United States General Accounting Office, "Risk-Based
Capital: Regulatory and Industry Approaches to Capital and Risk" (July 1998), p. 21.
80 See R. M. Pecchioli, The Internationalization of Banking (1983); see also United States General
Accounting Office, "Risk-Based Capital ...," op. cit., ii.	 p. 32.
81 See T. de Swaan, "Capital Regulation - The Road Ahead," statement at the conference "Financial
Services at the Crossroads: Capital Regulation in the 2 1' Century" (Feb. 1998).
82 See Mark J. Flannery, "Deposit Insurance Creates a Need for Banking Regulation," Fed. Res. Bank of
Phila. Bus. Rev. (Jan.fFeb. 1982).
83 See United States Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations for
Safer, More Competitive Banks (1991), pp. 11-2-3.
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positions. 84 In the international area, the capital adequacy requirement framework has
been applied to internationally active banks since the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision85 published its report on "International Convergence of Capital Measurement
and Capital Standards" (the Basle Capital Accord) in July 1988. Under the Basle Capital
Accord, capital adequacy measures are justified for the safety and soundness of the
international banking system and competitive equality and transparency within
international banking.86
However, the capital adequacy requirement framework has some deficiencies.
The major deficiencies stem from the arbitrary way in which the standards have been
formulated and from the framework's inability to adequately cover for banking risks.87
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the Basle standards, as Greenspan observes, there is
no choice but to continue to plan for a successor to the simple risk-weighting approach to
capital requirements embodied within the current regulatory standards. 88 Adding more
and more layers of arbitrary regulation would be counter productive. 89 In addition,
regulatory minimum capital adequacy requirements can serve to help ensure the stability
See Norton, op. cit., n. 77, pp. 29-31.
85 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision comprises representatives of senior officials of the central
banks and supervisory agencies of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Committee meets
regularly at the Bank for International Settlements, Basie, Switzerland.
86 See Norton, op. cit., n. 77, pp. 31-36.
7 The initial bank risk-based capital requirements primarily emphasised credit risk, reflecting the
predominance of lending activities by the banks. In 1996, the Basic Capital Accord was amended in order
to include corporate market risk requirements for specific types of assets that are often traded in the
internationally active banks.
88 Alan Greenspan, "The Role of Capital in Optimal Banking Supervision and Regulation," remarks before
the Conference on Capital Regulation in the 21st Century (Feb. 26, 1998).
89 Ibid.
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of financial markets to which they apply by limiting bank failures and losses to customers
or depositors.9°
2. Development of Capital Adequacy Standards in Korea
Korea's capital regulations date back to the enactment of the General Banking Act. The
General Banking Act of 1950 prohibited banking institutions from maintaining risk assets
in excess of ten times of equity capital. 9 ' Those requirements eased to fifteen times of
equity in 1962 for financing economic development programs. 92 In 1969, the risk / asset
based formula was changed to a payment guarantees based formula. 93 The ratio (total
payment guarantees and acceptances / capital) was again eased to twenty times of capital
in 1977, and to twenty times of the bank's equity in 1982.
The Office of Bank Supervision (OBS) also required commercial banks to
maintain certain "gearing ratios" in order to reflect desired levels of capital for liquidity
purposes. In 1981, the OBS set capital-to-deposit guidelines at ten per cent for all banks.
In 1988, in line with the ongoing financial liberalisation, the guideline was changed to the
capital-to-total asset ratio. 96 Under its guidelines, nationwide commercial banks and
local banks were required to maintain a minimum of six per cent and eight per cent of
United States General Accounting Office, "Risk-Based Capital .. .," op. cit., n. 79, p. 4.
91 General Banking Act of 1950 art. 15 ci. 1. The risk assets were bank's total assets less cash, deposits in
the Bank of Korea and banks abroad, and amount of Monetary Stabilisation Bonds. The equity capital
includes paid-in capital, reserved provisions and other surplus. In its allocation of the net profit earned in a
fiscal term, a bank should credit at least ten per cent of the net profit to a legal reserve until such time as the
reserve equals the amount of its total paid-in capital.
92 General Banking Act of 1962 art. 15 cl. 1.
General Banking Act of 1969 art. 15 ci. 1.
General Banking Act of 1977 art. 15 cl. 1.
General Banking Act of 1982 art. 15 cI. 1.
96 The gearing ratio is calculated as total assets (of banking account and trust account) capital. The capital
to asset ratio directs attention to the asset-side as a possible source of financial deterioration.
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capital to total assets, respectively. The minimum ratios were raised to eight per cent for
the nationwide banks and nine per cent for the local banks at the end of 1990. Actually,
however, the gearing ratios failed to carry out their prudential purposes. First, the ratio
did not weigh the risks of banks' assets. Second, the OBS did not have or exercise
appropriate enforcement measures. When a bank failed to maintain the minimum ratios,
the OBS did nothing more than call the bank's attention to the fact.
The amendment to the General Banking Act in 1991 required banks to maintain
prudent management and granted the Korean banking regulatory and supervisory
authorities, the Monetary Board and the OBS, powers to establish measures for banks'
prudent management. Thereafter, the Monetary Board introduced capital adequacy
requirements in July 1992. The capital requirements were based on the Basle
Committee's risk weighted capital adequacy requirement. The Monetary Board and the
OBS enforced the requirement from the end of 1993. Initially, the banks were required to
maintain minimum 7.25 per cent ratio until the end of 1994. The full eight per cent ratio
has been imposed from the end of 1995.
3. Shortcomings of Korean Capital Adequacy Requirements
Although Korea has established capital adequacy requirements for the commercial banks
following the Basle Committee's rules, the requirements have some shortcomings. First,
the priority of Korea's capital adequacy requirement was not aimed at establishing
prudential standards for Korean commercial banks. Instead, the new capital requirements
were introduced in order to raise Korean banks' credit standing in the international
finance markets, to promote preventive measures against adverse effects from the
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banking deregulation, and to work toward international regulatory convergence.97
Although the introduction of capital adequacy requirements may have improved the
general health of Korea's banking system, the requirements have not contributed to the
Korean banks' prudent behaviour. Under the implicit guarantees inherent in the
government's policy of refusing to allow any bank to fail, the Korean banks did not view
the capital adequacy requirement as a means to improve their prudential operations, but
instead considered only the penalties from the supervisory authorities if they failed to
maintain the ratios. 98
 Furthermore, the Korean government and the banking regulatory
and supervisory authorities focused only on the consequences of Korean banks' failing to
maintain the capital requirement in the international financial markets.99
Second, in spite of the fact that the framework of the Korean capital adequacy
requirement was similar to that of the Basle Capital Accord, there was inadequate
implementation. Pursuant to the requisites of the Basle Capital Accord, Korean capital
adequacy ratios are calculated on a consolidated basis; capital includes both core capital
(tier one) and supplementary capital (tier two); and assets are weighted item by item to
reflect credit risks.'°° The off-balance sheet engagements are also included in risk-
See Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Commercial Banks' Capital Adequacy Ratios and
Strengthening Strategy for the Capital Adequacy Ratios" (15 April, 1996).
98 H. Y. Chae, "Bank Capital Regulation: Theory and Practice," KIF Financial Paper No. 95-03 (1995), p.
2.
9 The OBS suggested several strategies for strengthening the capital adequacy ratios in order to improve
the Korean banks' credit standing in the international financial markets. It suggested that if the Korean
commercial banks failed to maintain minimum capital adequacy ratio of eight per cent, their credit
standings would be deteriorated and their funding Cost (borrowings) from the international financial
markets would be increased. Thus, the Korean banks would experience unfavourable operational
environments. See Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Commercial Banks' Capital Adequacy
Ratios ...," op. cit., n. 97.
100 See Financial Supervisory Commission, "Commentary on the Capital Adequacy Requirements
Calculation" (1998).
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weighed assets after conversion using credit conversion factors. 10 ' In Korea, however,
supplementary capital is made up of revaluation reserves, gains on securities valuation,
general provisions for loan losses, and subordinated term debts. Gains on securities
valuation may be included up to a maximum of forty-five per cent, and general
provisions for loan losses are limited to a maximum of 1.25 per cent (1.5 per cent before
the end of 1995) of risk-weighted assets.
Under the Basle standard, general provisions or general loan-loss reserves can be
part of the supplemental capital. According to the Basle Committee:
[g]eneral provisions or general loan-loss reserves are created against the possibility of future losses. Where
they are not ascribed to particular assets and do not reflect a reduction in the valuation of particular assets,
Where, however, provisions have been created against identified losses or in respect of a demonstrable
deterioration in the value of particular asset, they are not freely available to meet unidentfied losses
Such specific or earmarked provisions should therefore not be included in the capital base. 102 (Italics
added).
Korean implementation of the general provisions for loan-loss as supplemental capital is
not in accordance with the Basle standards. Most Korean banks' general provisions for
loan-losses are reserved for their non-performing loans) 03 The loan loss provisions for
Doubtful and Expected Loss loans, and part of Substandard loans are provisions created
against an identified deterioration in the value of particular assets although they are not
allocated to these assets. Those reserves cannot be used freely to cover unidentified
future losses. Therefore, the "general provisions for loan-loss" are not suitable as
supplemental capital for the capital adequacy requirement. 	 This inadequate
101 See ibid.
102 Balse Coniniittee on Bank Supervision, "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standard," (1988), para. 18.
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implementation led to a distorted perception of the real status of Korean banks' capital
ratios. For example, according to the OBS, Korean commercial banks maintained over
ten per cent of capital ratios in 1993 and 1994. 104
 However, the OBS required the banks
to maintain eight per cent of "real capital adequacy ratio." The "real capital adequacy
ratio" was calculated based on the formula that the bad debts (Doubtful loans and
Estimated Loss loans) were written off. Those ratios were not published by the OBS.
But, under the "real capital adequacy ratio," five out of six large Korean nationwide
commercial banks failed to meet the minimum eight per cent capital adequacy ratios at
the end of 1993.'° It also revealed that the more bad loans a bank had, the more
aggravated ratio the bank had.'° 6
 The new Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC)
recognised this problem and announced an amendment to the definition of supplemental
capitals for the capital adequacy ratio. Under the amendment, general loan-loss
provisions for non-performing loans (Substandard loans, Doubtful loans and Estimated
Loss loans) would be excluded from supplemental capital.'° 7
 The FSC imposed the new
rule from 1 January 1999.
Third, Korean capital adequacy standards allow Korean banks to count up to
forty-five per cent of their latent gains on securities holdings as supplemental capital.108
Since the Basle standards permit country regulators to have some discretion in their
103 Chae, op. cit., n. 98, p. 56.
104 The nationwide commercial banks maintained average 10.40 per cent and 10.19 per cent at the end of
1993 and 1994 respectively. The local banks maintained even higher ratios. They maintained average
14.86 per cent and 13.21 per cent at the end of 1993 and 1994 respectively. See ibid., pp. 54-61.
105 See ibid., pp. 55-6 1.
106 One nationwide bank, which had the largest amount of bad loans, had 5.47 per cent of "real capital
adequacy ratio," even if its official capital adequacy ratio was 9.84 per cent at the end of 1993. See ibid.
107 Office of Bank Supervision of Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "Amendment to the
Capital Adequacy Ratio Rules" (18 Aug. 1998).
108 Korean commercial banks are allowed to invest in stocks on their own account. Therefore, their
portfolios are directly vulnerable to asset price fluctuations.
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choice of supplemental capital, the treatment of latent gains on securities holdings is one
of the areas where discrepancies arise across countries. For example, U.S. banks cannot
count their latent gains on securities holdings as capital while their Japanese counterparts
can. The inclusion of unrealised gains of investment securities in regulatory capital may
intensify the volatility of capital adequacy ratios, thus having an inappropriate impact on
banks' behaviour.' 09
 For example, Korea's stock market plunged from a high value of
1000 for the Korean stock market index in 1991 to 500 in 1995. After the financial crisis,
the index plunged to less than 400. The deterioration of stock market values created large
losses of investment securities, which deteriorated the banks' capital requirement ratios.
4.	 The Use of Capital Adequacy Requirements in Korea
Even if the current risk-based capital adequacy requirements are arbitrarily formulated
and have limited coverage of banking risks, the capital requirements should be employed
for improving the safety and soundness of Korean banking system and enhancing the
transparency in the banking operations and banking regulatory and supervisory
operations.
Given that Korean commercial banks now will have greater autonomy in their
operations and less intervention, the Korean banking regulatory and supervisory
authorities must establish adequate supervisory and examination tools for banking
operations and the banks' positions. The capital adequacy requirement ratios provide an
objective, rule-based standard. For example, the FSC uses the capital adequacy
109 See Tatsuya Yonetani and Yuko Katsuo, "Fair Value Accounting and Regulatory Capital
Requirements," papers presented at the seminar sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
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requirement ratios to determine the soundness of individual banks. When the capital
adequacy ratio of an individual bank declines below a certain level, this automatically
triggers supervisory enforcement measures by the FSC.
Second, the capital adequacy requirements can provide individual banks with a
method to improve management discipline. Since the financial crisis in 1997 in Korea,
the capital adequacy requirement ratios have attracted particular attention from the
public. Bank managers have sought public confidence by increasing the capital adequacy
requirement ratios. Now that the Korean banking regulatory and supervisory authorities
have abolished guidelines which allowed the banks report better figures than their true
positions, bank managers need to act more prudently than before to protect their banks'
capital adequacy ratios.
Third, the capital adequacy requirement ratios as objective standards provide
transparency in the Korean banking operations. When correctly implemented, capital
adequacy requirements prevent banks from extending political loans, which would
eventually deteriorate banks' financial positions. The Korean banks are thus encourage
to establish more transparent lending policies and standards to maintain the requirements.
Moreover, the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities could not cover any
irregularities (e.g., those arising from political loans). The objective capital adequacy
requirements provide a restraint by limiting the regulatory and supervisory authorities'
forbearance.
titled Financial Services at the Crossroads: Capital Regulation in the Twenty First Century (Feb. 1998), pp.
10-11 and pp. 14-16.
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B. Loan Classification and Adequate Provisions
Korea's failure in the area of prudential banking regulations did not arise mainly from the
absence of prudential rules, but from weak implementation and poor supervisory
practices. Even if the Korean capital adequacy requirements have some shortcomings,
the major banking problems come from insufficient and ineffective mechanisms for
enforcing those rules. For example, applying the Basle eight per cent capital adequacy
rule without adequate loan loss provisioning distorts the information value of the capital
ratios. 11 ° Compliance with the eight per cent capital adequacy rule without adequate
reserves for loans of doubtful quality renders the ratios meaningless as banks may boost
capital ratios at the expense of provisioning. Therefore, under the Basle capital adequacy
rule, the regulatory and supervisory authorities should set out clearly the criteria, rules,
and practices for loan classification and loan loss provision.
1. Loan Classification and Loan Loss Provision Requirement before the
Crisis
In the past, the Korean banking supervisory authorities required Korean commercial
banks to classify their assets into five categories; normal, precautionary, substandard,
doubtful, and estimated loss." Pursuant to these regulations, banks' assets included
loans and discounts, domestic import usance bills, advances for customers, contra
account of acceptances and guarantees, foreign exchange, letters of credit, securities,
110 C. Dziobek, 0. Frecaut, and M. Nieto, "Regulatory and Tax Treatment of Loan Loss Provisions," IMF
Papers on Policy Analysis and Assessments No. PPAA/96 6 (1996).
III Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions of the Bank of Korea art. 20.
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advanced payments, credit card loans, and receivable claims." 2
 Among the banks'
assets, loan quality is most important to safety and soundness because loans are ordinarily
a bank's single largest asset and represent the greatest potential for
	
13 The FSC also
implements the definition of loan classification as the principle standard for other bank
assets. 114
 Under the regulations established by the Monetary Board, Korean commercial
banks had to classify their loans into five categories:"5
(1) Normal loans were defined as total credits extended to customers maintaining
sound financial condition, credit standing, and business standards.
(2) Precautionary loans were defined as total credits extended to customers who call
for particular attention in post-management based upon financial condition, credit
standing, and business standards. 	 The supervisory authorities required the
commercial banks to classify overdue loans in arrears for from three months to six
months as precautionary assets.
(3) Substandard loans were defined as the estimated amount to collect among the total
credits extended to customers who have an unfavourable financial condition, credit
standing, or business standard which requires some concrete steps of collecting the
credit. The overdue loans in arrears for six months or more were classified as
substandard loans. The OBS required the banks to calculate the estimated amount
based on its guidelines."6
112 Detailed Enforcement Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions of the Bank of
Korea art. 46.
113 See United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: 0CC Examinations Do Not
Fully Assess Bank Safety and Soundness" (Feb. 1993), P. 2.
114 Securities are classified with different standard and the Korean commercial banks need to reserve
securities loss provisions separated from the loan loss reserve.
115 Detailed Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions of the Bank of Korea app. 4.
116 Detailed Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions of the Bank of Korea art. 49;
Detailed Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions of the Bank of Korea app. 5.
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(4) Doubtful loans were defined as the portion of credits among total credits extended
to customers classified as substandard which is expected to be a loss but has not yet
been recognised as such.
(5) Estimated loss loans were defined as the portion of credits among total credits to
customers classified as substandard which must be accounted as a loss because
collection will not be possible.
Under the regulations, however, industry rehabilitation loans" 7 were subject to a
different classification. Since industry rehabilitation loans extended to non-viable
companies, the supervisory authorities required commercial banks to classify them as
normal, substandard, and estimated loss loans. Industry rehabilitation loans, which were
a type of credit that earns more than the prime-rate, were classified as normal loans. The
loans, the interest of which were exempted or given a grace of payment, were classified
as substandard loans. If the bank waived the credits, the loans were classified as
estimated loss.
After asset classification, Korean commercial banks were required to reserve 0.5,
1, 20, 75, 100 per cent of total amount against normal, precautionary, substandard,
doubtful, and estimated loss assets as loan loss provisions."8
2.	 Strengthening of Loan Classification and Loan Loss Provisions
Requirements
Under the agreement with the International Monetary Fund," 9
 the FSC enhanced its loan
classification and loan loss reserve requirements. From July 1998, Korean commercial
I 17 The industry rehabilitation loans are bank credits to companies which are subject to the government's
corporate sector restructuring plans. See J. B. Choi, op. cit., n. 37, pp. 118-123.
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banks are required to classify their loans in arrears for three months or more as
substandard instead of precautionary, and those in arrears for from one month to three
months as precautionary instead of normal loans.' 20
 The loan loss provision requirements
are also tightened. From July 1998, the required provisioning rate for precautionary
assets is two per cent from one per cent. 121
 The FSC also requires the commercial banks
to reserve loan loss provisions for payment guarantees. Even if Korean commercial
banks had to classify payment guarantees of which the principal obligation is recognised
as contra account of acceptances and guarantees, the supervisory authorities did not
require the banks to reserve provisions against them.'22
Some assets in trust accounts such as commercial paper, guaranteed bills and
privately placed bonds are virtually equivalent to credit extensions, but classified as
securities which are subject to different provision rules. The FSC includes such assets in
the asset category subject to loan loss provisions.' 23
 In addition, the requirement of 100
per cent of loan loss provisions for trust accounts with guarantees of principal has been
added to those with guarantees of interests.124
118 Detailed Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions of the Bank of Korea app. 3.
119 See Republic of Korea, "Memorandum on Economic Programs" (13 Nov. 1998).
120 Detailed Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions app. 3.
121 Ibid. art. 38 ci. 1.
122 The commercial banks are required to reserve 20, 75, 100 per cent of total amount against substandard,
doubtfil, and estimated loss payment guarantees as payment guarantee loss provisions. Ibid. art. 38 cl. 6.
123 lbid. app. 3.
124 Ibid. app. 2.
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3.	 Loan Classification Standards and Appropriate Loan Loss Reserves
(a) Who Establishes the Loan ClassfIcation Standards
To provide the true picture of a bank's condition, the loan classification standards need to
reflect the particular bank's environment. Korea's specific loan classification guidance
can provide a means for quantifying the credit risk factors. However, if the standards are
weak, banks have opportunities to delay recognition of losses in their loan portfolios and
to mask the need for regulatory intervention. If the standards are too onerous, banks have
to reserve unnecessary loan loss provisions that result in loss of profits. Therefore, each
Korean commercial bank should establish its own loan classification standards which
adequately reflect its own specific circumstances rather than follow the guidelines in the
regulations.
(b) Adequacy and Transparency
To be able to prudently value loans, the loan classification standards should be objective.
The current Korean regulatory classification standards are based on the borrower's past
or current financial performance and they do not take into account the future performance
of a borrower and its projects which affect the prospects for collection of loans.' 25 If the
bank's assets do not have an objectively determined market value, it is difficult to assess
the value of problem loans. For example, if the loan classification is dependent only on
125 In 1999, asset quality classification standards will be introduced based on the assessed future ability of
borrowers to honour their obligations. Financial Supervisory Commission Press Information, "Progress of
Strengthening Prudential Supervision and Regulations" (14 Dec. 1998).
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the loan's payment status, such as in Korea, without regard to the borrower's
creditworthiness or to the market value of collateral, then the delay in recognising bad
loans can be considerable.' 26
 Therefore, loan classification should be based on the
borrower's past financial performance, the current financial condition as well as its
projections of future performance.'27
It is essential that the approach that the individual bank sets in its own loan
classification standards require the bank to have adequate policies, practices and
procedures for evaluating the quality of loans. The loan classification policies and
procedures should be written forms in order to be examined by the supervisory
authorities and updated regularly to maintain appropriate standards. The role of the
supervisory authorities should be evaluating the bank's written policies and procedures
based upon its own guidelines, and confirming the bank's practices.
(c) Appropriate Loan Loss Reserve Requirements
Even if banks classify their loans appropriately, adequate loan loss reserves are critical to
bank safety and soundness and essential to early identification of deteriorating financial
conditions.' 28
 First, capital difficulties are frequently caused by losses from bad loans
and inadequate loan loss reserves are a common characteristic of banks which fail.'29
And a misstatement of the loan loss reserve affects capital and earnings, thus failing to
126 Inwon Song, "Korean Bank's Responses to the Strengthening of Capital Adequacy Requirements,"
Pacific Basin Working Paper No. PB98-0l (March 1998), p. 24.127 See Federal Reserve Board, Commercial Bank Examination Manual, sec. 2060.1, Classification of
Credits.
128 United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: 0CC ...," op. cit., n. 113, p. 33.129 Ibid., p. 2.
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reveal the bank's true financial conditions) 30 If the non-performing loans are
systematically understated, the loan loss provisions are apt to be too low, and the bank
net income and capital will be systemically overstated.' 31 Second, an inadequate reserve
also affects the examiners' ability to identify deteriorating financial conditions that may
require supervisory action between on-site examinations.'32
It is unclear that, in Korea, the current loan loss provision requirement practices
are adequate to state current financial conditions and provide sufficient protection against
future problems. The use of standard percentages derived from historical averages ("rule
of thumb approach") is likely to be misleading when applied to an individual bank, since
differences in loan portfolio characteristics, as well as current financial conditions, are
not considered.' 33 Since the Korean loan loss provision requirements are based on the
"rule of thumb approach," 34 the same problem arises in Korean banking supervision.
Like the loan classification standards, to take into account the individual
circumstance, the FSC needs to impose ultimate responsibility for establishing and
maintaining adequate loan loss reserve methodologies on individual banks. Then the FSS
should assess the reasonableness of banks' methodologies. The currently used "rule of
thumb approach" calculation should not be considered a floor or a safe-harbour level for
a bank's loan loss reserve. 135 The FSS should use the current standards as a "general
130 Ibid., p. 33.
13! Song, op. cit., n. 126, p. 24.
132 United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: 0CC ...," op. cit., n. 113, p. 33.
See United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: FRB Examinations and
Inspections Do Not Fully Assess Bank Safety and Soundness" (Feb. 1993), p. 33.134 The FSC does not mention that its requirements are based on the historical averages. But the FSC
regulations provide that the estimated loss amounts are same percentage as the loan loss provisions. See
Detailed Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking Institutions app. 13.
135 See Federal Reserve Board, "Commercial Bank Examination Manual," sec. 2070.1 Allowance for Loan
and Lease Losses, p. 2.
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guidance," taking into account the bank's individual circumstances. 136
 But the FSS needs
to develop a reliable methodology in order to effectively challenge bank managements'
reserving methods and results.'37
(d) Preventing Forbearance
Only with realistic loan classification and provisioning criteria are bank supervisors and
examiners able to identify asset quality problems and to ensure that banks take the
necessary corrective action. When the regulatory and supervisory authorities confirm a
bank's asset classification policies and procedures and the loan loss reserve methodology,
it is essential for banks to maintain the standards until proper modification is
implemented. Forbearance allows weak banks with distorted incentives to continue
operating, or invites looting by insiders, leading eventually to much larger clean-up
costs. 138 For example, the Korean supervisory authorities employed forbearance policies
before the financial crisis of 1997. Even if the regulations required the Korean
commercial banks to reserve more than 100 per cent of loan loss provisions, the OBS
permitted the banks' reserves to average 94 per cent of estimated loss loans as an interim
target ratio in 1997. The Korean forbearance polices distorted the ability to identify and
correct the banking problems.
136 See ibid.
137 See United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: FRB ...," op. cit. n. 133, p.
40.
138 Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies, op. cit., n. 61, p. 18.
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C. Internal Control Systems
1.	 The Need for Internal Control Systems in Korean Commercial Banking
Korea's past regulatory and supervisory practices have controlled every aspect of
banking operations. Such practices resulted in weak internal control systems in the
Korean banking system. Together with the weak classification and provisioning
requirements for problem loans, the weak internal control systems failed to provide the
banks with appropriate incentives to act prudently.
After the financial crisis in 1997, Korea has adopted reform polices which are
consistent with economic rationales) 39
 Under the policies, Korea's banking reform
enhances the liberalisation of the financial market. 14° The liberalisation policies increase
the competitive environment of the banks. A competitive environment needs
management soundness in order to promote financial stability. Therefore, when strict
regulatory controls are removed, the need for banks to develop sophisticated self-
regulatory mechanisms is evident. If the banks do not adopt alternative control systems,
the liberal circumstance encourages some banks to engage in imprudent activities, which
result in banking problems.
First, a system of effective internal controls is a critical component of bank
management and a foundation for the safe and sound operation of banks. 141
 It promotes
139 See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Korea's Economic Reform Progress Report" (13
Oct. 1998).
140 See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Reform Plans on Financial Industry
Regulations" (3 Dec. 1998).
141 Basic Committee on Banking Supervision, "Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking
Organisations" (Sep. 1998), p. 1.
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bank safety and soundness by preventing problems or irregularities from occurring.'42
The lack of good internal controls puts banks at risk of mismanagement, waste, fraud,
and abuse.' 43
 The BCCI affair clearly shows the need for an appropriate internal control
system. Owing to the absence of effective prudential supervision, which requires an
appropriate internal control system, BCCI was allowed to engage in myriad irregular,
often illegal, operations."
Second, together with the regulatory and supervisory prudential rules, appropriate
internal control systems can provide a framework to secure the soundness of banks. A
weak economy tends to expose internal problems which may not be evident when a bank
is operating in a strong economy.' 45 In a strong economy, a bank with strong
management and strong internal controls will most likely be healthy, and even a bank
with weak management and weak internal controls may be able to continue to operate,
although it may be considered a problem bank. In a weak economy, a bank with strong
management and strong internal controls will probably be able to remain sound, but a
bank with weak management and weak internal controls is likely to fail.' 46 Therefore,
good internal controls tend to serve as a buffer to protect banks from adverse economic
conditions and enhance a bank's viability.'47
Third, appropriate internal systems create a sound credit culture necessary to the
Korean banking system in the new economic environment. The weaknesses in the
142 United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: 0CC ...," op. cit., n. 113, p. 15.
United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: FRB ...," op. cit., n. 133, p. 4.
For more the internal controls and the BCCI affairs, see John F. Mogg, "Internal Controls: The EC
Response to BCCI," in Ray Kinsella ed., Internal Controls in Banking (1995).
145 United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Failures: Independent Audits Needed to Strengthen
Internal Control and Bank Management" (May 1989), p. 32.146 Ibid
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management of banks lead to excessive risk taking and undermine corporate governance
and market discipline. 148
 A sound credit culture is one of the key elements necessary to
the development of a robust financial system.' 49 To establish and maintain a sound credit
culture, Korean banks need appropriate internal control systems which create the
foundations of good institutional governance.
Furthermore, in Korea, internal control systems can be used as a "firewall" for the
banks against the government's unfettered interference in banking operations and
political loans, which are motivated by political or non-business considerations. As
experienced in Korea, government interventions blunt the banks' incentives to discipline
poor performers. Once an appropriate internal control system is established and well
operated, the possibility of the government's unfettered interference and the political loan
problems can be greatly reduced. The appropriate internal control system requires the
bank to operate in a transparent manner. Therefore, the irregular transactions, for
example lending influenced by the government or the politicians, can be detected and
subject to scrutiny.
2.	 Establishing the Internal Control Systems
To establish adequate internal control systems in the Korean banking system, it is
essential that the primary responsibility is placed on the individual banks. First, it is
impossible to achieve banking system stability without individual banks' financial
stability. The essential purpose of internal control systems is to safeguard the financial
147 Ibid., p. 30. See also United States General Accounting Office, "Thrift Failures: Costly Failures
Resulted from Regulatory Violations and Unsafe Practices" (June 1989), pp. 62-66.
148 See IMF, "Toward a Framework for Financial Stability" (1998), p. 7.
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integrity of banks.' 50 By imposing responsibilities for operating in a sounder and more
prudent fashion, the banks have to exercise a much higher degree of care. Banks also
must realise that they are no longer safe from failures because the government's
guarantee is removed. Second, standard internal control systems, designed to fit all
commercial banks, are likely to be misleading when applied to individual banks. The
current bank restructuring program in Korea would change the banking market into
specialised market shares.' 5 ' Acknowledging their limited administrative capacity,
instead of trying to solve all problems by themselves, the Korean regulatory and
supervisory authorities should encourage commercial banks to establish their own
internal structures to administer lending and manage risks. Since the individual
arrangements may differ, the FSC and the FSS should check that banks meet minimally
acceptable standards and monitor banks' compliance with those standards.
To impose the responsibilities for establishing adequate internal control systems
on the individual banks, it is essential that banks have managerial autonomy. Without
managerial autonomy, it is uncertain that banks, especially bank managements, can rebuff
the government's undue intervention. For example, when the government can influence
appointments of bank management, the bank management tends to follow the
government's directions rather than do what is financially sound for the bank.
Even if individual banks have primary responsibilities for internal controls,
underlying any solution to enhance bank internal control systems must be a co-operative
See Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies, op. cit., n. 61.
150 See Ray Kinsella, "Introduction: Internal Controls in Banking," in Ray Kinsella ed., Internal Controls
in Banking (1995), p. 1.
151 See Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "Reasoning behind Bank Selection of Acquiring
Banks" (29 July 1998).
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effort between banks and regulators.' 52
 Of them, banks have the primary responsibilities
to have an adequate internal control system for bank soundness. Then the regulatory and
supervisory authorities have the responsibilities for assessing whether the internal control
system is appropriate and is well functioning. 153
 By assessing each bank's internal
control system and identifying the weaknesses, the regulatory and supervisory authorities
can recognise problems as early warning signs of financial deterioration and consider
them in assessing bank safety and soundness.'5'
3.	 Components of Internal Control Systems
(a) Adequate organisational structures
(1) Board of directors
To have adequate internal control systems, banks need a board of directors responsible
for (1) approving and reviewing the overall business strategies and operating policies of
the bank; (2) approving the organisational structure, especially for adequate internal
control structure; (3) ensuring that senior management takes the steps necessary to
identify, measure, monitor and control the major risks run by the bank; and (4) ensuring
that senior management is monitoring the effectiveness of the internal control system.155
More specifically, the board of directors is responsible for ensuring that an adequate and
152 See United States General Accounting Office, "Failed Banks: Accounting and Auditing Reforms
Urgently Needed" (April 1991), P. 34.153 See Basic Committee on Banking Supervision, "Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking
Organisations" (Sep. 1998), p. 22.
154 See United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: 0CC Examinations Do Not
Fully Assess Bank Safety and Soundness," Report to Congressional Committees (Feb. 1993), p. 3.
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effective system of internal controls is established and maintained.' 56 It is also important
that, in an effective system of internal controls, the directors can discharge their fiduciary
duties without undertaking day-to-day monitoring of management.'57
The General Banking Act gives the board of directors of Korean commercial
banks powers to review and approval matters concerning (1) management targets and
appraisal, (2) the amendment of the articles of incorporation, (3) the budget, and (4)
important organisation changes, such as dissolution, transfer of business and mergers.'58
Since Korean banks are established as limited companies under the Commercial Code, a
board of directors also has the powers to approve the company's operations and oversee
the director's work.' 59 However, neither the Commercial Code nor the General Banking
Act provides clear authority or responsibility for a bank's board of directors to have an
adequate internal control structure. It is desirable that the General Banking Act provides
clear structural responsibilities for the internal control system in Korean commercial
banks. Until then, the FSC should provide that a board of directors of a bank has powers
to establish an adequate internal control system and relevant policies, and to review its
effective and efficient operations.
To ensure that it carries out its duties effectively, a board of directors should be
sufficiently independent from the management. Without independence, the board of
directors can not deter unsafe and unsound banking practices and other management
155 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, "Framework for Internal Control Systems ...," op cit., n.
l4l,p. 10.
156 Ibid.
157 United States General Accounting Office, "Failed Banks ...," op. cit., n. 152, p. 37.
158 General Banking Act art. 23. Until Februaiy 1999, the board of directors could review and approval
matters concerning steps for the resolution of bad loans and financial incidents whose scale was determined
by the FSC.
159 Commercial Code art. 393.
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abuses. To achieve independence, the non-executive members of the board have
important roles to prevent the executive directors from controlling the board. Under the
General Banking Act, a bank is required to have both executive directors and non-
executive directors.' 6° The number of executive directors must be less than half of the
total number of directors. The non-executive directors are recommended by the
representatives of shareholders (70 per cent of non-executive directors) and by the board
of directors (30 per cent of non-executive directors). Moreover, in respect of listed
company on the Korea Stock Exchange, at least 25 per cent of board members (minimum
one member) in a bank should be independent non-executive directors who are not
related to the bank.'6'
(2) Bank management
Once the board of directors approves the relevant bank operating policies, senior bank
management is responsible for executing bank operations within the policies.' 62
 The
senior bank management, including the president of bank and the executive directors, is
responsible for implementing strategies and policies approved by the board of directors;
developing processes that identify, measure, monitor and control risks incurred by the
bank; maintaining an organisational structure that clearly assigns responsibility, authority
and reporting relationships; setting appropriate internal control policies; and monitoring
160 General Banking Act art. 22 ci. 2.
161 Regulations on Secunties Listing (stipulated by the Korea Stock Exchange under the Securities and
Exchange Act) art. 48.5 ci. 1.
162 See H. J. Lee (the Chairman of the FSC), "Policy Directions for Economic Restructuring," address to
the Korea Chamber of Commerce (4 Feb. 1999).
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the adequacy and effectiveness of the internal control system.' 63
 To ensure the
management's effective function, the management needs to be free from other interest
groups, especially the government. It is doubtful that, in Korea, the current appointment
procedure for the bank management, especially the president of a bank, can prevent from
the government's interference over appointment of the bank management. A president of
a Korean commercial bank is recommended by the candidate recommendation
committee, consisting of all non-executive directors, before appointment by the
shareholders meeting.' 64
 However, it is long argued that bank management appointments
have been influenced by the government. It is essential, in Korea, that bank management
is selected and appointed free from any unreasonable considerations.
(3) Internal Auditor
Korean commercial banks are required to have an internal auditor. The internal auditor
needs to review the accounting and other records and the internal control environment.
The internal auditor also needs to be independent from the operational management. The
internal auditor is essential for an effective internal control system to monitor the system
by providing independent assessment of the adequacy of, and compliance with, the
established policies and procedures.165
163 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, "Framework for Internal Control Systems .," op. cit., n.
l4l,p. 11.
General Banking Act art. 24.
165 Basic Committee on Banking Supervision, "Framework for Internal Control Systems ...," op cit., n.
141, p. 20.
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(b) Lending Standards
An appropriate internal control system requires establishing policies governing lending
standards and other financial decisions that are explicit, transparent and disseminated
throughout the organisation.' 66 Among the internal controls, controls over loan
operations have paramount importance because loans typically comprise most of banks'
assets and involve significant risk.' 67 For sound bank management, the lending standards
need to include lending policies, prudent credit approval procedures, risk limitation, and
administration procedures.' 68 To enhance the transparency in the banks' lending
activities, the banks need to be required to have "written and detailed" loan policies and
procedures which provide assurance that loans are properly extended within the policies
and procedures. In addition, throughout the life of the loans, complete and current credit
information must be maintained.'69
In Korea, the lack of autonomous lending activities has been identified as one of
the major problems in the banking industry) 70 The lending decisions of Korean banks
have not been based on strict analysis of the profitability of borrowers' investment
projects. Rather, in the case of big firms, the banks have shown the tendency to lend
money in the belief that these are too big to fail, while in case of small and medium size
firms the lending decisions have been based mainly on the collateral offered.' 7 ' Without
166 See Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies, op. cit., n. 61, P. 34.
167 United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality; 0CC ...," op. cit., n. 113, p. 15.
168 See IMF, "Toward a Framework for Financial Stability," op. cit., n. 148, p. 7.
169 See United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: 0CC ...," op. cit., n. 113,
Pp. 15-16.
See Chung, op. cit., n. 3, pp. 50-55.
Bank of Korea, "Bank Restructurmg in Korea" (Dec. 1998), P. 5.
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securing autonomous lending decisions, Korean commercial banks can not be shielded
from unreasonable interference by the government and other interest groups. First, in this
circumstance, the appropriate lending policies and standards, which are explicit, detailed
and transparent, can help to prevent the banks from extending unsound loans. Second,
given the Korean banks have full autonomy in their lending activities, the appropriate
lending standards will be one of the major areas that the banking regulatory and
supervisory authorities review and assess in order to ensure that banking problems do not
arise from imprudent lending activities.
(c) Risk Management Standards
Sound internal risk management is essential for the prudent operation of individual banks
and for promoting stability in the financial system generally.' 72 As financial markets
develop and new complex instruments are introduced, effective risk management of
banks becomes even more critical.' 73 Therefore, an effective internal control system
requires that the banks have their own adequate risk management standards that recognise
and continually assess the material risks that could adversely affect the banks.174
In general, Korea's banking crisis in 1997 did not come from extraordinary
technical transactions but mainly from plain asset quality problems and market risk
exposures, especially to currency risk. This resulted from the lack of understanding of
the risks entailed in banking by Korean commercial banks as well as Korea's bank
172 See Basle Conm-iittee on Banking Supervision. "Risk Management Guidelines for Derivatives" (July
1994), p. 1.
1 Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies, op. cit., n. 61, p. 34.
1 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. "Framework for Internal Control Systems ...," op. cit., n.
l4l,p. 14.
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regulatory and supervisory authorities and from the weak risk management systems in the
Korean banking system. According to one survey, most of Korean commercial banks
have established asset and liability management (ALM) organisations and operated the
ALM systems as the risk management system. 175
 But the ALM systems of Korean banks
are at the beginning stage and have not influenced the decision making processes for risk
management.'76
The Korean banking regulatory and supervisory authorities need to focus on the
internal risk measurement and management processes of banks with more risk-focused
policies. This approach reinforces market incentives that prompt banks themselves to
invest heavily to improve their management information systems and internal systems for
quantifying, pricing, and managing risk.' 77
 In other words, the regulatory and
supervisory authorities need to supply general guidelines for the risk management
principles, while the banks are encouraged to develop their own risk management
systems. Until the Korean banks develop adequate risk management standards, the FSC
and the FSS need to provide their guidelines for the banks to develop their own risk
management systems. After the Korean banks establish individual risk management
systems, the FSC and the FSS need to continuously assess whether the banks have
adequate policies and procedures for identifying, monitoring and controlling risks. For
example, when banks engage in large borrowing in foreign currency, it is necessary for
In April 1997, of 18 Korean commercial banks, 16 banks had established ALM systems and the other
two were introducing the systems. Y. K. Hahm, "Adoption and Impact of Risk Management System in
Banking: An Empirical Study Focusing on ALM System," KIF Finance Research Paper 98-02 (1998).
176 Ibid., p. 37. The FSC also noticed that the risk management in Korean banks is infant stage. See
Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "Progress of Strengthening Prudential Supervision ...,"
op. cit., n. 125.
177 Alan Greenspan, "The Role of Capital ...," op. cit., n. 88.
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banks to have adequate risk management systems to prepare for a large and sudden
change in exchange rates.
(d) Adequate Administration Procedures
For effective internal control systems, appropriate administration procedures are
necessary to ensure that the established policies are followed and that special interests are
not allowed to influence decisions.' 78 Compliance with an established internal control
system depends heavily on a well documented and communicated organisational
structure that clearly shows lines of reporting responsibility and authority and provides
for effective communication throughout the organisation.' 79 A clear allocation of duties
and responsibilities can provide a structural framework which helps to remove the
possibilities of unreasonable influences. All levels of personnel in the bank will
understand that any policy violations or illegal actions are eventually noticed and the
responsibilities are located.
178 See IMF, "Toward a Framework for Financial Stability," op. cit., n. 148, P. 8.
179 BasIc Committee on Banking Supervision, "Framework for Internal Control Systems ...," op cit., n.
l4l,p. 12.
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III. MONITORING MEASURES AND PROMPT REGULATORY
ACTION
A.	 Disclosure Standards and Off-Site Surveillance
1.	 Public Disclosure
(a) Purposes and Benefits of Public Disclosure
Financial markets contain disciplinary mechanisms that can reinforce the efforts of
supervisory authorities by rewarding banks that manage risk effectively and penalising
those whose risk management is inept or imprudent. 18° The effective functioning of
market discipline could produce the optimal combination of financial stability and
efficiency and make the regulation and supervision of a banking system minimal.'8'
However, since market discipline can work well only if several conditions are met 182 and
the conditions are difficult to meet, market discipline should be used as the
complimentary means for the banking regulation and supervision.
Public disclosure has several benefits in promoting safety and soundness in the
banking system. First, public disclosure helps prevent the occurrence of problems in
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. "Enhancing Bank Transparency" (Sep. 1998), p. 1.
181 See Franco Bruni, "Prudential Regulation in an Integrated Financial Market: Issues of Optimality and
Credibility," in Guido Ferrarini ed., Prudential Regulation of Banks and Securities Firms: European and
Interanational Aspects (1995), p. 90.
182 See Timothy Lane, "Market Discipline," 1MF Working Paper No. WP 92 42 (1992). Lane classifies the
conditions into four categories:
(1) Financial and credit markets must be open and contestable;
(2) Financial operators must react rationally to the incentives provided by prices and risks that
they are able to assess;
(3) Information on the activities and financial conditions of borrowers, lenders and
intermediaries, must circulate quickly and spread symmetrically over the capital market; and
(4) Bailout of insolvent operators must not be anticipated.
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banks. Enhanced public disclosure allows market discipline to work earlier and more
effectively, thereby strengthening the incentives for banks to behave in a prudent and
efficient manner. 183
 Second, timely public disclosure can reduce the seventy of market
disturbance because market participants are informed on a more ongoing basis and,
therefore, not as likely to overreact to information about current conditions. 184 Third,
public disclosure can reinforce specific supervisory measures designed to encourage
banks to behave prudently by requiring banks to disclose whether or not they are in
compliance.' 85 By improving public disclosure, therefore, the banking regulatory and
supervisory authorities strengthen market participants' ability to encourage safe and
sound banking practices. To achieve the objective, a bank must provide timely, accurate,
relevant and sufficient disclosures of qualitative and quantitative information that enables
users to make proper assessment of the institution's activities and risk profile.'86
(b) Public Disclosure in the Korean Banking System
Korean commercial banks are required to publicly disclose (1) annual balance sheet as of
the closing date, (2) income statement for the fiscal year, and (3) combined financial
statements within three months from the closing date of accounts) 87 Korean commercial
banks are also required to submit their balance sheets to the Bank of Korea by the end of
each month, and the Bank of Korea shall publish them in its monthly statistical
183 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, "Enhancing Bank Transparency," op. cit., n. 180, p. 6.
184 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
185 Ibid., p. 7.
186 Ibid., p. 4.
187 General Banking Act art. 41 ci. 1.
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bulletin) 88
 Under the General Banking Act, 189
 the FSC requires Korean commercial
banks to disclose the management performance.' 90
 The management performance
disclosure includes matters relating to (1) the organisational structure and personnel, (2)
financial account and income account, (3) fund raising and its management, (4)
management indexes for prudence, profitability, and productivity, and (5) important bank
management subjects, such as management policies and risk management, which was
required by the FSS.' 9 ' Korean commercial banks are also required by the FSC to
disclose events which have a significant effect on prudential management.' 92
 These
include the occurrence of bad loans and financial incidents,' 93
 and the imposition of
management improvement orders. In addition, Korean commercial banks are required to
report their annual share holders' meeting (1) changes in bad and non-performing loans
for the fiscal year, and (2) the conditions relating to borrowers whose loans become
significant bad loans or non-performing loans.' All public disclosures are published in
the forms established by the FSC, the FSS, or the Bank of Korea.
Until October 1998, Korean commercial banks were required to publicly disclose
fifty-five items relating to the above requirements. From November 1998, the FSC
requires the commercial banks to disclose information under the Financial Industry
Public Disclosure Standards. Under the standards, the FSC enhances the disclosure
requirements. After establishing the standards, Korean commercial banks are required to
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid. art. 51.
190 Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Banking institutions art. 38 ci. 1.
Ibid.
192 Ibid. art. 38 ci. 3.
See Detailed Enforcement Regulations for Supervision of Banking lnstitutrnns art. 43.
194 Ibid. art. 44.
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disclose five more items' 95
 relating to (1) foreign currency dominated assets and
liabilities, including foreign currency liquidity ratios, (2) off-balance sheet activities,
including large losses under derivative contracts, (3) credit ratings by the rating agencies,
(4) risk management, (5) transactions with affiliates, (6) transactions with the Bank of
Korea and other financial institutions, and (7) trust accounts.
(c) Components of Public Disclosure
Public disclosure should be relevant and sufficient. The Basle Committee recommends
that, for enhancing bank transparency, the regular financial reporting and other public
disclosure information, in clear terms and appropriate details, should include (1) financial
performance, (2) financial position (including capital, solvency and liquidity), (3) risk
management strategies and practices, (4) risk exposures, (5) accounting policies, and (6)
basic business, management and corporate governance information.' 96 In Korea,
however, public disclosure has been limited to the status of financial statements. Since
the FSC has enhanced the public disclosure requirements in the areas of risk
management, off-balance sheet transactions, asset classification, and special disclosure
items such as those related to financial mishaps and losing a lawsuit involving a large
sum, the information from such disclosure can help the market participants, especially the
financial market professionals who are able to process highly sophisticated information
and directly influence bank behaviour. There are, however, areas to improve the public
disclosure in the Korean banking system. For example, trust businesses by commercial
195 See Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "Financial Institution Public Disclosure
Enhancement Measures" (9 Oct. 1998).
196 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, "Enhancing Bank Transparency," op. cit., n. 180, P. 17.
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banks are not subject to the same standards as the banking business generally. The trust
business should be disclosed under the same standards as the banking business because,
in order to enhance market discipline, disclosure should include the entire spectrums of
banks' operations.
Public disclosure should be timely. Information released "too late" considerably
reduces the value of public disclosure. To give a meaningful picture of a bank, the
information should be provided with sufficient frequency and timeliness.' 97
 In Korea, the
FSC has increased the frequency of regular disclosure (most disclosure of information
required by the General Banking Act and the FSC) from once a year to twice a year.
Quarterly disclosure is to be recommended after the introduction of quarterly accounting
requirements from September 1999. Information on the occurrence of large bad loans
and financial incidents is necessary to disclose immediately in a reliable way. Such
information has the strongest potential to trigger market reactions and the banks are
always reluctant to provide it 198 When such negative information is disclosed
involuntarily or indirectly, the markets' reaction can be very harsh.'
Information from public disclosure should be accurate. The bank management
and internal auditor have primary responsibilities for providing accurate information.
The external audit can ensure the accuracy of information provided by the banks but
tends to delay the release of information. 200
 Moreover, it is difficult to ensure that the
forward-looking information, such as earning predictions, is accurate or reliable when
197 Ibid., p. 16.
198 IMF, "Toward a Framework for Financial Stability," op. cit., n. 148, p. 24.
199 Ibid.
200 Basic Committee on Banking Supervision, "Enhancing Bank Transparency," op. cit., n. 180, p. 16.
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released. 201
 Therefore, the accuracy of information needs to be reviewed and assessed by
the supervisory authorities. Any substantial false or misleading information and omission
should be penalised. Furthermore, a key means of ensuring accurate and reliable
information is adequate accounting standards. 202 Objective official accounting standards
help diminish manipulative practices and avoid confusion on the part of users of financial
information.203
2.	 Supervisory Reporting and Off-Site Surveillance
Off-site surveillance provides early warning of actual or potential problems and a means
for monitoring banking performance. 204 To have effective off-site surveillance system,
the banking supervisory authorities require timely, accurate, relevant and sufficient
information. The information, which the banking supervisory authorities need, includes
not only the publicly disclosed information but also other information about the banks for
their own use. After collecting information, the supervisory authorities need to analysis it
in order to assess the condition of individual banks and the banking system as a whole.
More specifically, the supervisors need to detect potential problems at an early stage and
identify trends not only for particular institutions, but also for the entire banking
system.205
201 ibid., p. 16.
202 The accounting standards will be discussed in Section B.
203 See United States Department of Treasury, op. cit., n. 83, Discussion Chapter XI.
204 See Vincent P. Polizatto, "Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: Building an Institutional
Framework for Banks," World Bank Working Paper No. 340 (1990), p. 25.
205 BasIc Committee on Banking Supervision, "Enhancing Bank Transparency," op. cit., n. 180, p. 13.
218
Chapter Three
Korean commercial banks are required to submit to the FSS operation reports
(call reports) of the preceding month by the end of each month. 206
 The FSS stipulates the
types and contents of call reports in its procedures for the detailed enforcement
regulations. Under the procedures, the call reports include matters concerning (1) the
bank's structure and personnel, including the articles of incorporation, and stockholding
by single stockholders, (2) financial conditions, (3) affiliates, and (4) lending activities.
The FSS also requires Korean commercial banks to report the occurrence of business
suspension, the suspension and resumption of deposit payment, the changes of directors,
and the imposition of supervisory measures by foreign supervisory authorities to the
foreign establishments immediately. 207
 Moreover, the FSS can require Korean
commercial banks to submit reports and data on their operations and finances.208
In general, the reporting requirements to the FSS are very broad and the FSS can
acquire any reports and data from the banks if it decides that they are necessary to the
FSS's operations. It is difficult to draw a clear line for relevant and sufficient
information. However, the reporting requirements must be designed to make more
transparent the true position of banks, but not to impose substantial costs on the banks by
requiring irrelevant reports or data, 209 because the FSS's goals of operation are to
promote financial stability in the Korean banking system rather than control it. When the
FSS decides to require any reports and data, it should consider whether the management
206 General Banking Act art. 47 cl. 1. But the FSS requires the commercial banks to submit the call reports
by the 20th day of each month. Detailed Enforcement Regulations for Supervision of Banking Institutions
art. 64 ci. 1.
207 Detailed Enforcement Regulations for Supervision of Banking Institutions art. 64 ci. 5.
208 General Banking Act art. 47 ci. 3; Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory
Organisations art. 40 ci. i.
209 Within weil-managed banks, information that is relevant should already be available internally and used
by management to operate the business. Basic Committee on Banking Supervision, "Enhancing Bank
Transparency," op. cit., ii. 180, p. 10.
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and auditor reporting requirements are intended to (1) focus management's attention on
its accountability for internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations, (2)
improve the regulatory agencies' ability to detect unsafe and unsound conditions at an
early stage, and (3) support prompt regulatory action to ensure that deficiencies which
may threaten an institution's solvency are corrected in a timely manner.210
Since October 1996, the OBS, now the FSS, has conducted off-site surveillance
by establishing a special team in each examination department. The FSC establishes a
plan to employ off-site surveillance as one of the main supervisory instruments of
consolidated financial supervisory services. 21 ' Under the plan, special task forces, which
are dealing with off-site surveillance only and separated from examination teams, are to
be established in each examination department. 212 However, when the FSC establishes
the off-site surveillance structure, it is important to have a clear relationship between the
off-site surveillance and the examination teams. The co-operation between the off-site
surveillance and the examination teams is crucial because the serious problems detected
by the off-site surveillance team would trigger the examination and the examination team
needs the information the off-site surveillance team has before and during the
examination. With the information, the examination team can make a better examination
plan and examine the areas where weaknesses exist. After examination, the off-site
surveillance team needs the information from the examination team for better
surveillance.
210 United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: 0CC ...," op cit., n. 113, P. 22.
211 Financial Supervisory Commission, "Strengthening Prudential Supervision and Regulation" (December
1998).
212 Ibid.
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B. Accounting Standards
1.	 Need for Accurate Financial Information
It is crucial that the information disclosed and reported is based on sound measurement
principles and that the principles are properly applied. The accounting standards for
public disclosure and reports to the supervisory authorities should be sufficient for
describing the true conditions of the banks. If accounting rules allow the bank
management considerable latitude in determining carrying amounts for problem loans
and repossessed collateral, recognising decreases from historical cost to market value has
an adverse effect on a bank's reported financial condition. 213 This gives bank
management an incentive to use the latitude in accounting rules to delay loss recognition
as long as possible. As a result, the inaccurate publicly disclosed information misleads
the users.
Moreover, the accounting principles used in call reports and other financial
statements by the banks need to provide the true financial conditions of a bank to the
banking regulatory and supervisory authorities. Only with a sufficiently accurate picture
of the financial conditions of banks, can the regulatory and supervisory authorities have
efficient off-site surveillance, which gives early warning of troubled banks. Inadequate
call reports impair regulatory decision making, resulting in continued operation and
losses by unsafe and unsound banks. 214 Therefore, fostering accurate and relevant
213 United States General Accounting Office, "Failed Banks .. .," op. cit., n. 152, p. 6.
214 Ibid., p. 19.
221
Chapter Three
financial reporting can assist the financial statement users, including regulators and
supervisors, in making decisions.215
2. Implementation of Mark-to-Market Accounting
(a) Securities Holdings
As the most important measure to enhance the accounting transparency of financial
institutions, mark-to-market accounting has been introduced in order to make the banks
recognise the gains and losses from the securities holdings accurately. 216 In Korea,
financial institutions, including commercial banks did not adopt mark-to-market
accounting for securities, while other Korean firms have used it. As a result, distrust of
financial statements of financial institutions has arisen due to the weak transparency in
accounting practices. Korean commercial banks have implemented mark-to-market
accounting principles from the closing date of the first half of 1998 fiscal year. Prior to
the recent amendment, the FSC required Korean commercial banks to classify their
securities as Korean won or foreign currency dominated securities. Among the Korean
won securities, shares were appraised by the lower-of-cost-or-market method. Other
Korean won securities were appraised by the historical cost method. Foreign currency
securities were appraised by the lower-of-cost-or-market method. Those methods did not
reflect the actual conditions of the banks. The amended regulations require the banks to
classify their securities, regardless of the denominated currency, as traded or investment
securities based on the marketability and the bank's intention as to whether it holds them
215 Ibid., p. 20.
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until maturity. The traded securities, which have marketability and are held for short-
term fund management, are appraised by mark-to-market valuation. Among the
investment securities, the marketable securities are appraised by the mark-to-market
valuation. The non-marketable securities are appraised by historical cost accounting.
The bank's subsidiary shares are appraised by the equity method.
(b) Enhancement of Financial Statement Accounting Principles
In Korea, the banks' accounting standards for public disclosure and the accounting
standards for supervisory reporting had been integrated for the regulatory and supervisory
purposes rather than providing accurate information to the financial users. 217 Those
practices resulted in a lack of comparability across the financial industries. Furthermore,
the financial statements of financial institutions lacked transparency and consistency.
The financial supervisory authorities issued guidelines for closing accounts for the
financial institutions. The guidelines were not only changed from year to year, but also
allowed the financial institutions' accounting practices to differ from generally accepted
accounting principles by other Korean finns.218
Since the financial crisis in 1997, there have been numerous demands for the
reform of accounting practices in Korea. The International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank demanded Korea to upgrade accounting standards to meet international
practices. The reform process included the areas of (1) revision of financial accounting
216 Mark-to-market accounting is an accounting method that values the assets at fair current value at the
valuation date, amends the book value and recognises the gains or losses from the difference.
217 Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "Reform of Accounting Standards in Korea" (11
Dec. 1998).
218 Ibid.
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standards that are the primary source of Korea's generally accepted accounting
principles, (2) establishment of accounting standards for financial institutions, including
commercial banks, and (3) establishment of accounting standards for combined financial
statements.219
The accounting standard reforms are intended to provide more accurate and
transparent information to financial users as a part of public disclosure requirements. The
reformed accounting standards are established and implemented independently by the
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), generally in the corporate accounting
standards. The FSC also established the accounting standards for the banks, insurance
companies, and securities companies respectively. The reformed standards for the
financial institutions, including banks, securities companies, and insurance companies,
require (1) the adoption of the mark-to-market method to account for securities including
the Fund for Stock Market Stabilisation, 22° (2) recognising the restructuring losses as
incurred, 221 and (3) recognising allowances for potential losses arising from guarantee
services and the resulting losses in the current year's financial statement. 222 As for the
banks, the reformed standards enhance the disclosures of financial information such as
maturity of assets and liabilities, transactions with other banks and money market, foreign
currency risk exposures, and losses from managing trust accounts.
219 Ibid.
220 The financial institutions must report their securities at market value and recognised 100 per cent
unrealised holding gains or losses in the current year's income statement.
221 When the contractual terms of impaired loans are modified, the carrying amount of the impaired loans
must be adjusted to the present value calculated based on the modified terms.
222 The Korea's financial regulatory and supervisory authorities have not required the financial institutions
to recognise allowances for potential losses from guarantee services. After reforming the account
standards, the FSC stipulated the regulation that the commercial banks are required to make provisions for
guarantee services.
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C. Bank Examination
1.	 Objectives and Scopes of Bank Examination
Bank examination is one of the major supervisory instruments for reviewing and
assessing banks. The objectives and scopes of bank examination differ among the
authorities depending on the goals of banking regulation and supervision and the powers
they have. Generally, the common practices are that the examiners check the compliance
with laws, regulations, and other regulatory and supervisory guidelines or directions, and
assess the financial conditions of banks. Given that financial stability is the primary
objective of banking regulation and supervision, the examiners need to help the
regulators and supervisors to maintain financial stability. To achieve this aim, the
examiners should emphasise on risk-focused examinations.223
Under the risk-focused examination approach, the objectives of on-site
examination should be to:224
(1) Test and reach (or reaffirm) conclusions about the reliability of banks' systems,
controls, and reports. The bank examiners should explicitly include an
assessment of how effectively banks manage risk and a rating on their sensitivity
to risks posed by a variety of market factors.225
(2) Investigate changes or anomalies disclosed by off-site monitoring and analysis.
223 See Laurence H. Meyer, "Issues and Trends in Banking Regulatory Policy and Financial Modernization
Legislation," remarks at the Bank Administration Institute, Finance and Accounting Management
Conference (9 June 1998).
224 See United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: 0CC ...," op. cit., n. 113, p.
11.
225 Thomas J. McCool, "Bank and Thrift Examinations: Adoption of Risk-Focused Examination
Strategies," Statement before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Comrmttee
on Banking and Financial Services, United States House of Representatives (8 Oct. 1997), published in
United States General Accounting Office Document No. GAOIT-GGD-98-13, p. 3.
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(3) Evaluate those aspects of banks' operations for which portfolio managers cannot
rely on the banks' own systems and controls.
(4) Help ensure that the regulators take timely and forceful corrective action.
Under the risk-focused examination approach, the scopes of examination should
be to:
(1) Evaluate the adequacy of the capital adequacy requirement ratios. Under the
minimum capital requirement rules, a bank may adopt patterns of making
cosmetic changes in order to exploit differences between capital as measured for
regulatory purposes and the bank's true economic capital. 226 The examiners not
only ensure that a bank meets the minimum ratios, but also assess whether the
bank has any cosmetic changes to adjust its risky asset positions.
(2) Assess the quality of assets, especially loans, and ensure the adequacy of the
provisions for losses. 227 It is critical to determine the quality of assets, especially
loans and the adequacy of loss reserves, because without proper assessment the
examiners have no reliable basis to understand a bank's true financial condition.
(3) Assess the internal control system. The examiners have to ensure that a bank has
an adequate internal control system and evaluate the effectiveness of and
compliance with the internal control system.
226 See Larry D. Wall and Pamela P. Peterson, "Banks' Responses to Binding Regulatory Capital
Requirements," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review (March/April 1996), p. 3.
227 See McCool, op. cit., n. 225, pp. 6-8.
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2.	 Bank Examination Practices in Korea
Bank examination in Korea can be divided into three categories: periodic examination,
special examination, and investigation. The periodic examination, as annual
examination, examines all head offices of individual banks and about ten per cent of
branches. Generally, the scope of the periodic examination covers all activities of the
bank. The special examination is carried out when there are impeding policy issues or
other serious problems. Investigation is carried out to scrutinise matters relating to the
collection of information for bank supervision, and the complaints and appeals from bank
customers. Such Korean bank examination is carried out without prior notice at least
once a year. This practice is intended to be effective in enabling bank examiners to
detect indications of fraud, embezzlement or other criminal activities.
The past examination practices have been focused on whether any wrongdoing
has occurred and whether a bank follows the authorities' directions. For example, the
examiners checked whether a bank extended financial funds to unqualified industries, and
misused funds for purposes other than those originally intended. Those practices helped
the authorities to control the banks, but failed to analyse the individual banks' prudential
conditions, and therefore, the safety and soundness of banking system as a whole. Even
in the cases where the examiners attempted to address safety and soundness concerns, the
examination process may only provide a "snapshot" of the bank's conditions as of a
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given date without addressing potential risks and the management systems needed
internally by the bank to control risk in a dynamic, changing environment.228
To achieve the goal of financial stability, the FSC and the FSS need to adopt the
risk-focused examination approach. Korea's adoption of the risk-focused examination
approach needs two preconditions. First, the quality of examiners should be improved.
The comprehensive internal control system assessment can only be achieved when the
examiners fully understand how the system works and how to test the system. Moreover,
if the banks are allowed to have their own loan classification and loan loss provision
systems, the examiners should assess the quality of system. Second, the examiners
should have a clear written mandate and procedures for the examination. After
examination, the examiner should produce a written, detailed report for clear
communication with the banks and the other departments. The risk-focused examination
approach gives the examiners substantial discretionary powers to determine subjectively
whether a system is adequate. The regulators need to establish policies to ensure
sufficient documentation of the analysis that underlies the examination report and
thorough supervisory review of all examination and inspection procedures. The review
process is an important quality control measure to ensure that conclusions reached are
properly supported.229
In relating to the risk-focused examination approach, the Korean banking
regulatory and supervisory authorities need to enhance the management appraisal system.
The Korean regulatory and supervisory authorities have implemented the CAMEL ratings
228 Polizatto, op. cit., n. 204, P. 23.229 United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: 0CC ...," op. cit., n. 113, p. 4.
228
Chapter Three
as the management appraisal system. 23° The CAMEL (an acronym for Capital adequacy,
Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity) rating system quantifies a
supervised institution's condition in five critical areas and assigns an overall composite
rating. The management appraisal system makes possible graduated supervision
measures based upon the result of appraisal. It can enhance management efficiency by
assessing the performance of financial institutions and providing corresponding
incentives or penalties. 23 ' However, the success of the management appraisal system
requires adequate accounting standards and the ability to evaluate bank management with
proper criteria. The FSS is planning to implement a revised management appraisal
system that is focused on risk assessment with a view to providing a service to the
financial institutions as their supervisory authorities. 232
 Under the plan, the current
CAMEL method will be changed to CAMELS, which includes sensibility to market risk.
It is a desirable step to enhance the risk-focused approach. Nevertheless, the Korean
regulatory and supervisory authorities need to require the bank examiners to develop
appropriate criteria for evaluating a bank's management condition. The bank
management evaluation should provide an assessment of bank's current and future
conditions.
3. Role of Internal and External Audit
The financial conditions of banks are essential information for the regulatory and
supervisory authorities and the markets to ensure the banks' prudence. Since the bank
230 See Detailed Enforcement Regulations for Supervision of Banking Institutions app. 12.
231 See Financial Supervisory Commission, "Progress of Strengthening Prudential Supervision ...," op. cit.,
n. 125.
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management prepares the financial statements for public disclosures and the supervisory
reporting, the financial information is reviewed to obtain reasonable assurance that the
financial statements are free of material misstatements. The bank examiners can perform
the review to evaluate the financial information, including asset quality and other areas of
a bank's activities. A major disadvantage of this approach is that it can be labour
intensive and can be inhibited by budgetary constraints. 233 An alternative approach is the
Bank of England system under the Banking Act 1987. By relaxing the duty of
confidentiality owed by a bank auditor to the client, the bank subject to the audit, a bank
auditor could pass to the Bank of England, whether or not in response to a request made
by it, any information which acquired in a professional capacity and which was relevant
to the discharge of the supervisory functions of the Bank of England.234
In Korea, commercial banks are required to have internal auditors and are subject
to an external audit requirement. In December 1998, under the External Audit Act, the
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) published the standards for external auditors to
audit Korean financial institutions. An accounting firm to audit commercial banks with
assets in excess of 800 billion Korean won should have more than 100 certified public
accountants and have an audit quality management contract with an internationally
recognised firm. 235 The scope of external audit is financial auditing, 236 while the internal
auditor audits not only financial but also business matters.
232 Ibid.
233 Polizatto, op. cit., n. 204, p. 17.
234 See United Kingdom Banking Act 1987 sec. 47. It is important to note that the Bank of England did not
conduct the on-site examinations.
235 The audit quality management contract includes the agreement that the internationally recognised firm
manages the quality of audit by the Korean firm and the agreement that the audit reports could be issued
under the name of internationally recognised firm. The SFC provides that an internationally recognised
firm should have its member firms in more than 30 countries and have more than 2000 professionals. The
SFC estimates that there are 28 accounting firms meeting the conditions.
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Auditing mechanisms are essential to ensure that accounting norms are effectively
applied and maintained in regard to financial matters. Even if the FSS can perform the
review to evaluate the banks' financial conditions, both internal and external audits can
be used as vital complements to assessments of banks' financial conditions by the bank
regulatory and supervisory authorities. Internal audits on an ongoing basis enable
problems to be recognised before they are able to impair the financial soundness of a
bank.237
 External audits on the basis of internationally acceptable standards by
independent qualified private entities are important in the accuracy and
comprehensiveness of information disclosed to external parties. 238 However, reliance
should be placed on external auditors only when a well-developed independent auditing
profession exists, when supervisors and auditors have a clear understanding of their roles,
and where auditors are fully accountable.239
Under the financial stability objective in bank regulation and supervision and the
risk-focused examination approach, the full scope audits, including financial audit and
business audit, can reinforce the banking on-site examination and supervisory work. In
Korea, the internal auditor, who audits banks' business matters (especially the internal
control system), can provide benefits such as the early detection and correction of internal
control problems and efficiencies in the examination process. However, the bank
regulatory and supervisory authorities should only rely on internal control work
performed by the banks' audit function after sufficient review and evaluation, and then
236 See External Audit Act art. I.
237 Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies, op. cit., n. 61, p. 29.
238 Ibid., p. 29.
239 Ibid., p. 42. See also Ruth de Krivoy, "Crisis Avoidance," in Ricardo Hausmann and Liliana Rojas-
Suarez eds., Banking Crises in Latin America (1996). Krivoy argues that, to ensure their objectivity and
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only if the auditors are competent and independent and their audit programs are adequate
and effective.240
In Korea, under the External Audit Act, the external auditors can examine the
banks' business matters, such as internal control system, only if the auditors need it in
relation to their financial audits.24 ' Since full scope independent audits by external
auditors can help fill the need for increased oversight in the present age of financial
deregulation, 242 Korea can consider bestowing full scope audit powers to the external
auditors. In a regulatory and supervisory environment such as in Korea, however, where
the on-site examinations provide the primary evaluation of banks' operations, the benefits
of full scope external audit should be limited. First, the external audits would not replace
the on-site examinations but provide the bank regulatory and supervisory authorities with
information from audits in a timely manner, especially when the audits take place
between the examinations. Currently, the FSS may request the banks' external auditors
to submit information and other documents related to the soundness from audits. 243 By
requiring the external auditors to submit the audit reports and notify any concerns from
the audits directly to the FSS, 2 it is more feasible to enhance the off-site surveillance
and the early detection of problems. This approach, however, would place an additional
burden on the auditors than that of the U.K. Bank Act 1987 where the auditors had
discretion. Second, the full scope independent audits can improve the quality of on-site
credibility, the external auditors need to be legally accountable for the competence and integrity of their
examinations.
240 United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Examination Quality: 0CC ...," op. cit., n. 113, p. 18.
241 See External Audit Act art. 6 ci. 1.
242 United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Failure ...," op. cit., n. 145, pp. 40-41.
243 General Banking Act art. 48 cl. 3.
244 The External Audit Act requires the external auditors to submit their audit reports to the audited
company (the bank), the SFC, and the Korea Institute of CPAs. External Audit Act art. 8 ci. I.
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examination. The external audits can diminish a possibility of failing to identify any
material weaknesses by the bank examiners.
D. Prompt Regulatory Action as Enforcement Measure
1.	 Prompt Regulatory Action in the U.S.
After experiencing the thrift and banking crisis of the 1980s, the U.S. federal regulators
were criticised for not taking prompt and forceful action to minimise or prevent losses to
the insurance funds due to bank and thrift failures. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) was enacted to make fundamental
changes in federal oversight of depository institutions. The FDICIA mandates that the
regulators establish a two-part regulatory framework to improve safeguards for the
deposit insurance funds. The first part focuses on capital levels of depository institutions,
and the second part focuses on other measures of an institution's safety and soundness.
Section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act requires the regulators to
categorise depository institutions into five categories on the basis of their capital levels
and to take increasingly severe supervisory actions as an institution's capital level
deteriorates. The section establishes a system of mandatory supervisory actions that are
to be triggered by an institution's capital levels. Section 39 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act directs regulatory attention to the non-capital areas of an institution's
activities as they pertain to safety and soundness. The section requires the regulators to
develop and implement safety-and-soundness standards in three areas: (1) operations and
management; (2) asset quality, earnings, and stock valuation; and (3) compensation. The
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Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 amended
section 39 to eliminate the requirement for quantitative standards for asset quality and
earnings and to allow the regulators greater discretion in setting standards as well as in
determining whether to take action against institutions that fail to meet the standards.
However, the implementation of section 39 should (1) establish clear, objective criteria
for what would be considered to be unsafe and unsound practices or conditions and (2)
link the identification of such conditions to specific mandatory enforcement actions.245
The prompt corrective action (PCA) approach has several advantages. First, PCA
intends to limit the number and the costs of bank failures by intervening earlier in
problem banks and by encouraging banks to become better capitalised. 246 Second, PCA
reduces the possibilities of regulatory and supervisory forbearance. When the banking
regulatory and supervisory authorities have wide discretion in deciding both the timing
and nature of enforcement actions, the lack of standard measures of unsafe and unsound
practices and conditions and the tendency to avoid taking forceful action are major
problems in the supervisory process. 247 PCA imposes a binding constraint on bank
supervisors either by intervening earlier than would be the case with formal actions or by
intervening in problem banks that, for whatever reason, did not receive a formal action.
Therefore, PCA can remove or reduce the discretionary decision-making of the
regulatory and supervisory authorities by providing quantifiable measures for assessing a
bank's financial condition. Third, PCA increases the certainty in the banking industry
245 See United States General Accounting Office, "Bank and Thrift Regulation: Implementation of
FDICLA's Prompt Regulatory Action Provisions" (Nov. 1996), P. 5.246 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren, "Will Legislated Early Intervention Prevent the Next Banking Crisis?,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper (1996), p. 2.247 See United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Supervision: OCC's Supervision of the Bank of
New England Was Not Timely or Forceful" (Sept. 1991), PP. 18-20.
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with which specific practices regarding assets, earnings, or management may be regarded
by the regulators as unsafe or unsound. The enforcement process can only be helped by
introducing more definitive measures regarding unsafe and unsound practices and by
linking regulatory responses to those measures so that bankers, regulators, and others
know much more precisely what to expect from the enforcement process. 248 The U.S.
General Accounting Office's review reveals that when the U.S. banking regulators used
the most forceful actions available to correct unsafe and unsound banking practices, the
enforcement process produced better result.249
However, PCA has some limitations. First, the focus of PCA is to intervene in
banks after their capital ratios have fallen. But, a bank's capital ratio is a lagging, not
leading indicator. The capital-based safeguards are inherently limited because capital
does not typically show a decline until an institution has experienced substantial
deterioration in other components of its operations and finances.250 Secondly, PCA
criteria are intended to be applied on the basis of reported bank capital ratios, even in the
absence of an examination. This is an offset by the fact that call report data submitted
between examinations often are less reliable than those immediately following an
examination.
248 United States General Accounting Office, "Bank Supervision: Prompt and Forceful Regulatory Actions
Needed" (April 1991), P. 46.249 ibid., p. 29.
250 United States General Accounting Office, "Bank and Thrift Regulation ...," op. cit., n. 245, pp. 6-7.
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2. Implementation of Prompt Regulatory Action in Korea
An amendment to the General Banking Act in 1991 established the corrective action
provisions in Korea. 25 ' Under the provision, the Monetary Board of the Bank of Korea
stipulated in its regulations implementing corrective action in 1992. Under the
regulations, the OBS could impose management improvement recommendations and
management improvement measures on commercial banks. In deciding on the
management improvement recommendation, the OBS considered its prudential
management ratios252 and the management status evaluation (CAMEL ratings). As for
the management improvement measures, the OBS could impose the measures when a
bank fails to meet the capital adequacy ratio for two consecutive years; fails considerably
to meet the other prudential management ratios; fails to improvement its conditions after
the management improvement recommendation; deteriorates its asset prudential quality
due to large losses; or maintains remarkably unfavourable management. Those
provisions bestowed on the OBS wide discretion in deciding whether it applies the
corrective actions. The wordings of the provisions, such as considerably and remarkably,
allowed the OBS to take into account other considerations rather than the financial
stability or other banking regulatory and supervisory objectives for its enforcement
actions. Moreover, the regulations did not have compulsory constraints that the OBS had
to impose any corrective actions. Therefore, the OBS was allowed to pursue supervisory
forbearance.
251 General Banking Act 1991 art. 18 ci. 5.
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In 1997, the Financial Industry Restructuring Act was enacted in order to promote
financial industry restructuring. One of the major restructuring measures was the
corrective action for the ailing financial institutions, including commercial banks. In
September 1998, an amendment to the Financial Industry Restructuring Act explicitly
provides the prompt corrective action measures. 253
 The act provides the definition of
non-viable financial institutions. According to the act, a financial institution is deemed as
a non-viable financial institution when (1) its liabilities exceed the assets; (2) it suspends
the payments on obligatory credits, including deposits, and the repayments of other
financial institutions; or (3) the FSC or the KDIC decides that it could not pay the
obligatory credits and repay loans from other financial institutions without external fund
support or special borrowings. 254 The FSC has to (1) recommend, require, or order the
measures the act provides or (2) require a plan to fulfil the measures when a financial
institution fails or the FSC decides that it is evident that a financial institution fails to
meet the FSC's standards.255
In June 1997, under the Financial Industry Restructuring Act, the FSC stipulates
its standards and measures for the prompt corrective actions against troubled banks. The
FSC implements three measures for the prompt corrective actions: management
improvement recommendation, requirement, and order. When a bank (1) fails to
maintain eight per cent of risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio or it (2) is rated by the
management status evaluation as scale 3 for the composite ratings but scale 4 for the asset
252 They included the capital adequacy, liquidity asset, usable deposit and equity capital to loan, loan loss
reserve, retirement reserve, operational real estate, bad loan ratios and other prudential ratios for bank
management.
253 Financial Industry Restructuring Act art. 10.
254 Ibid. art. 2 no. 3.
255 Ibid. art. 10 ci. 1.
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quality or capital adequacy ratings,256
 the FSS should impose the management
improvement recommendation on the bank. Under the management improvement
recommendation, a bank is required to:
(I) improve its personnel and operational structures;
(2) reduce its operational costs;
(3) improve its efficiency on the branch management;
(4) restrict the fixed asset investment, new activities, and new investment;
(5) dispose non-performing loans;
(6) restrict the increase or decrease of equity capitals;
(7) restrict the dividend pay-outs; andlor
(8) reserve special loan loss provisions.
The management improvement requirement is imposed by the FSS when (1) a
bank's capital adequacy ratio becomes under six per cent to the risk-weight assets or (2)
its composite management status evaluation ratings are scale 4 or lower. Beyond the
above management improvement recommendation requirements, the bank is required to:
(1) close or merge its branches and restrict open new branches;
(2) prohibit investment;
(3) restrict to hold risk assets and dispose its assets;
(4) restrict its interest rates on deposits;
(5) divestiture its subsidiaries;
(6) replace the management and external auditor;
(7) suspend partial operations; andlor
256 The rating scheme is based on a scale of I through 5.
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(8) set a plan for merger, acquisition by a third party, or transfer its whole or
partial business.
When (1) a bank's capital adequacy ratio becomes under two per cent or (2) a
bank becomes a non-viable bank under the Financial Industry Restructuring Act, together
with the measures for the management improvement requirement, the FSC has to:
(1) require the bank to write off or merge its shares;
(2) suspend the management and appoint an administrator;
(3) order merger;
(4) order the bank to transfer its whole or partial business;
(5) order acquisition by a third party; andlor
(6) suspend the bank's operation within six month time or revoke the bank's
charter.
In Korea, the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities need to enforce
regulations in a consistent fashion and must not pursue regulatory forbearance. The
moral hazard problems can be reduced in the banking system when the regulators and
supervisors pursue prompt corrective action if banks are not complying with the
regulatory requirements. 257 Therefore, the prompt corrective action is a significant
change in that it reduces the potential for regulators to exercise forbearance for
undercapitalised banks. 258 In addition, the PCA scheme is one of primary formula for the
rule-based, objective banking regulation and supervision, what Korea needs. However,
257 Frederic S. Mishkm, "Understanding Financial Crises: A Developing Country Perspective," NBER
Working Papers No. 5600 (1996), p. 12.
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PCA needs to ensure sufficiently flexible banking supervision to allow adjust individual
cases. To achieve this goal without limiting the purposes of PCA, the Korean banking
regulators and supervisors need limited discretionary powers on their decisions within the
Financial Industry Restructuring Act. Then the transparency in the regulatory and
supervisory decisions and actions can assure that the banking regulatory and supervisory
authorities do not abuse their discretionary powers
3. Other Enforcement Measures
The enforcement powers of the FSC and the FSS can be divided into two groups:
sanctions against banking institutions and against bank officers and employees. When
bank institutions (1) violate the provisions of the General Banking Act, regulations,
orders or instructions, issued under the General Banking Act or the Act Concerning
Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations, or (2) engage in conduct in an
unlawful or unsound manner, upon the recommendations of the FSS, the FSC may259
(1) direct the FSS to take measures such as issuing cease and desist orders or
warnings concerning such unlawful conduct;
(2) issue an order to cease unsound operational practices;
(3) impose business suspension of up to six months; and
(4) revoke the relevant banking license.
When officers and employees of banking institutions willfully violate the
provisions of the General Banking Act, regulations, orders or instructions, issued under
258 Wall and Peterson, op. cit., n. 226, p. 4.
259 Revised General Banking Act art. 53; Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Organisations art 43.
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the General Banking Act or the Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory
Organisations; 26° commit any act which greatly impairs the sound operation of a banking
institution;261 make false supervisory reports or neglect to submit them; 262
 reject, obstruct
or evade the supervision and examination of the FSS,263
 or neglect to take appropriate
actions or disciplinary measures required by the FSS,2
(1) the FSC may order the concerned officer to suspend performance of his
duties;
(2) the FSC may advise general meetings of banks' shareholders to dismiss the
concerned officers;
(3) the FSC may direct the FSS to take appropriate measures such as issuing
warnings against the concerned officers; and
(4) the FSS may require heads of banking institutions concerned to take
appropriate disciplinary measures against the concerned employees, such as
dismissal or suspension from office, reduction of pay, or reprimand.
The enforcement powers of the Korean banking regulatory and supervisory
authorities are broad and subject to the discretion of the authorities. For example,
260 Revised General Banking Act art. 54; Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Organisations art 41.
The General Banking Act requires "intention" of banks' officers and employees while the Act
Concerning Establishment of Supervisory Orgamsations only requires "violation" of officers. Under article
41 of the Act Concerning Establishment Supervisory Organisations, employees of "financial institutions"
(including banking institutions and other financial institutions) are subject to enforcement measures
regardless of their intention (by not stipulating "willfully" in the article). Therefore, it is possible to
interpret either that, unlike employees of other financial institutions, banks' employees are subject to
enforcement measures only when they "willfully" violate relevant acts, regulations or other directions, or
that the article 41 of the Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations widens
scopes of enforcement. To clarif' the discrepancy, Korea needs to harmonise differences between two
acts.
261 Revised General Banking Act art. 54.
262 Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Organisations art 41 no. 2.
263 ibid., art 41 no.3.
ibid., art4l no. 4.
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violations of all directions of the FSC and the FSS are subject to enforcement actions.
Criteria for enforcement actions are broadly stipulated, e.g. "unsound manner."
Furthermore, Korea's enforcement powers are utilised to ensure Korean banks operate for
the government's purposes, such as financing certain sectors.
Under these circumstances, a "market-competitive and commercially-driven"
environment cannot be established. To achieve a banking system which operates with
true market and commercially oriented practices, the FSC and the FSS need to exercise
their enforcement powers for effective prudential supervision, not for effective control
over the banking sector.
IV. MARKET-ORIENTED COMMERCIAL BANKING
Korea's reformed and restructured regulatory and supervisory structure (the FSC) created
a system which either ensures a "safe and sound" banking system free from government
and political interference or retains a banking system "controlled" by the FSC. To
achieve the objective of a "safe and sound" banking system, Korean banks need to have a
"market-competitive" and "commercially-driven" environment free from any control or
interference by the government, the politicians or the regulatory and supervisory
authorities in carrying out objectives that are inconsistent with "safe and sound" banking
regulatory and supervisory objectives.
A "market-competitive and commercially-driven" banking sector can be
established when the FSC and the FSS regulate and supervise with effective and
transparent supervisory standards, monitoring and enforcement for achieving "financial
stability." The objective of "financial stability" removes possibilities of interference
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from the government and politicians and hinders the control by the banking regulatory
and supervisory authorities. 	 Furthermore, effective and transparent supervisory
standards, monitoring and enforcement, which are consistent with evolving international
standards and principles, provide the underlying framework in which Korean banks
operate in a market and commercially oriented environment, but are subject to prudential
regulation and supervision.
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KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
In 1997, Korea experienced significant financial and economic turmoil triggered by
international concerns as part of a regional financial crisis that was officially recognised
with the depreciation of the Thai baht in July 1997. The Korean financial crisis
demonstrated many of the current weaknesses of the Korean banking and financial
system. Since "official" diagnosis of crisis is important to provide appropriate policy
response, this chapter seeks to analyse and identify causes of the Korean financial crisis.
This chapter begins by examining macroeconomic conditions in Korea leading up to the
crisis environment, which serve to clarify the origins of the Korean crisis (and Asian
financial crisis in relevant part). After identifying the origins of the Korean financial
crisis, this chapter will evaluate Korea's policy responses to the crisis and crisis
management methodologies. Policy responses and crisis management methodologies
crucially involve official intervention (e.g., as lender of last resort), financial system
reform, and financial sector restructuring. The Korea government's policy responses and
crisis management methodologies are considered from the following perspectives: (1)
whether they were appropriate and effective, and (2) whether they were sufficient to
correct inherent weaknesses of the Korean financial system relating to the banking
regulatory and supervisory structure and to the supervisory standards and enforcement
which were discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three.
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I. KOREAN MACROECONOMY TRENDS PRIOR TO THE
CRISIS
A. Growth and Trends
Prior to the economic and financial crisis environment officially acknowledge in late
1997, the Korean economy was marked by a puzzling dichotomy between a benign real
economy and growing financial market tensions.'
Table 1 Indicators of Korean Macroeconomic
Per cent
	
1990	 1991	 1992 1993
	 1994	 1995	 1996	 1997
GDPgrowth(%)	 9.5	 9.1	 5.1	 5.8	 8.6	 8.9	 7.1	 5.5
Savings rate
(% of GDP)	 35.7	 35.7	 34.9	 34.9	 34.6	 35.1	 33.6	 33.1
Unemployment rate	 2.4	 2.3	 2.4	 2.8	 2.4	 2.0	 2.0	 2.6
Inflation rate	 9.30	 6.22	 4.82	 6.24	 4.41	 4.96	 4.45
Government Fiscal
Balance	 -0.68	 -1.63	 -0.50	 0.64	 0.32	 0.30	 0.46	 0.25
(% of GDP)
Source: Bank of Korea
'OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 1998 (Sep. 1998), p. 20.
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The Table 1 data demonstrate that Korea generally maintained robust economic
growth throughout the 1990s. Notwithstanding sluggish growth in 1992-93, the average
GDP growth was 7.8 per cent during the period of 1990-95. In 1996, although Korea's
export prices fell 13.4 per cent, 2 import prices fell 1.2 per cent, and GDP growth was
approximately 7.1 per cent. The first quarter of 1997, when GDP growth fell to 5.7 per
cent, appeared to mark a successful 'soft-landing' from excessive growth. 3 Inflation was
the lowest domestic levels in over a decade and prices were generally stable.
Unemployment remained between 2.0-2.8 per cent and very low by international
standards. In addition, the government fiscal balance has been prudent. The government
budgets registered regular aimual surpluses and maintained fiscal responsibility since
1993 after a small fiscal deficit in 1990-92. Thus, as of 1997, Korea's economic
fundamentals appeared generally sound, even robust.
B. Current Account Imbalance
Notwithstanding sustained economic growth and falling inflation, Korea's current
account deficit became problematic.
2 This shock was equivalent to some four per cent of national income. Ibid.
Ibid.
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Table 2 Korean Current Account Balance
In US$ ZOO millions, per cent
1990	 1991	 1992 1993	 1994	 1995	 1996	 1997
Current Account	 -20.03	 -83.17	 -39.43	 99.0 -38.67 -85.08 -230.05
	 -81.67
Current
AccountlGDP	 -0.8	 -2.8	 -1.3	 0.3	 -1.0	 -1.9	 -4.7	 -1.9
Source: Bank of Korea
The Table 2 data indicate that similarly to other Asian countries whose currencies
collapsed in 1997, Korea experienced considerable current account deficits in the late
1990s. The Korean current account deficit was low in the early 1990s (within the 1-3 per
cent range of GDP). Korea maintained a small surplus of 0.3 per cent of GDP in 1993.
However, the changes in current account position beyond 1993 were significant. The
current account deficits were 1.0 per cent, 1.9 per cent, and 4.7 per cent of GDP in 1994,
1995, and 1996, respectively. The widening current account deficits, when coupled with
declining productivity growth, progressively reflected investments that were of uncertain
quality.4
See Pedro Alba et a!., "Volatility and Cantagion in a Financially-Integrated World: Lessons from East
Asia's Recent Experience," paper presented at the PAFTAD 24 conference, "Asia Pacific Financial
Liberalization and Reform," (20-22 May 1998, Chiangmai, Thailand), p. 37.
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C. Capital Flows
Private sector capital flows to developing countries increased six-fold over 1990-1996.
Recent studies indicate that during the I 990s, the five East Asian countries (Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) hit hardest by the Asian crisis, experienced
massive capital inflows.5
Capital flows
% of GDP
Table 3 Capital Flows to Korea
In USS 10 millions
1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994
256	 641	 659	 274	 1030
	
1.6	 3.1
	
1995	 1996	 1997
	
1679	 2333
	
544
	3.9 	 4.9
	
2.8
Direct investment	 -2.6	 -3.1	 -4.3	 -7.5	 -16.5	 -17.8	 -23.4	 -19.5
Portfolio	 0.8	 30.5	 58.0	 100.1	 61.2	 115.9	 151.8	 147.6
investment
Financial
institution	 28.6	 58.6	 24.3	 12.0	 89.8	 134.0	 141.5	 -141.2
borrowings
Source: Bank of Korea, JMF
See Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis," Harvard Institute
for International Development Working Paper (1998), p. 5.
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The Table 3 data demonstrate that the capital inflows to Korea increased on
average from 1.4 per cent of GDP between 1986-90 to 6.7 per cent between 199096.6
The capital inflows increased in 1991-92, then decreased down to the 1990 level in 1993
when Korea had a small current account surplus. Since 1994, the capital inflows
significantly increased and reached about five per cent of GDP in 1996.
In connection with capital flows, direct investment steadily decreased, but
portfolio investment and financial institution borrowings rose substantially. In addition,
borrowings of private institutions have similarly increased. In late 1997, global concerns
arose about Korea's private sector foreign debt obligations. Until December 1997,
Korea's statistics on foreign debt was calculated as defined by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The IBRD standard counted as foreign debt
Korean residents' debt from non-Korean residents. On 29 December 1997, the Korean
government announced its agreement with the IMF for a new definition of Korea's
external liabilities. Under this agreement, the total Korean external liabilities as defined
by the IBRD included off-shore borrowings of Korean banks and overseas borrowing of
overseas branches and subsidiaries of Korean banks, excluding (a) borrowings of
overseas branches and subsidiaries of Korean enterprises, and (b) deposits in overseas
branches and subsidiaries of Korean banks. 7 Under the new definition, the initial figures
showed that Korea's foreign liabilities increased from US$104.7 billion to US$157.5
billion at the end of 1996.
6 lbzd.,p. 8.
' See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Agreement on Definition of the Total Korean
External Liabilities between the Korean Government and the IMF," (30 Dec. 1997).
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Table 4 Korean External Liabilities
In US$ billions
1993	 1994	 1995	 1996	 June 1997	 Sep. 1997	 Nov. 1997	 End of 1997
43.9	 96.9	 127.2	 164.3	 180.4	 180.1	 161.8	 158.1
Source: Ministiy of Finance and Economy
Table 5 Structure of Korea's External Liabilities as of End 1996
In US$ billions
Total External Liabilities 	 157.5
Long-term Liabilities (1+11+111) 	 57.5
I. Financial Institutions (A+B) 	 41.5
A. Domestic financial institutions 	 38.3
Resident domestic financial insntutions	 24.5
Offshore banking of domestic financial institutions 	 8.5
Foreign branches of domestic financial institutions 	 5.3
B. Branches of foreign banks	 3.2
II. Domestic Corporations	 13.6
III. Public Sector 	 2.4
Short-term Liabilities (1+11)	 100.0
I. Financial Institutions (A+B) 	 78.0
A. Domestic financial institutions 	 65.2
Resident domestic financial institutions 	 26.2
Offshore banking of domestic financial institutions 	 12.7
Foreign branches of domestic financial institutions 	 26.4
B. Branches of foreign banks	 12.8
II. Domestic Corporations	 22.0
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy (Estimated in 1998)
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Among the foreign liabilities, Korean financial institutions shared 65.7 per cent of
total liabilities (66.6 per cent of long-term liabilities and 65.2 per cent of short-term
liabilities) at the end of 1996. The external liabilities data also revealed that Korean
short-term liabilities represented an alarming 63.5 per cent of total external liabilities at
the end of 1996. Furthermore, the short-term borrowings by Korean financial institutions
increased substantially in 1994-96.
Table 6 Trends of Borrowings by the Korean Financial Institutions
In US$ 100 millions
	
1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995	 1996	 1997
Financial Institutions (A+B)
	 28.6	 58.6	 24.3	 12.0	 89.8	 134.0	 141.5 -141.2
A. Long-term liabilities	 -0.5	 37.1	 12.0	 0.8	 19.5	 16.1	 15.3	 7.2
Depositmoneybanks	 -3.3	 21.5	 9.0	 1.5	 21.8	 20.3	 24.9	 6.6
Development institutions 	 0.7	 9.1	 0.8	 -0.8	 0.1	 -3.5	 -8.5	 -0.1
Merchant banking corporations 	 2.1	 6.5	 2.2	 0.1	 -2.4	 -0.7	 -1.1	 0.7
B. Short-term liabilities	 29.1	 21.5	 12.3	 11.2	 70.3	 117.9	 126.2 -148.4
Depositmoneybanks	 24.2	 18.0	 7.0	 3.9	 53.8	 85.2	 71.9 -103.1
Development institutions	 3.6	 3.1	 5.9	 5.6	 7.8	 15.6	 22.4	 -24.3
Merchantbankingcorporations	 1.3	 0.4	 -0.6	 1.7	 8.7	 17.1	 31.9	 -21.0
Source: Bank of Korea
The Korean depository banks (commercial banks and specialised banks)
borrowed US$5.38 billion in foreign currency denominated debt obligations in 1994,
approximately fourteen times more than in 1993 but about four times more than the
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average borrowings of 1990-93. The depository banks substantially increased their
foreign currency borrowings over 1995-96. The foreign borrowings data of merchant
banking corporations were even more alarming. In 1994, Korean merchant banking
corporations borrowed US$0.87 billion in foreign currency, which was about five times
more than in 1993. The merchant banking corporations borrowed about 100 times more
than average borrowings over the period of 1990-93. In 1994 and 1995, the borrowings
in foreign currency by the merchant banking corporations reached US$1.71 and US$3.19
billion, respectively.
D. Growing Numbers of Bankruptcies
In January 1997, Hanbo Steel collapsed under US$6 billion in debts. Hanbo, Korea's
fourteenth largest corporate group in terms of assets, was the first bankruptcy of a Korean
chaebol in a decade. In the months that followed, other significant corporates/chaebol
such as Sammi Steel, Jinro and Dainong, became insolvent, and in July 1997, Kia
Motors, the third largest Korean auto-maker, also entered bankruptcy. The debt-to-equity
ratio of Korean corporates was approximately 450 per cent by the end of 1996, three
times the comparable U.S. ratio, and more than five times the comparable Taiwanese
ratio.8
 The top thirty Korean chaebols had even higher leverage, on average more than
500 per cent in 1996. The highly leveraged positions of the corporates and resulting
Pedro Alba eta!., op. cit., n. 4, p. 57.
Ibid. But, one research estimates the Korea's debt equity ratio was 132 per cent at the end of 1995 when
the debt-equity ratio equals a company's debt divided by shareholder's equity. Yet, it still recognises the
fact that Korean companies had high debt-equity ratio. Michael Pomerleano, "The East Asia Crisis and
Corporate Finances: The Untold Micro Story," World Bank Working Paper No. 1990 (1998), pp. 6-7.
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balance sheet problems, facilitated declining growth in 1997 and thereafter triggered a
fifty per cent increase in the number of corporate insolvencies.'0
The high leverage meant that small shocks to interest rates vis-à-vis operational
cash flows of corporates greatly affected their ability to service debts. The chaebols,
which went bankrupt or had severe financial problems in 1997, tended to have even
larger debt-equity ratios." The return on invested capital for the bankrupt firms, and
additionally for twenty of the top thirty chaebols, was generally well below their
respective costs of capital.'2
E. Currency Crisis
On 2 July 1997, the Bank of Thailand "officially" abandoned defence of the baht
exchange rate and "permitted" the currency to float. The immediate depreciation of the
baht eventually triggered the depreciation of several other regional currencies, such as the
Philippine peso, the Malaysian ringgit, and the Indonesian rupiah.'3
'° OECD, op. cit., n. 1, p. 29.
In case of Sammi, the ratio was 3,245 per cent, while the Jinro group's ratio was 8,598 per cent. See
Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini, "What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial
Crisis?: Part I: A Macroeconomic overview," mimeo (1998), Table 7.
12 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
13 For more Thai financial and economic crisis, see Tull Traisorat, "The Thai Financial and Economic
Crisis of 1997-98: An Opportunity to Re-address the Fundamentals," Studies in International Financial and
Economic Law No. 18 (1998).
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Table 7 Exchange Rate to the US Dollar
Korean won
1996	 l997Q1	 1997Q2	 1997Q3	 199710	 199711	 199712	 1997Q4
Endof	 844.90	 895.00	 877.90	 914.40	 964.60 1170.00	 1695.00	 1695.00
Periodaverage	 805.13	 866.27	 891.70	 898.63	 926.10	 1033.23	 1499.38	 1151.23
Source: Bank of Korea
Under Korea's market average rate (MAR) exchange system, t4 the nominal
won/US dollar rate was allowed to float in the interbank market within a daily range
around the weighted average of the previous day's interbank rates for spot transactions,
and the range was widened in the late 1993 to plus/minus one per cent. Since the Bank of
Korea acted as a buyer/seller of last order to prevent what it considered excessive
exchange rate fluctuations, the system was still a "managed float."
Between July and October 1997, the Korean won depreciated by 2.8 per cent, but
initiated a steep decline in mid-October 1997. The Korean won went into a free-fall on
19 November 1997, and devalued nearly 50 per cent during a two-week period after the
Korean government widened the daily currency band from eight to ten per cent and
thereafter announced that it would henceforth refrain from intervening in the currency
markets (i.e., defending the exchange rate band). In early December 1997, the Korean
government's revelation of alarmingly low level of usable foreign exchange reserves and
disclosure of excessive short-term foreign currency denominated borrowings resulted in a
In March 1990, Korea adopted the MAR system, in which the exchange rate was determined by market
force. However, the system was intended to restnct short-term, speculative capital movements by
introducing daily range. See Chiho Kim, "Monetary Policy in a Changing Financial Environment -
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sharp decline of rollover rates of interbank claims on Korean institutions and further
accelerated downward pressure on the won. The Korean won ultimately depreciated by
55 per cent between October-December 1997.
Table 8 Foreign Exchange Reserves
In US$ billions
1993	 1994	 1995	 1996	 1997
Official gross reserves	 20.3	 25.7	 32.7	 33.2	 20.4
Usable gross reserves 	 20.2	 25.6	 28.5	 29.4	 9.1
In months of imports	 2.6	 2.6	 2.4	 2.0	 0.6
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, 1MF
The Korean government mounted an ultimately unsuccessful effort to defend the
exchange rate band by direct intervention (spot foreign exchange and forward contract
transactions) in October-November 1997, and used over sixty per cent of the nation's
total dollar reserves without achieving its objective. Further, the Bank of Korea shifted
large amounts of foreign exchange reserves to offshore branches of Korean banks to help
them repay the short-term debt obligations falling due by the end of the year and
otherwise maintain international creditworthiness. Thus, Korea lost US$10 billion in
measured reserves and US$25 billion in usable reserves during the crisis period, almost
exhausting measured official reserves during November and early December 1997 alone.
The direct intervention and ensuing capital flight left the Bank of Korea with only US$6
billion in usable foreign exchange reserves by early December 1997.
Searching for an Efficient Monetary Policy Framework in Korea," Pacific Basin Working Paper No. PB97-
05 (1997), pp. 11-12.
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II. CAUSES OF THE KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
A.	 Explaining Financial Crisis Generally
In trying to define the underlying causes of banking and financial crises, a number of
theories have been postulated. These theories are generally reviewed as follows.
1.	 Theories of Financial Crises'5
(a) Macroeconomic Policy-induced Theory
The traditional "first-generation," macroeconomic models explain that banking and
financial crises primarily arise as a result of loose macroeconomic policies.' 6
 A balance
of payment crisis (such as currency depreciation, serious depletion of foreign exchange
reserves, and collapse of a pegged exchange rate) arises when domestic credit expansion
by the central bank is inconsistent with the pegged exchange rate. The credit expansion
often results from excessive public sector deficit spending and expansionary monetary
policy. Foreign exchange reserves fall gradually until the central bank is vulnerable to a
sudden run on reserves, which exhausts the remaining reserves, and pushes the economy
to a floating rate.
The traditional "second-generation" (more recent) macroeconomic models
generally explain that banking and financial crises arise as the result of direct conflict
between a fixed exchange rate regime and the desire to pursue a more expansionary
See Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The Onset . . .," op. cit., n. 5, pp. 3-4.
16 Paul Krugman, "A Model of Balance of Payment Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Baking, vol. 11
(1979), pp. 311-325.
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monetary policy,' 7
 if certain requirements are present) 8
 The fundamental tradeoff
between the costs of maintaining the exchange rate band (currency parities) andlor
abandoning it is a predictably deteriorating one, such that at some future date the nation
would be likely to devalue its currency even in the absence of a speculative attack. The
"speculators" would therefore attempt to get out of the currency prior to a perceived
devaluation, ultimately forcing untimely devaluation because such activities worsen the
government's tradeoff. Therefore, the crisis is ultimately provoked by the inconsistency
of government policies, which make the long-run survival of the fixed exchange rate
regime impossible.
(b) Financial Panic Theory
The "financial panic" theory analyses the possibility of self-fulfilling crises.' 9 A
"financial panic" is defined as an adverse equilibrium outcome in which short-term
creditors suddenly withdraw their loans from a solvent borrower. 2° In general terms, the
"panic" can occur due to "herding" behaviour by foreign investors expecting currency
realignments, or due to contagion effects from crises in other nations or regions, largely
independent from the position of economic fundamentals. The basic notion of a self-
fulfilling crisis is that international credit markets are prone to self-fulfilling crises in
which individual creditors may act rationally but market outcomes may nonetheless
Maurice Obstfeld, "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Paper No. 4640 (1994).
First, there must be a reason why the government would like to abandon its fixed exchange rate. Second,
there must be a reason why the government would like to defend the exchange rate. Third, in order to
create the circular logic drives a crisis, the cost of defending a fixed rate must itself increase when people
expect that the rate might be abandoned.
' Maurice Obstfled, "Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features," NBER Working Paper No.
5285 (1995).
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produce sharp, costly, and fundamentally unnecessary panicked reversals in capital flows
reversals. 2 ' Therefore, this theory hold that financial markets may overreact or
"overshoot" and the extent of the exchange rate adjustment exceeds any reasonable
estimate of what might have been required to correct the initial overvaluations of the
affected currencies.22
(c) Bubble Collapse23
A "financial bubble" occurs when investors collectively purchase a financial asset at
prices increasingly above its fundamental value in the expectation of continuing
subsequent capital gains. In each subsequent period, the bubble may either continue to
grow, or suddenly collapse with a positive probability. The collapse of the bubble and
timing thereof is generally unexpected but not completely unforeseen, since market
participants are aware of the bubble and the probability distribution regarding its
collapse.
20 Douglas Diamond and Phillip Dybvig, "Bank Run, Liquidity, and Deposit Insurance," Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 91(1983), pp. 401-419.
21 Steven Radelet and Jeffiey Sachs, "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects,"
Harvard International Development Working Paper (1998), p. 5.
22 See Stanley Fischer, "The Asian Crisis and the Changing Role of the IMF," Finance and Development,
vol. 35 no. 2 (June 1998), p. 4.
23 See Olivier Blanchard and Mark Watson, "Bubbles, Rational Expectations, and Financial Markets," in
Paul Wachtel ed., Crises in the Economic and Financial Structure (1982).
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(d) Moral Hazard Crisis24
A "moral hazard" crisis generally arises because banks and other non-bank financial
institutions (NBFIs) are able to borrow funds on the basis of implicit or explicit
government guarantees of their respective liabilities.
	 If banks and NBFIs are
systematically undercapitalised or under-regulated, they may use these funds in overly
risky or even criminal ventures.
(e) Disorderly Workout25
A "disorderly workout" occurs when an illiquid or insolvent borrower provokes creditors
into a forced liquidation even though the borrower is worth more as an ongoing
enterprise. A disorderly workout occurs especially when markets operate without the
benefit of creditor coordination through a comprehensive legal framework for corporate
bankruptcy. The problem is sometimes known as "debt overhang," wherein coordination
problems among creditors prevent the efficient provision of worker capital to the
financially distressed borrower, thereby delaying or preventing the eventual discharge of
bad debts.
24 See Akerlof and Romer, "Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit," NBER
Working Paper No. 1869 (1994).
25 See Jeffrey Sachs, "Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?" mimeo (1995).
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2.	 Explaining the Asian Financial Crisis
The above referenced theoretical explanations of financial crises can be generally applied
to the Asian financial crisis as follows.
(a) Macroeconomic Theories
The Asian financial crisis generally does not fit within the macroeconomic theory
paradigm.26 The Asian crisis was generally not the result of conflicts between the pegged
exchange rate regimes and the fiscal policies. Thus, unbalanced macroeconomic policies
(such as incurring excessive public sector deficits) were generally not the primary
characteristic of East Asian nations subject to the crisis. Moreover, the "second-
generation" model also does not provide a valid explanation of the Asian financial crisis.
Nations with low public debt levels, such as those in the East Asia, should not experience
crisis on the basis of macroeconomic imbalances.
(b) Self-fulfilling Crisis (Market Panic)
The self-fulfilling crisis theory is based on the idea that the crisis is mainly the result of a
self-fulfilling panic of investors. Therefore, the argument is that structural deficiencies of
international capital markets were primary responsible for the Asian financial crisis.
Radelet and Sachs27 initially explained that the East Asian crisis resulted from
26 See Pablo Bustelo, "The East Asian Financial Crises: An Analytical Survey," ICE! Working Paper
(1998), pp. 21-22.
27 Radelet and Sachs, "The Onset ....., op. cit., n. 5.
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vulnerability to financial panic that arose from certain emerging weaknesses in these
economies (especially growing short-term debt), combined with a series of policy
missteps and accidents that triggered the systemic panic. While there were significant
underlying problems and weak fundamentals besetting the Asian economies at both
macroeconomic and microeconomic levels, the imbalances were arguably not severe
enough to warrant a financial crisis of the magnitude that took place in late 1997. In
short, the Asian financial crisis was more likely triggered by dramatic swings in creditor
expectations about the behaviour of other creditors, thereby creating a self-fulfilling,
though possibly individually rational, financial panic. The essence of the crisis was
rooted in huge, sudden capital flow reversals, as economies which previously attracted
large foreign capital inflows suddenly became subject to withdrawals of short-term lines
of credit, an exodus of portfolio capital, and offshore flight by domestic investors.28
Recent studies have argued that there were conditions sufficient to trigger self-
fulfilling panic in the Asian financial crisis. For instance, in their second view, Radelet
and Sachs argue that the main condition of a self-fulfilling panic is a high level of short-
term foreign liabilities relative to short-term foreign assets. 29 Chang and Velasco3° also
emphasise "international illiquidity" as a principal condition of Asian financial crisis. A
nation's financial system is "internationally illiquid" if potential short-term foreign
currency denominated debt obligations exceed the amount of foreign currency that the
nation can access on short notice. 3 ' Chang and Velasco further argue that financial
28 Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "What Have We Learned, So Far, from the Asian Financial Crisis?,"
mimeo (1999), P. 2.
29 See ibid.
° Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco, "The Asian Liquidity Crisis," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Working Paper No. 98-11(1998).
Ibid., p. 22.
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market liberalisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, an unprecedented increase in
short-term foreign currency denominated liabilities, and an increase in foreign currency
debt created a situation of international illiquidity, which made the East Asian countries
vulnerable to self-fulfilling financial crises. Additionally, Krugman argues that the role
of corporate balance sheets in determining their ability to invest, and that of capital flows
in affecting the real exchange rate, are the core effects to produce a feedback loop that
can cause a potentially healthy economy to experience a self-fulfilling financial crisis.32
(c) Fundamental Weaknesses (Moral Hazard)
The proponents fundamental weakness/moral hazard argue that the Asian financial crisis
generated from deficiencies within the Asian economies themselves. 33
 In their view,
these weaknesses were small enough to be overlooked in the early 1990s, but became
much larger and more obvious in 1996 and early 1997. These weaknesses change
resulted in a sudden fundamental shift in perceptions about the outlook for continued
growth, and a rapid withdrawal of financing and capital flow reversals.
The moral hazard explanation34 emphasises the problem of speculative investment
in dubious activities resulting from the moral hazard of implicit guarantees, systemic
corruption and cronyism. The Asian financial intermediaries were perceived as having
implicit government guarantees for their liabilities, but were essentially unregulated and
therefore subject to severe moral hazard problems. The moral hazard problems,
combined with the prevalent abuse of political connections, resulted in excessive
32 Paul Krugman, "Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises," paper prepared for the
festschnft volume in honour of Robert Flood (1999).
See, e.g., Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, "What Caused ...: Part I ...," op. cit., n. 11.
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speculative investment and a massive boom-bust cycle in financial and related assets,
such as real estate, equities, and currencies, largely anticipated by rational market
participants. When the boom cycle reversed itself, banks using assets as collateral for
their credit obligations entered a sustained and inevitable period of crisis.
Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini explain that structural and policy distortions are the
roots of the Asian financial crisis, even if market overreaction/overshooting and investor
herding to facilitate declines in exchange rates, asset prices and economic activity to be
far more severe than perceptually warranted by the initial weak economic conditions.35
In 1990-96, the usual conditions indicating a potential currency crisis (slow economic
growth, high budget deficits, high inflation, and substantial current account deficits over
several years) were not observed in East Asia. However, unsound fundamentals were at
the heart of the turmoil. Under political pressure to maintain high economic growth rates,
corporates were traditionally given explicit or implicit guarantees to their projects. On
the financial side, the moral hazard problem guided banks to borrow excessive foreign
currency borrowings and thereafter engage in excessive speculative domestic lending
activities, as facilitated by the extensive liberalisation of capital markets during the
1990s. At the international level, the moral hazard problem hinged upon the behaviour of
international banks and NBFIs, provided enormous amounts of credits through loan
facilities with apparent neglect to sound risk management standards. Under these
conditions, the current account imbalances, quantity and quality of financial overlending,
banking problems, and composition, maturity and size of capital inflows and reversals are
the roots of the financial crisis.
See Paul Krugman, "What Happened to Asia?," mimeo (1998).
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubmi, "What Caused ...: Part I ...," op. cit., n. 11.
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(d) IMF Perspective
IMP analyses of the Asian financial crisis generally identified economic overheating,
fixed exchange rates, financial weakness, lack of information and transparency, and loss
of confidence as underpinnings of the crisis. 36
 According to the IMF, 37 fast growth in
domestic credit in the East Asian nations created overheated economies, which in turn
generated large current account deficits and asset value inflation. The sustained
maintenance of pegged exchange rate regimes encouraged large capital inflows that
reversed themselves when the regime became unstable. Moreover, financial systems in
the East Asian nations were systemically unsound, due to (1) weak management and poor
control of risks, (2) lax enforcement of banking regulation and inadequate prudential
supervision, and (3) governmental interference, directed credit policies, and lending to
related parties. The absence of timely and accurate information and transparency in
general were also pervasive in East Asian financial systems, which hindered market
participants from maintaining realistic views of economic fundamentals. Finally, a lack
of confidence unfolded in each nation just before the financial turmoil commenced,
primarily resulting from political uncertainties regarding the authorities' commitment to
maintaining pegged exchange rate regimes and implementing the necessary reforms and
adjustments. This degeneration of confidence exacerbated the respective currency
depreciation and declines in equity market indexes and other financial market asset
prices. At the external dimension, large private capital flows were driven by an
36 IMF, "The Asian Crisis: Causes and Cures," Finance & Development, Vol. 35 No. 2 (June 1998), Pp. 18-
19.
IMF, World Economic Outlook (May 1998), p. 3.
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underestimation of risks for higher yields. Thus, international investors contributed
significantly to the downward pressure on the respective currency in crisis, especially the
Thai baht in July 1997.
B.	 Origins of the Korean Financial Crisis
In looking specifically to the origins of the Korean financial crisis, the following specific
observations can be made.
1.	 The Chaebol Structure
The Korean financial crisis stemmed in large part from the chaebol structure and its
relationship to the failure of the financial system (especially as to the commercial
banking and merchant banking sectors). With respect to the non-financial business
aspects, several factors causing the economic crisis have been identified, including excess
leverage (the ratio of debt to equity) and overly concentrated investments. The chaebols
generally maintained high leverage given their easy access to credit from financial
institutions. The average leverage ratio of the thirty largest chaebols was approximately
five to one in 1996. At the same time, the chaebols' over-leveraged expansion caused
excess industrial capacity. A statistical review of the financial practices and performance
of corporates in East Asia reveals the trend of unsustainable rapid (and probably
excessive) investment in fixed assets by excessive borrowing in Korea.38 The declining
economic growth induced highly leveraged chaebols to prevail to overwhelmingly high
debt burdens, and when the corporate sector could no longer service its debt obligations,
38 See Pomerleano, op. cit., n. 9.
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the financial sector was predictably burdened with massive nonperforming loans. The
problems of excessive leverage and overcapacity led to the financial crisis, especially
banking system failure, where the government intervened directly at the micro-level by
controlling and manipulating the banking industry to carry out governmental economic
policies.
2.	 Government Control over Banking Industry
As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, 39
 the Korean government controlled the
banking industry in two ways. First, the government's control and intervention came
from its legal and practical control over the regulatory and supervisory framework of the
banking industry. Secondly, the Korean commercial banks were largely controlled and
utilised for channelling funds to support the government's economic development plans.
The government exerted direct control over bank regulators and supervisors such that the
Korean commercial banks were relegated in essence to become "government agents."
Moreover, the government regarded the chaebols as pillars of the economy, and
implicitly guaranteed that they would not fail. The Korean banks, therefore, would
continue lending to them, regardless of the health of the underlying business, especially
through loans secured with collateral, usually real property. As of June 1997, the ratio of
collateralised commercial loans to total Korean loans dominated in won was
approximately 50.6 per cent. 4° Among the Korean nationwide commercial banks, the
large commercial banks, which were controlled longer and more intensively by the
39 See Chapter Two Section II C.
K. Y. Kim, "Newly Established Banks Have More Credit Lending," Maeil Business Newspaper (8 Oct.
1997).
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government on an aggregate basis, suffered more from non-performing loans than other
newly established nationwide banks.
Under these circumstances, the Korean banking industry was thoroughly
permeated with a culture of "moral hazard." The Korean banks kept lending to chaebols
which the government preferred or otherwise presented no objections thereto. Although
government involvement in banking lending decisions gradually declined since banking
industry liberalisation began in 1980s, Korean banks nonetheless developed few skills in
credit analysis or risk management. 4 ' Lending decisions were still largely based on the
availability of collateral rather than on an assessment of risk or future repayment
capacity. Reflecting the history of directed lending, banks generally did not insist on, or
receive, full financial information from chaebols.42
3.	 Lax Regulation and Supervision
As also discussed in chapter Two in this thesis, 43
 the Korean government's control over
the domestic banking industry focused on the credit allocation among banks. Korea's
banking regulatory and supervisory framework was poorly implemented and the existing
prudential regulations were not meaningfully enforced. The moral hazard problems
created incentives for risky behaviour, but the lax prudential regulation and supervision
did not allow the Korean banking regulatory and supervisory authorities to recognise and
address these issues.
41 Unlike other Asian countries which experienced the financial crisis in 1997, in Korea, the quantity of
lending growth was not significant during the 1990s, but many loans made by the banks and NBFIs were of
low quality. See Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, "What Caused ...: Part I ...," op. cit., n. 11, pp.25-27 and
Tables 18-20.
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The regulations concering the Korean specialised banks and other non-bank
financial institutions were more problematic. For specialised banks, only nominal
regulation and supervision existed. Only single borrower lending limits and payment
guarantee limits were enforced, but there were various exceptions, which subsumed the
regulations themselves. For NBFIs, merchant banking corporations were prohibited from
lending and discounting commercial bills or providing payment guarantees to any
single individual or juridical person in excess of twenty-five per cent of its equity. 45
 The
aggregate amount of borrowings, commercial paper issues, debt obligations, debentures,
guarantees on commercial paper issues, and payment guarantees could not exceed twenty
times the company's equity. 46 Merchant banking corporations could exceed these
limitations when the MoFE authorised such activities, however. Under MoFE guidelines,
the aggregate amount of commercial bill discounts, commercial bill brokerages, loans,
and payment guarantees to the controlling shareholder was limited to 100 per cent of
merchant banking corporation equity. The aggregate amount of commercial bill
discounts, loans, and payment guarantees to a single affiliated business group was limited
to 150 per cent of the equity.
The Office of Bank Supervision of the Bank of Korea (OBS) also permitted the
banks to utilise lax and often unrealistic accounting standards. The commercial banks
were required to reserve minimum 100 per cent loan loss provisions under OBS
regulations. Under the OBS loan classification standards, banks were required to have on
42 Tomás J. T. Balrfio and Angel tJbide, "The Korean Financial Crisis of 1997: A Strategy of Financial
Sector Reform," IMF Working Paper No. WP 99 28 (1999), p. 16.
43 See Chapter Two Section II C.
Merchant Banking Act of 1995 art. 15, ci. 1.
Ibid. art. 15, ci. 2.
Iibd. art. 14.
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reserve a total amount of 0.5 per cent of normal loans, one per cent of precautionary
loans, twenty per cent of substandard loans, seventy-five per cent of doubtful loans, and
100 per cent of estimated loss loans. However, the OBS permitted banks' reserves to
average ninety-four per cent of estimated loss loans as an interim target ratio in 1997.
The commercial banks were also required to have securities investment loss provisions of
thirty and fifty per cent in 1996 and 1997 respectively. 48 Even if the banks were required
to meet the minimum eight per cent capital adequacy ratio on risk-weighted assets, the
OBS provisioning ratios essentially limited the desired result. Under the OBS interim
target ratios, only four commercial banks officially failed to meet the minimum capital
adequacy ratio at the end of 1997. When the commercial banks were required to reserve
100 per cent loan loss provisions and securities investment loss provisions, however, only
twelve of the twenty-six commercial banks could meet the minimum capital adequacy
ratio.49
Moreover, neither the regulatory nor supervisory authorities had implemented any
measures to regulate and supervise Korean financial institutions in foreign currency
denominated borrowings. Korea's total external liabilities were US$180.1 billion and
US$158.1 billion as end of September and December 1997 respectively. 50 The external
liabilities had increased approximately 400 per cent over the last five years. Korean
financial institutions, including commercial banks, were responsible for more than sixty-
The OBS set the interim target ratio on loan loss provisions between eighty-three and 100 per cent based
on the bank's fmancial condition. See Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Regulatory Guidelines
for Provisioning in Fiscal Year 1997 and Supervisory Measures to Problem Banks" (22 Dec. 1997).
48 The OBS set the interim target ratios based on the Korean stock market and the commercial banks' profit
conditions. Ibid.; see also Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Regulatory Guidelines for
Provisioning Securities Investment Loss in Fiscal Year of 1996" (19 Dec. 1996).
' See Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Commercial Banks' Capital Adequacy Ratios and
Supervisory Measures to Substandard Banks" (26 Feb. 1998).
° See Table 4.
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five per cent of total external liabilities as end of 1996. The structure of external
liabilities revealed that short-term liabilities were more than sixty-three per cent of the
total liabilities as end of 1996.51 More importantly, the financial institutions generally
mismatched their foreign currency dominated lendings and borrowings by funding long-
term lending facilities with short-term foreign currency denominated borrowings, which
cost less than long-term borrowings. Under this mismatch problem, the commercial
banks were not required to maintain adequate liquidity ratios on the foreign currency
assets until June 1997. The OBS thereafter reviewed the ratios52 and, according to the
audits of nationwide commercial banks, no nationwide commercial bank met the 100 per
cent liquidity ratio as of end of the 1997; and only four banks maintained the minimum
seventy per cent ratio (which the OBS required as an adequate level). 53 Additionally, it is
well recognised these banks also invested in foreign securities of nations such as
Thailand, Indonesia, and Russia, and Latin America (Brady bonds) with about twenty per
cent of their foreign borrowings. 54 Thus, it is clear that insufficient capital adequacy
ratios, inadequate legal lending limits on single borrowers or groups of related borrowers,
inadequate asset classification systems and poor provisions for possible losses, and a
general absence of meaningful disclosure and transparency of bank operations all
contributed to banking fragility and the collapse of the Korean banking system.
51 As of June 1997, the ratio was 67.9 per cent. The figures had gone down 61 per cent, 55 per cent, and
44.3 per cents of total liabilities as of September, November, and December 1997 respectively because of
loan withdrawals by foreign banks.
52 The liquidity ratio on foreign currency asset = foreign currency assets with less than three month
maturity foreign currency borrowings x 100.
" J. H. Kim, "Nationwide Commercial Banks Poorly Manage the Foreign Currency Assets- Short-term
Foreign Currency Liabilities Caused the Foreign Currency Crisis," Chosun Ilbo (11 Mar. 1998), p. 10.
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4.	 Increasing Financial Fragility
The conditions of moral hazard and lax regulation and supervision rendered Korean
banks and NBFIs more vulnerable to economic shocks in facilitating lending to economic
sectors or firms whose debt service capacity was particularly susceptible to shocks and by
reducing their own capacity to absorb negative shocks, especially by exacerbating
currency and maturity mismatches and by under-provisioning for future potential losses.
The general absence of meaningful regulation and supervision of financial institutions
allowed poorly governed corporations to invest borrowed money in highly inflated or
risky assets. The commercial bank trust businesses and merchant banking corporations
were crucial for the buildup of the crisis due to weak and arbitrage regulation and
supervision and the development of risky practices.55
The general lack of transparency, in the form of unreported mutual guarantees,
nondisclosure of corporate and bank net positions, and insider relations, masked the
effect of poor investments and speculative lending activities, and prevented the market
from recognising and correcting the problems through "market discipline" channels.
These weaknesses were aggravated by undisciplined foreign lending. The problem was
not so much overall indebtedness, but the composition of debt, with a buildup of short-
term, unhedged foreign currency debt leaving the economies vulnerable to a sudden to a
sudden loss of confidence. 56
 Further, the serious mismatch between foreign liabilities
and foreign assets of Korean banks and NBFIs and growing corporate bankruptcies put
the Korean financial institutions, especially several merchant banking corporations, under
I. H. Kim, "How to Use USS 156.9 Billion," Chosun Ilbo (8 Jan. 1998), p. 10. For example, the MoFE
revealed that Korean fmancial institutions have US$ 5.5 billion in credits to Indonesia by lending and
purchasing bonds. See K. H. Kim, "Credit to Indonesia," Chosun JIbo (11 Mar. 1998), p. 1.
' Balifio and Ubide, op. cit., n. 42, p. 16.
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significant pressure since much of the foreign borrowing of these companies had been, in
effect, channelled through (and in some cases guaranteed by) them.
III. RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
A. DeaLing with Growing Corporate Bankruptcies Before the IMF
Programme
The Hanbo Steel Co., Hanbo group's main company, defaulted on its debt obligations on
23 January 1997. The Hanbo "bribe-for-loan" scandal underscored that Korea needed
sweeping financial reforms. 57
 The scandal forced the Korean government to decide
against rescuing the Hanbo group from bankruptcy and insist on a more rigorous
treatment based on market principles rather than the past policy of dealing with chaebol
that bankruptcies of chaebol by takeovers from larger groups with government subsidised
loans. Foreign investors perceived the Korean government policy in handling the Hanbo
bankruptcy was regarded as a firm determination for market reforms toward a more
independent and accountable banking system, even if Hanbo's collapse made foreign
lenders suspend or limit financing to the overseas branches of Korean banks, given the
continued widening of the so called "Korean Premium."58
After the Hanbo collapse, to promote corporate rehabilitation and restructuring,
the Korean government introduced the Bankruptcy Deferment Accord (BDA) in April
1997. The BDA was intended to facilitate support to the troubled companies and prevent
Alba et a!., op. cit., n. 4, p. 59.
See Chapter Two Section III C. See also Irma Adelman and Byung Nak Song, "The Korean Financial
Crisis of 1997-98," mimeo (1998).
See Daekeun Park and Changyong Rhee, "Currency Crisis in Korea: Could It Have Been Avoided?,"
mimeo (1998), pp. 8-9.
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their bankruptcies; the Jinro and Dainong groups were among those supported by the
scheme. Notwithstanding the government's efforts towards rescuing troubled companies,
on 15 July 1997 the Kia group became threatened with insolvency and was aided under
the BDA. The government, dealing with the Kia collapse at the early stage, resisted
widespread calls for a wholesale bailing out of Kia and other troubled chaebols.59
The MoFE, facing the difficulties in the financial industries, announced its
package for financial assistance on 25 August 1997.60 The announcement was intended
to help the banking sector following the string of chaebol collapses. The financial
assistance would be channelled through the Korea Asset Management Corporation
(KAMC) to take over non-performing assets. The announcement also offered emergency
loans from the BOK to commercial banks and merchant bank corporations. On 22
October 1997, the Korean government decided to bail out the near-bankrupt Kia group.
This was the turning point where Korea's private banking crisis officially became a
sovereign crisis. 6 ' On 24 October 1997, Standard & Poor's (S&P) promptly downgraded
the credit ratings of Korea from AA- to A+ with the rating outlook remaining negative.62
The rating agency criticised the decision to bail out Kia by saying that 'the bailout might
alleviate short-term pressures but the long run economic consequences are
unambiguously negative.' 63 On 28 October 1997, Moody's also downgraded Korea's
short-term credit rating from Prime-I to Prime-2. Under the Cooperative Financing
System, the Korean government tried to revive Kia by forcing the banks to lend unlimited
Joim Burton, "South Korea: A Quiet Change," Financial Times (8 Aug. 1997).
60 See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Programs for Financial Market Stability and
International Confidence" (25 Aug. 1997).
6 Park and Rhee, op. cit., n. 58, P. 15.
62 See Christopher Huhne, "After Asia: Some Lessons of the Crisis," paper presented to the East Asian
Crisis Conference at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex Univ. (13-14 June 1998).
63 See Park and Rhee, op. cit., n. 58, p. 15.
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amounts until Kia's rehabilitation was secure.
	 The government even suspended the
lending limit guidelines against the new loans to Kia.
Moreover, in response to the growing foreign liability payment pressure, Korea
pledged its foreign currency reserves to bail out banks and guarantee foreign loans to
corporate borrowers that promoted its export policy. 65
 In August, the government
decided to extend its foreign currency reserves to merchant banking corporations, 66
 and
there was abundant speculation concerning the level of usable foreign currency reserves
held by the Bank of Korea. In November 1997, the Korean press reported that Korean
commercial banks were practically in default on their foreign liabilities and the Bank of
Korea deposited its foreign currency reserves in the foreign branches or subsidiaries of
Korean commercial banks in order to prevent the defaults. 67
 Tn October and November
1997, the Korean government announced fundamental restructuring packages to deal
with the escalating financial crisis. The government announced policies for opening
long-term bond markets and liberalising foreign borrowing to induce foreign capital.68
On 19 November 1997, two days before Korea officially requested monetary assistance
from the IMF, the government also announced a set of financial support policies. These
policies entailed: (1) enhancing the financial capacity of the KAMC to purchase
distressed assets, which would then be purchased by the government within two years;
(2) facilitating the restructuring of financial institutions through mergers and injections of
new funds by domestic and foreign investment; (3) providing vastly increased deposit
"See "Is a Financial Panic Coming?" Korea Economic Daily (6 Nov. 1997).
65 See Cover Story, "Rescuing Asia," Business Week (17 Nov. 1997).
See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Programs for Financial Market Stability and
International Confidence" (25 Aug. 1997).
67 
j s Lee, "Five Largest Nationwide Banks Escaped from Foreign Liability Defaults," Mae:1 Business
Newspaper (18 Nov. 1997).
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insurance by raising the capital of the Deposit Insurance Corporation almost tenfold; (4)
further liberalising the capital account by raising the limits on individual investments by
foreigners and guaranteeing corporate bonds with maturities over three years; and (5)
strengthening financial disclosure standards and loan classification requirements. 69
 This
package was announced one month before the presidential election, however, and was
generally viewed as neither credible nor tenable.7°
B. International Monetary Fund Programmes
After consistent denials, Korea's new Minister of Finance and Economy announced on
21 November 1997 that Korea would seek a rescue package from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). After negotiations, the Korean government and IIMF jointly
announced a US$21 billion stand-by credit facility in support of the Korean economic
adjustment. programme. Some US$36 billion of additional financing from multilateral
and bilateral sources were also announced in support of the programme. 7 ' Under the IIMF
agreement, the Korean government agreed to undertake various measures. First, a strong
macroeconomic framework designed to continue orderly reductions in the external
current account deficit, build up international reserves, and contain inflationary pressures
through tighter monetary policies and significant fiscal adjustment.
	 Second, a
comprehensive strategy to restructure and recapitalise the financial sector and improve
transparency, market-oriented practices, and supervision. Third, measures to reduce the
68 See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Program for Financial Market Stability" (30 Oct.
1997).
69 See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Financial Market Stabilisation Package" (19 Nov.
1997).
,	 Adelman and Song, op. cit., n. 57.
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high degree of reliance by corporates and financial institutions on short-term debt
obligations and facilitate improved diversification of risk in the economy.72
The programmes have been based on five key policy components:
macroeconomic and fiscal policies, financial sector restructuring, capital account and
trade liberalisation, corporate governance and corporate restructure, and labour market
reform. 73
 First, in order to reduce the current account deficit and to contain inflation to
five per cent, the Korean government pursued stringent fiscal and monetary policies by
(1) tax increases and expenditure cuts, and (2) a substantial increase in interest rates.
Second, to achieve a prudentially sound financial system, the programme planned to set
up a strong, independent financial regulatory and supervisory authority; strengthen
prudential regulations; close non-viable merchant banking corporations; and nationalise
certain commercial financial institutions. Third, the further liberalisation of financial
markets by proceeding to fully liberalise the use of money market instruments, allowance
of foreign investment in domestic financial institutions, authorisation for foreign banks
and brokerage houses to establish subsidiaries, and elimination of ceilings on foreign
investment in Korea equities. The trade opening was to abolish trade-related subsidies
and liberalise merchandise imports and foreign financial services. Fourth, in order to
improve corporate governance and the corporate structure, the transparency of corporate
balance sheets was to be improved by enforcing accounting standards and the
71 These included US$14 billion from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and US$22
billion from a group of industrial countries.
72 International Monetary Fund Press Release, "IMF Approves SDR 15.5 Billion Stand-by Credit for
Korea" (4 Dec. 1997). In summary, the IMF programmes have had nine main declared goals: (I) prevent
outright default on foreign obligations; (2) limit the extent of currency depreciation; (3) preserve a fiscal
balance; (4) limit the rise in inflation; (5) rebuild foreign exchange reserves; (6) restructure and reform the
banking sector; (7) remove monopolies and otherwise reform the domestic non-financial economy; (8)
preserve confidence and creditworthiness; and (9) limit the decline of output. See Radelet and Sachs, "The
Onset ...," op. cit., n. 5, p. 24.
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restructuring of corporate finances was to be encouraged by measures to reduce the high
debt-equity ratios, capital market development, and changes to the cross guarantee
system with chaebols. Fifth, the labour market was to be made more flexible by
clarifying the circumstances and procedures for layoffs. The subsequent IMF
programmes relaxed monetary and fiscal targets. The second IMF programme adopted
on 24 December 1997 allowed the Korean government to sterilise activated amounts
from the 11.3 trillion won liquidity support package provided to the financial sector as
necessary to keep overall liquidity sufficiently tight to maintain interest rates at adequate
levels.74
 The third IMF programme adopted on 7 January 1998 authorised the Korean
government to expand the money supply by 14.9 per cent as of March 1998. The fourth
IMF programme adopted on 7 February 1998, a fiscal deficit of about 0.8 per cent of
GDP was projected. 76
 With the updated macroeconomic projections indicating weaker
growth and ongoing structural adjustment in the economy, a larger fiscal deficit, 1.2 per
cent of GDP, was permitted.77
See Republic of Korea, "Memorandum on the Economic Program" (3 Dec. 1997).
' See Republic of Korea, "Letter of Intent Sent to LMF" (24 Dec. 1997).
See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Revision on IMF Agreed Macroeconomic
Indicators" (8 Jan. 1998).
76	 first IMF programme was designed to yield 1.5 per cent of GDP.
' See Ministry of Finance and Economy, "Updated Memorandum on Economic Program for Second
Quarterly Review 1998" (4 May 1997).
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IV. REFORMING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
A. New Financial Regulatory and Supervisory System
The Korean government introduced a plan to reform the central banking and financial
supervisory systems in July 1997 and further submitted thirteen financial reform bills,
including a Revised Bank of Korea Act and an Act Concerning Establishment of
Financial Supervisory Organisations. 78
 The proposed legislation received substantial
objections from financial supervisory organisations, those Bills were not enacted until the
IMF intervened. On 29 December 1997, in a special session of the National Assembly
following the Stand-By Arrangement between the Korean government and the IMF that
required financial sector restructuring, the Bills were enacted. 79
 The General Banking
Act was also amended on 13 January 1998 and came into effect on 1 April 1998.
1. Bank of Korea
The Revised Bank of Korea Act 1997 designates the Bank of Korea (BOK) as the
monetary authority. It also mandates price stability as the sole objective of the BOK.8°
The Act also changes the composition of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), which
replaced the Monetary Board. The MPC consists of seven members, including the
Governor of the Bank of Korea (Governor). The Governor is nominated by the President
78 See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Releases, "Reform on Central Bank and Financial
Supervisory System" (25 July 1997); Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Releases, "Summary of
Financial Reform Bills" (22 Aug. 1997).
See Republic of Korea, "IMF Stand-By Arrangement Summary of the Economic Program" (5 Dec.
1997).
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and approved by the State Council. Three of the seven members are recommended
respectively by the MoFE, the Governor, and the Chairman of the Financial Supervisory
Commission; and the remaining three are recommended by the President of the Korea
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Chairman of the Korea Federation of Banks,
and the Chainnan of the Korea Securities Dealers' Association, respectively. 8 ' The
Governor is designated as Chairman of the MPC. 82 Under the revised Act, the BOK
implements monetary policy based on market principles and harmonises its policies with
the government's economic policies, but only insofar as it does not conflict with the
BOK's main objective of maintaining price stability. 83
 The revised Act significantly
repudiates government control over the BOK by removing the chairmanship position and
the membership from the MoFE to the MPC. The revised Act further reduces the power
of the Minister of MoFE to appoint the Auditor of the BOK and to administer the
appointment process for MPC members. 84
 Thus, the MoFE no longer has the right to
review the business activities of the BOK, but on the other hand it retains the power to
request reconsideration of MPC decisions (but only when the resolution is in conflict
with the government's economic policies). In such cases, the MoFE should immediately
announce its request publicly.85
Under the Revised Bank of Korea Act, the banking regulatory and supervisory
responsibilities are transferred from the BOK to the Financial Supervisory Commission
(FSC). However, the BOK retains limited supervisory roles as the de jure lender of last
° Revised Bank of Korea Act art. I.
Ibid. art. 13, ci. 1.
82 Ibid. art. 13, ci. 2.
Ibid. art. 4.
The Auditor shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister of MoFE.
85 Revised Bank of Korea Act art. 92.
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resort. The BOK retains the right to request financial institutions and the financial
supervisory authorities to submit information necessary to implement monetary policy. 86
The BOK further retains the right to request financial supervisory authorities to inspect
commercial banks and implement corrective measures. 87
 If necessary, the 130K may
request a joint inspection. 88
 Finally, the BOK maintains the right to inspect operations
and assets of financial institutions when it extends liquidity support to them.89
2.	 Financial Supervisory Commission, Securities and Futures
Commission, and Financial Supervisory Board
The Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations establishes a
new financial regulatory and supervisory system. The Financial Supervisory
Commission (FSC) under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister is responsible for
promulgating and amending supervisory rules and authorising business activities and
operations of the financial institutions. 90
 The FSC consists of seven members: the
chairman, the vice-chairman, the vice-Minister of MoFE, the Deputy Governor of the
BOK, the head of the consolidated Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation, a financial
expert nominated by the chairman of the Commission, an accounting specialist
nominated by the Minister of MoFE, a legal expert nominated by the Minister of Justice,
and a representative of the business sector nominated by the President of the Korea
86 Ibid. art.87.
87 Ibid. art. 88, cls. 1 and 2.
88 Ibid. art. 88, ci. 1.
89 Ibid. art. 65, ci. 3.
° Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Orgamsations art. 3; Act Concerning
Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations art. 17. Even if placed under the Prime Minister, the
FSC shall operate its functions independently from the Prime Minister under the article 3 of the Act.
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Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 9 ' The chairman, the vice-chairman, and the
financial expert are to serve on a full-time basis for a renewable three year term. 92 The
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) is responsible for overseeing the securities and
futures markets under the guidance of the FSC. 93 The FSC vice-chairman is designated
to hold the position of the SFC chairman.94
Under the Act, the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) was established as a
special juridical person on January 1, 1999 as prescribed by subsequent Presidential
Decree. 95 The FSS is responsible for inspecting, auditing, and sanctioning financial
institutions under the direction of the FSC and the SFC. 96 The FSC chairman is also
designated as FSS. 97 From April 1, 1998 until the FSS was established, financial
institutions were essentially supervised by several institutions. The OBS, which was
separate from the BOK, was responsible for supervising commercial banks, long-term
credit banks, the NACF, the NFFC and its member cooperatives, the NLCF, trust
companies, and other institutions as FSC sees fit. 98 The Securities Supervisory Board
was responsible for supervising securities companies, securities finance corporations,
investment advisory companies, securities investment trust companies, and futures
trading companies. 99 The Insurance Supervisory Board as its name implies was
responsible for supervising insurance companies.'°° Finally, the Credit Management
Fund supervised merchant banking corporations, mutual savings and finance companies,
Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations art. 4, ci. 1.
92 Ibid.art.6,ci. 1.
Ibid. art. 19.
Ibid. art. 20, ci. 2.
Ibid. art. 24; Ibid. Addenda art. 1.
Act Concerning Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations art. 37.
Ibid. art. 29, ci. 2.
98 Ibid. Addenda art. 2, ci. 2, no. 1.
Ibid. Addenda art. 2, ci. 2, no. 2.
281
Chapter Four
financial companies specialising in loan business, and credit unions.' 0 ' The Korea
Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank, and the Industrial Bank of Korea had been
regulated and supervised by the MoFE.
Although the FSC and FSS are authorised financial regulatory and supervisory
entities, the BOK retains the right to request that FSS conduct on-site or, in conjunction
with the Bank, joint examinations of specific banks. 102 Furthermore, the BOK may
request the FSS for its findings from the examinations and, on the basis of these findings,
may request that FSS order banking institutions to implement corrective measures.'° 3 In
the above situations, the FSS must accept and act on BOK requests.'°4 The Korea
Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) may also request the FSC and the FSS to conduct
on-site or joint examination of insured financial institutions. 105 Additionally, the MPC of
the BOK may request the FSC to reconsider a previously adopted resolution provided
that the resolution has direct relation to and impact on monetary and credit policies.'06
When the request for reconsideration is made, the final decision requires a 2/3 majority
vote of the FSC membership.'°7 The MoFE, the MPC, and the FSC may, when any one
of them deems it necessary for the conduct of its policies, request information and data
from each other.'°8 In those cases, each of them must comply with the request unless a
feasible reason can be given for not doing so.Z09
'°°Ibid. Addenda art. 2, ci. 2, no. 3.
lOt Ibid. Addenda art. 2, ci. 2, no. 4.
102 Ibid. art. 62, ci. 1.
103 Ibid. art. 62, ci. 2.
104 Ibid. art. 62, ci. 4.
'os Ibid. art. 66.
106 Ibid. art. 63, ci. 1.
107 Ibid. art. 63, ci. 2.
108 Ibid. art. 65.
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3. New Role of the MoFE
The MoFE retains authority over financial policies at the macroeconomic level, foreign
exchange policies, and preparation of financial-related legislation. The licensing
authority for banking institutions was initially transferred to the MoFE from the
Monetary Board."° In May 1999, the authority over licensing financial institutions and
prudential supervision of specialised banks was transferred to the FSC.IH
4. Depoliticalisation
The Korean reforms regarding central banking and financial regulatory and supervisory
systems are necessary steps towards establishing a new banking system which is
structurally independent from other government departments (especially the MoFE).
However, the reformed banking regulatory and supervisory structure does not entirely
remove the possibility of undue government agency and other political interference over
the Korean banking system. As part of the executive branch, the FSC can still exert
significant control over the Korean banking system to pursue the government's
objectives. Moreover, the reformed system does not provide any practical means to
prevent or substantially limit political interference.
B. Financial Sector Restructuring Programmes
Under the IIMF agreement, the Korean government agreed to make its financial system
more transparent, market-oriented, competitive, and well regulated and supervised with
'°9 lbzd. art. 65.
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clear and firm exit policies)' 2
 The reforms implemented in the financial sector may be
divided into three components: restructuring troubled financial institutions, disposing of
non-performing loans and improving prudential supervision.
1.	 Restructuring Financial Institutions
(a) Merchant Banking Corporations
Prior to the financial crisis, there were thirty merchant banking corporations operating in
Korea. As providers of short-term financing," 3
 the merchant banking corporations were
capitalised with public deposits, and also borrowed in domestic and foreign currency
from the Korean commercial banks and foreign financial institutions. However, the
merchant banking corporations had significant "mismatch" problems. In November
1997, approximately eighty-four per cent of their assets had longer maturities than the
sources of capital." 4
 As the Korean economic and financial conditions deteriorated, their
non-performing assets increased. According to the FSC, the ratios of non-performing
assets to total assets of the merchant banking corporations were 1.55 per cent, 1.76 per
cent and 4.49 per cent as at the end of December 1996, June 1997 and December 1997,
respectively." 5
 Further, the pressures of foreign currency withdrawals from international
institutions increased and several merchant banking corporations faced defaults. Thus,
on 25 November 1997, the MoFE suspended foreign currency operations of eight
110 Revised General Banking Act of 1998 art. 28, ci. 1.
' See Revised General Banking Act of 1999 art. 8, ci. 1.
112 See IMF Press Release, "IMF Approves SDR 15.5 Billion Stand-by Credit for Korea," Press Release
No. 97 55 (4 Dec. 1997).
See Chapter One Section!.
114	 E. A. Lee, "Conditions of Merchant Banks," Maeil Business Newspaper(19 Nov. 1997).
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merchant banking corporations and ordered them to transfer their foreign currency assets
and liabilities to designated commercial banks.
Under the IMF programme, the Korean government demonstrated its intention to
close troubled financial institutions. The MoFE suspended operations of nine insolvent
merchant banking corporations on 2 December 1997 and five additional merchant
banking corporations on 10 December 1997, respectively. The MoFE then required all
thirty merchant banking corporations to submit preliminary rehabilitation plans. The
Evaluation Committee for Merchant Banking Corporations, established on 29 December
1997, completed its assessment of plans submitted by the merchant banking corporations
based on their ability to achieve Basle Committee capital adequacy ratios of four per cent
by 31 March 1998 and six per cent by 30 June 1998. The ten merchant banking
corporations that were suspended after the Evaluation Committee's first assessment were
closed by revocation of their respective licenses on 27 February 1998. The remaining
twenty merchant banking corporations were required to submit revised rehabilitation
plans for a second round of evaluations by the Evaluation Committee.
The second round of evaluations were premised on liquidity, asset quality, and
management capability." 6 The Evaluation Committee recommended the closure of two
additional merchant banking corporations and revaluation of three other merchant
banking corporations. Of those five merchant banking corporations, three were
ultimately closed. The remaining fifteen merchant banking corporations, whose
rehabilitation plans were approved, were required to enter into managerial contracts with
115 See Financial Supervisory Commission, "Financial and Corporate Restructuring: Progress and Future
Tasks" (March 1999), p. 29.
116 Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Merchant Banking Corporation Evaluation" (26 Feb.
1998).
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the supervisory authorities. These contracts included timetables for achieving and
maintaining operations in compliance with the capital adequacy ratios of four per cent by
31 March 1998, six per cent by 30 June 1998, and eight per cent by 30 June 1999,
respectively. If rehabilitation plans were not implemented to the satisfaction of
supervisory authorities, the merchant banking corporation(s) in question would have its
(their) licenses revoked. 117
 As a result of end-June 1997 evaluation, which required the
merchant banking corporations to meet capital adequacy ratio of six per cent, two
additional merchant banking corporations were ultimately closed. In January and
February 1999, two other merchant banking corporations were merged with commercial
banks. Thus, at present eleven merchant banking corporations are operating, and one
merchant bank corporation is suspended.
In response to the suspension and closures of merchant banking corporations, a
"bridge" merchant banking corporations, called Hanaerum Merchant Bank, was
established in December 1997 to assume control over and liquidate their assets. This
institution also assumed control over the deposits of suspended or closed merchant
banking corporations, along with most of their performing assets.
(b) Commercial Banks
(1) Initial Measures
The Korean government employed a different approach in the commercial banking
sector. One of the ten Korean local commercial banks had a 21.4 per cent ratio of non-
See Republic of Korea, "Letter of Intent Sent to IMF and Memorandum on the Economic Reform" (18
Feb. 1998); Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Merchant Banking Corporation Evaluation"
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performing loans to total loans as at the end of 1997, while four other such banks had
18.3 per cent, 14.9 per cent, 12.5 per cent, and 11.3 per cent non-performing loans to total
loan ratios, respectively. Two nationwide commercial banks, the Korea First Bank and
Seoul Bank, had 11.4 per cent and 10.3 per cent non-performing loans." 8
 Thus, upon full
disclosure of loan losses and securities investment losses, these banks had -2.70 per cent
and 0.97 per cent of capital ratios to risk-weight assets as of end of 1997)' Unlike the
merchant banking corporations, the Korean government initially neither suspended nor
closed the troubled commercial banks. Instead, the government unilaterally reduced the
existing shareholders equity of the Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank, which were both
technically insolvent, from 820 billion won to 100 billion won each (the minimum
amount of equity required for a nationwide commercial bank under the General Banking
Act), and provided capital injections in January 1998.120 After recapitalisation, the
capital adequacy requirement ratios for these institutions improved dramatically, to 7.15
per cent and 11.63 per cent, respectively.' 2 ' The government and KDIC effectively
acquired an ownership stake of ninety-four per cent in each bank, effectively
nationalising them, and appointed outside experts to assist the Privatisation Committee in
developing privatisation strategies and select lead managers for privatising these
(26 Feb. 1998).
118 See Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Commercial Banks' Capital Adequacy Ratios and
Supervisory Measures to Substandard Banks" (26 Feb. 1998). Their non-performing loan ratios were 16.7
and 15.1 per cents as of September 1997. Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Commercial Bank
Loans as of September 1997" (20 Nov. 1997).
119 Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Commercial Banks' Capital Adequacy Ratios and
Supervisory Measures to Substandard Banks" (26 Feb. 1998).
120 Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Government Capitalisation Plan for Korea First Bank
and Seoul Bank" (5 Jan. 1998).
121 Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Commercial Banks' Capital Adequacy Ratios and
Supervisory Measures to Substandard Banks" (26 Feb. 1998).
287
Chapter Four
banks.' 22
 The government planned to sell at least one of these banks to foreign financial
institution to normalise the operations.'23
In addition, the OBS ordered measures designed to improve management for six
commercial banks whose capital adequacy ratios based on full provisioning fell below six
per cent, and management improvement recommendations for six commercial banks
whose ratios fell between six and eight per cent, as of year end 1997.124 Under the
management improvement recommendations, the commercial banks must meet the
minimum eight per cent capital adequacy ratio within six months to two years. The
respective banks must formulate clear plans for utilising new capital sources and reducing
the amount of risk assets to meet the minimum ratios. Until the respective banks meet
the minimum ratio, dividend payouts are suspended, unprofitable branches must be
closed, and authorisation must be obtained to conduct new activities or considerably
expand existing operations. Thus, such banks are required to:
(I) establish measures to reduce costs and improve internal governance;
(2) establish and carry out measures to reduce non-performing loans and improve
risk assessment, pricing, and loan recovery;
(3) replace management;
(4) improve internal audit and control functions and develop risk management
systems with appropriate risk levels; and
122 See Republic of Korea, "Letter of Intent Sent to IMF and Memorandum on the Economic Reform" (18
Feb. 1998).
123 Ministry of Frnance and Economy Press Release, "IMF Program Implementation Plans" (17 Dec. 1997).
For more measures imposed on the Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank, see Ministry of Finance and
Economy Press Release, "Revised Government Capitalisation Plan for Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank"
(3 Jan. 1998).
124 Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Commercial Banks' Capital Adequacy Ratios and
Supervisory Measures to Substandard Banks" (26 Feb. 1998). Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank were
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(5) present business plans and expected financial statements for the next three
years.
Under the management improvement measures, the banks must meet all
requirements of the management improvement recommendations. Beyond the above
referenced requirements, banks are obliged to establish measures for restructuring;
replace external auditors; analyse internal governance systems and submit plans to
improve them; and present business plans and expected financial statements for the next
five years. In addition, the banks are prohibited from new investments and expanding
operations. The twelve banks, under the management improvement measures or
recommendations, were required to submit its recapitalisation plans to the OBS by 30
April 1998)25 If the plans were approved by 30 June 1998, the bank in question would
enter into a managerial contract with the OBS to implement the plans, which would
include a schedule for achieving specified goals. If the plans were rejected or otherwise
not implemented as agreed, the OBS would adopt appropriate measures to the full extent
of its powers.' 26
 The government further established a special task force for the MoFE to
coordinate, monitor and assess rehabilitation plans, bank restructurings, and use of public
funds.' 27 The Task Force functions were transferred to a bank restructuring unit under
the Financial Supervisory Commission in April 1998.
ordered the management improvement recommendations on September 5, 1997 and the management
improvement measures on December 22, 1997.
125 Republic of Korea, "Letter of Intent Sent to IMF and Memorandum on the Economic Reform" (18 Feb.
1998).
126 Ibid.
127 The Task Force was established under the IMF programme. The members of the Task Force, chaired by
a Director General level staff at the MoFE, include two or three staff of director level members from the
MoFE, the OBS, the Korea Asset Management Corporation, and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The Director of Supervision Policy of the OBS, the Executive Director of the KAMC, the Director of
Management of KDIC, and non-government specialists such as financial researchers, lawyers, and
accountants participate in the ordinary meetings.
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The twelve commercial banks whose capital ratios fell below eight per cent as of
December 1997 submitted their rehabilitation plans by 30 April 1998. After evaluations
by external auditors based on capital adequacy, the recapitalisation plan, assets quality
classification, the reduction plan for risky assets, cost reduction measures, and the
management improvement plan, a Bank Management Evaluation Committee (or Bank
Appraisal Committee)' 28 evaluated the rehabilitation plans as to whether the banks could
meet the revised capital adequacy ratios of either eight per cent (or six per cent if a bank
would not engaged in the international operations) by June 2000.129 On 28 June 1998,
the Committee reported its final assessment results to the FSC, wherein five banks' plans
were approved, two banks received conditional approvals, and six banks' plans were
rejected.'30
(2) Bank Closures
On 29 June 1998, following review of the Bank Management Evaluation Committee
report, the FSC conditionally approved seven banks' plans and disapproved of five
banks' plans, respectively. The FSC considered the Bank Management Evaluation
Committee's recommended approvals of four banks' plans with some reservations, and
decided that such plans were evaluated as being vulnerable to external macroeconomic
128 The Committee was established on 20 June 1998. It consisted of twelve members from the private
sectors. The chairman was the representative of the lead accounting firm from the group of accounting
firms that had conducted evaluations on rehabilitation plans. The other members were selected from
accounting firms (five members), law firms (two members), university professors (one member), research
institutions (one member), consulting firms (one member), and international experts (one member).
129 See Financial Supervisory Commission Structural Reform Planning Unit Press Release, "Procedures and
Standards of Bank Resolutions" (1 July 1998).
130 ibid.
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conditions and relied on internal sources of funds rather than external funds.' 3 ' The FSC
also decided that one bank's plan, despite receiving disapproval by the Bank
Management Evaluation Committee, should be approved with conditions because the
bank's total assets exceeded its total liabilities. The Financial Industry Restructuring Act
did not allow for the closure of a bank with positive net worth. Therefore,, the bank
legally could not be classified as a non-viable financial institution under the Financial
Industry Restructuring Act,' 32
 as amended in September 1998.'
With its rehabilitation plan decisions, the FSC decided to close five small to
medium-sized banks, three nationwide banks and two local commercial banks, and
transfer their assets and liabilities to five stronger banks in so-called purchase and
assumption ("P&A") operations.' 34
 Under the P&A formula, the five acquiring banks
purchased the sound assets and assumed the liabilities of each closed bank. The
acquiring banks were selected based on their (1) capital adequacy ratios of nine per cent
or more at the end of 1997; (2) capabilities to stabilise in a timely manner after acquiring
the failed bank and to recapitalise through rights issues or foreign capital injections; and
(3) synergy effects considering competitive edge and branch distribution.' 35
 To prevent
the deterioration of acquiring banks' financial conditions, the FSC provided fiscal support
measures, 136
 which included:
131 See Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "Ailing Bank Resolution" (29 June 1998).
132 Ibid.
133 See Financial Industry Restructuring Act art. 2 ci. 3.
134 See Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "The FSC Chairman's Announcement upon Bank
Resolution" (29 June 1998).
135 See Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "Ailing Bank Resolution," (29 June 1998); see
also Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "Frameworks for Acquiring Banks" (29 June 1998).
136 See Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "Finalisation of P&A Terms and Conditions" (24
July 1998).
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(1) the acquiring banks were granted put-back options to sell back to the KAMC
any assets that turned became nonperforming within six months after
acquisition; and
(2) capital was to be injected, in the form of government securities, to the
acquiring banks to the extent necessary to prevent deterioration of the
acquiring banks' capital adequacy ratios due to their P&A of the failed banks'
assets, while the KAMC was to purchase some of the bad loans on their own
books at standard discounts to book value.
Upon completion of due diligence analysis of the assets and liabilities of the resolved
banks, the KAMC purchased bad loans with a book value of 4.16 trillion won on 28
September 1998. On 29 September 1998, the KDIC injected 5.78 trillion won by which
the liabilities of the resolved banks exceeded their assets. Finally, the licenses of the
resolved banks were revoked on 30 September 1998.
(3) Viable Bank Restructuring
The remaining seven banks that were deemed able to carry out rehabilitation plans were
required to submit implementation plans (memoranda of understanding) by 31 July 1998.
The MOUs between a bank and the FSC generally included:137
(1) measures for changing management (including large scale replacement of
management, recruitment of new management from outside, and recruitment
of foreign experts);
131 See Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "Ailing Bank Resolution," (29 June 1998).
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(2) measures for recapitalisation or mergers, if the recapitalisation is difficult,
with clear timetables for implementation;
(3) capital reduction plans to write down the equity of existing shareholders,
equivalent to the difference between the net asset value and paid-in capital;'38
(4) measures for management improvement, including downsizing and earning
improvement; and
(5) measures for preventing any further deterioration of asset quality.
The process induced voluntary mergers and foreign investments with government
contributions. Two large nationwide banks announced their merger on 31 July 1998, and
registered their merger on 6 January 1999. The government announced a contribution of
5.5 trillion won to purchase their non-performing loans and recapitalise these banks,
which would own ninety-five per cent of the merged bank.' 39 On 17 December 1998,
one large nationwide bank, a local bank and a merchant bank corporation announced their
merger to create a unified commercial bank.' 4° On 12 February 1999, one additional
local bank, which was categorised as non-viable and ordered to merge by the FSC. The
government also contributed 7.75 trillion won to purchase their non-performing loans and
recapitalise the institution, which would own ninety per cent of the merged bank.'4'
One nationwide bank, formally a specialised bank, recapitalised through foreign
investment and government capital injections.' 42 A German bank invested 350 billion
138 The assets value was calculated based on the assessment results at the end of March 1998. If the net
asset value was negative, a full write-off was required.
' See Financial Supervisory Commission, "Financial & Corporate Restructuring" (March 1999), P. 8.
' 40 See ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Korea's Economy Reinvented: Strategy Details
and Progress" (12 June 1998).
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won by converting existing debt to equity, which acquired an ownership stake of thirty
per cent. The Bank of Korea, the existing shareholder, injected 336 billion won through
the Korea Ex-Im Bank) 43
 One remaining small nationwide bank wrote off its paid-in
capital and recapitalised on 29 October 1998.
(4) Sound Bank Restructuring
The remaining twelve banks, whose capital adequacy ratios were eight per cent or more,
were reviewed by the FSC in August 1998) One local bank, which was ordered to
comply with the management improvement measures before the evaluation, increased its
paid-in capital, and two more local banks were ordered to comply with the management
improvement recommendations following the evaluations. The FSC conditionally
approved their rehabilitation plans. In addition, two medium sized nationwide banks
voluntarily merged in January 1999, followed by the merger between one large
nationwide bank, formally a specialised bank, and the Korea Long-Term Credit Bank.
Foreign investment also contributed the restructuring,' 46 as the International Finance
Corporation invested US$152 million in Hana Bank and US$25 million in the Korea
Long-Term Credit Bank.
See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Bank Restructuring Progress" (28 June 1999).
Financial Supervisory Commission, "Financial & Corporate Restructuring," op. cit., n. 139, p. 8.
See ibid., p. 10.
' See Ministry of Finance and Economy Press Release, "Korea's Economy Reinvented: Strategy Details
and Progress" (12 June 1998).
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(c) Other Financial Institutions
According to the FSC, the Korean NBFIs had approximately 30 trillion won in
non-performing loans as of March 1998, nearly seven per cent of NBFI total assets. In
June 1998, the FSC announced a restructuring plan for insurance companies, investment
trust companies, leasing companies and securities companies, based on the measures that
non-viable institutions would be closed and distressed NBFIs subject to prompt
corrective actions.' 47 Of twenty-five existing leasing companies, twenty-one companies
had negative assets. The restructurings were generally conducted by the parent
company(ies) (banks) on a voluntary basis, because the Lending Act prohibited the
application of prompt corrective action measures against leasing companies under the
Financial Industry Restructuring Act. 148 As a result, five companies are currently under
liquidation procedures and five additional companies transferred their businesses to a
bridge leasing company. The remaining eleven companies, which had negative assets,
are undergoing management normalisation.
In May 1998, the FSC announced the standards for "prompt corrective actions"
against securities companies, based on their respective operational net capital ratios.149
Two securities companies were closed and three additional securities companies were
suspended between May-August 1998. In August 1998, four securities companies whose
operational net capital ratio or asset/liability ratio fell short of 100 per cent at the end of
June 1998 were ordered to submit rehabilitation plans. The FSC approved two
147 See Financial Supervisory Commission, "Financial & Corporate Restructuring," op. cit., n. 139, P. 28.
148 See ibid., pp. 12-13.
'49 See ibid., pp. 13-14.
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companies' plans with conditions and disapproved the other two, which the FSC decided
to close. As for the fifty existing insurance companies, the FSC adopted prompt
corrective action standards in June 1998 based on their respective reserve ratios. 150
 The
FSC required eighteen life insurance companies and four non-life insurance companies,
which had insolvent utilising reserves at the end of March 1998, to submit rehabilitation
plans. As a result of evaluation, the FSC closed four life insurance companies. Thus,
seven life insurance companies have submitted their implementation plans and seven
other life insurance companies and two non-life insurance companies have submitted
their performance undertaking letters. Finally, the FSC closed two investment trust
companies and five other of such companies are liquidating voluntarily. Thus, among
230 mutual credit facilities companies, twenty-six companies were closed and seventeen
companies are currently under restructuring.
2. Public Support for Disposing of Non-performing Loans and Financial
Sector Restructuring
At the end of 1997, the Korean commercial banks had bad loans (loans classified as
either doubtful or estimated loss) in excess of 10 trillion won and approximately 22.6
trillion won in non-performing loans (loans classified as either substandard, doubtful or
estimated loss), after 7.1 trillion won worth of bad loans were sold to the KAMC in
November-December 1997. The bad loans and non-performing loans represented
approximately 2.7 per cent and 6 per cent of their total outstanding loans, respectively. If
the 7.1 trillion won worth of bad loans sold to the KAMC were taken into account, the
non-performing loans of Korean commercial banks would be approximately 10.7 per cent
° See ibid., p. 14.
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of total outstanding loans. As Korea's economic conditions deteriorated, the total non-
performing loans of commercial banks increased to 29 trillion won, which was
approximately 8.6 per cent of total loans. At the end of 1998, the Korean commercial
banks held approximately 22.2 trillion won in non-performing loans, which was nearly
7.4 per cent of total outstanding loans. The specialised banks held approximately 11.4
trillion won in non-performing loans, which was 8 per cent of total loans at the end of
1998. The Korean NBFIs non-performing loans were approximately 26.6 trillion won, or
20 per cent of total loans at the end of 1998. Finally, the Korean financial institutions
held precautionary loans in excess of 50 trillion won as of March 1998.
The Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMC) was established to reduce
the problems faced by banks and merchant banking corporations from non-performing
loans. 15 ' The KAMC began purchasing non-performing assets from financial institutions
in November 1997.152 On 20 May 1998, the Korean government released a progress
report and future plans for economic restructuring,' 53
 wherein it estimated the total
amount of troubled loans (loans classified as precautionary or worse) of all Korean
financial institutions was approximately 118 trillion won, or 28 per cent of GDP, and that
the total amount of non-performing loans was approximately 68 trillion won as of March
1998. The government targeted 100 trillion won worth of troubled loans for immediate
disposition at an estimated market value of 50 per cent of their book value. Therefore,
The KAMC was originally established in 1962 to collect non-performing loans for banks. In November
1997, a legislation was passed to dissolve the old KAMC and create a new entity with increased capital.
152 The KAMC's Non-performing Asset Management Fund has ten trillion won. 2.5 trillion won from the
budget account, two trillion won loan from the Bank of Korea, an estimated five trillion won from the
proceeds from bonds by the Fund itself, and 0.5 trillion won in contributions from financial institutions
make up the ten trillion won. All losses will be covered using fiscal resources. See Ministry of Finance
and Economy Press Release, "Financial Market Stabilisation Package" (19 Nov. 1997).
153 Ministry of Finance and Economy, "Korea's Economic Restructuring: Progress Report and Future
Plans" (20 May 1998).
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under this scenario the losses incurred by financial institutions would be 50 trillion won.
The government planned the disposal of troubled loans through two channels: (1) half of
the loans would be disposed of by financial institutions themselves by selling off
collateral or calling in loans, and (2) the KAMC would purchase the remaining half at the
estimated market price of 50 per cent of book value. The KAMC would issue 25 trillion
won in bonds to meet the funding requirement for the disposal of non-performing loans,
and the government would provide a guarantee on the bonds and bear the interest
expense.
Thus, the KAMC purchased non-performing loans with a purported face value of
44.1 trillion won from Korean financial institutions for 19.9 trillion won, from the period
of November 1997-December 1998. The Korea First Bank and the Seoul Bank sold 6.6
trillion won worth of non-performing loans, and other commercial banks sold 23.2 trillion
won worth of non-performing loans. The KAMC purchased 2.7 trillion won worth of the
merchant banking corporations' non-performing loans. The KAMC also purchased 5.8
trillion won worth of non-performing loans from fidelity and surety insurance companies.
The life insurance companies and the securities companies sold 0.1 trillion worth of their
non-performing loans, and specialised banks also sold 5.7 trillion worth of non-
performing loans, to KAMC. In addition, the Korean government planned to purchase
about 32 to 42 trillion won worth of non-performing loans at 12.5 trillion won.
Korea's financial restructuring requires not only the disposition of non-
performing loans but also recapitalisation of viable financial institutions. In May 1998,
the government estimated that Korean financial institutions had to realise 50 trillion won
of losses, which would eventually result in the erosion of their capital bases. The
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financial institutions had set provisions for 9 trillion won, and were expected to provide
an additional 6 trillion won during 1998. Therefore, the estimated provisioning shortfall
of financial institutions would be approximately 35 trillion won. The government also
estimated that financial institutions would need at least 4 trillion won to reach the
minimum 8 per cent capital adequacy ratio. Thus, the total capital shortfall of financial
institutions would be approximately 39 trillion won. Under the government plan, to
cover the 39 trillion won recapitalisation funding, the KDIC would issue 16 trillion won
in bonds to inject capital in financial institutions. The government would also provide a
guarantee on the bonds issued by the KDIC and bear the interest cost. The financial
institutions would raise 20 trillion won in the market, and the remaining 3 trillion won
corresponded to capital injections into the Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank, already
disbursed in January 1998. In addition, the KDIC would issue an additional 9 trillion
won in bonds to meet the expected demand for depositor protection.
Thus, under these measures, the government injected a total of 21 trillion won
into commercial banks for recapitalisation and loss compensation for depositor
protection, and into NBFIs for loss compensation. The five commercial banks, which
acquired five other closed banks, received 5.8 trillion won for loss compensation to cover
for negative net worth registered as a result of the acquisitions and an additional 1.2
trillion won for recapitalisation necessary to elevate their capital adequacy ratios to pre-
acquisition levels. The merged banks received 3.6 trillion won to elevate capital
adequacy ratios to the sound bank's pre-merger ratios (in case of merger between the
sound bank and the troubled bank, or up to 10 per cent, in case of merger between the
troubled banks). The NBFIs also received 7.8 trillion won for loss compensation.
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3.	 Strengthening Banking Environment and Prudential Supervision
After the Han ho scandal, the OBS introduced the credit committee system to improve
loan evaluations in commercial banking, in particular to prevent bank presidents from
deciding on large loans, thus eliminating politically connected lending schemes. The
FSC introduced a lending evaluation system for interlinked business groups
(chaebols), 154 which focuses on the interlinked business group as a whole rather than on
individual companies in the group. Under this programme, the interlinked business group
is required to enter into a financial agreement with its main creditor bank. The agreement
contains regularly scheduled evaluations of the group's financial conditions, leverage
reduction plans, and mandatory discussions with the bank on any new projects that the
group may desire to undertake. The agreement also places the true owner as the
executive director to be legally responsible for the management of the group.
The FSC further requires commercial banks to maintain diversified loan portfolios
and avoid concentration on a specific industry. Thus, when commercial banks finance
large investment projects, they need to use project financing structures and techniques to
ensure that the project company is independent from the parent company and the account
is supervised in an escrow account of the main creditor bank. As part of improving loan
evaluations, the FSC requires commercial banks to review borrower financial statements
with all available information rather than simply on the basis of ordinary balance sheets
and profit and loss accounts generated during the loan evaluation period.155
See Detailed Enforcement Regulations for the Credit Management of Banking Institutions art. 14.
155 Office of Bank Supervision Press Release, "Supervisory Measures from 1-lanbo Case" (26 June 1997).
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The Korean government introduced the prohibition of mutual payment guarantees
within the fifty largest interlinked business groups to be implemented by March 2000.
The thirty largest groups must reduce mutual payment guarantees to 100 per cent of their
equity by March 1998 and otherwise clear all mutual payment guarantees by March 1999.
The thirty largest chaebols are required to produce combined financial statements
beginning in fiscal year 1999 to increase the transparency of corporate accounts. The
new system is based on a broad definition of what constitutes an "affiliated company,"156
which makes the statements very comprehensive. The combined financial statements
include combined balance sheets, income and cash-flow statements, as well as footnote
reporting of intra-group loans, loan guarantees and other major transactions. In addition,
accounting standards were tightened in December 1998.157 To enhance the independence
of external auditors responsible for verifying company accounts, auditor selection
committees are now required in Korean stock market listed companies and chaebol
affiliated firms that are required to otherwise prepare combined financial statements.
The Korean government also established a plan to strengthen the regulatory and
supervisory framework, in particular the prudential regulations implemented during
1998.158 In April 1998, the evaluation standard for marketable and investment securities,
held by the banks in their trust accounts, was changed to reflect the mark-to-market
method. At the end of June 1998, a full 100 per cent provisioning for loan losses,
retirements and valuation losses on securities investment must be set aside. On 30 June
156 Affiliated companies comprise "all" domestic and foreign interlinked companies. See Financial
Supervisory Commission and Securities and Futures Commission, "Reform of Accounting Standards in
Korea" (11 Dec. 1998).
'"See ibid.
158 Republic of Korea, "Letter of Intent Sent to IMF and Memorandum on the Economic Reform" (18 Feb.
1998).
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1998, the FSC introduced additional prudential regulations, most importantly the new
classification standards and provisioning rules. Loans more than 3 months overdue are to
be classified as "substandard," and loans in arrears by 1 month to less than 3 months are
to be classified as "precautionary." The provisioning requirement for precautionary
assets was increased from 1 per cent to 2 per cent. The FSC also introduced regulations
to require provisions for securities losses against non-tradable securities in trust accounts,
and to deduct from Tier 2 capital all provisions for non-performing loans (effective
January 1999). The FSC further required that the mark-to-market evaluation standard for
marketable and investment securities be applied to securities in banking accounts.
The FSC also announced the strengthening of prudential regulations and
supervision with respect to foreign exchange operations of commercial banks. The FSC
recognised that foreign exchange operations under the Foreign Exchange Act had been
enforced mainly through focusing on aspects of management of external assets and
liabilities. Thus, the supervision of foreign exchange operations was tailored towards the
stability of foreign exchange and monetary policies rather than towards assuring the
soundness of commercial banks.' 59 The principal area of strengthening in this respect is
that of liquidity management. The foreign currency liquidity regulations include the
Market Mismatches (GAP) Regulation and the Foreign Currency Liquidity Ratio
Regulation. Under the GAP Regulation, banks are required to divide their assets and
liabilities into seven "buckets" based on residual maturities: 0 to 7 days, 8 days to 1
month, 1 month to 3 months, 3 months to 6 months, 6 months to 1 year, 1 to 3 years and
above 3 years. Then the banks have to maintain minimum ratios of cumulative GAP
159 See Financial Supervisory Commission Press Release, "Strengthening of Prudential Supervision of
Foreign Exchange Operations in Commercial Banks" (30 June 1998).
302
Chapter Four
amounts to total foreign currency assets. 0
 The ratio must be positive mismatches for the
first bucket of no more than 7 days, -10 per cent for the period of no more than I month,
and -20 per cent for the period of no more than 3 months. This regulation is enforced on
a consolidated basis, encompassing the accounts of banks' headquarters, domestic
branches, overseas branches, overseas subsidiaries and offshore accounts. The Foreign
Currency Liquidity Ratio Regulation requires that banks have short-term assets (less than
3 months) to cover at least seventy per cent of short-term liabilities. The ratio must be
calculated based on foreign currency assets and liabilities of banks' headquarters,
domestic branches, overseas branches, overseas subsidiaries and their off-shore accounts.
Those regulations came to effect 1 January 1999. The FSC also introduced overall
foreign currency exposure limits on a per counterparty basis, including foreign currency
loans, guarantees, securities investments and off-shore financings. Finally, the FSC
required that banks establish risk management systems for country risk, derivatives and
foreign currency asset-liability-management, and further strengthened its off-site
surveillance by improving banks' reporting systems.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
Korea's financial crisis in 1997 illustrates that a government-controlled banking
system, coupled with lax regulation and supervision, facilitates inevitable problems for
banks even if macroeconomic conditions appear to be sound and even robust. Moreover,
without appropriate diagnosis of and policy responses to crisis, with appropriate
sequencing thereof, measures to protect the economy and financial system cannot
° GAP ratio in each period = (accumulated foreign currency liquid assets - accumulated foreign currency
303
Chapter Four
succeed. Korea's Bankruptcy Deferment Accord, which intended to support troubled
companies, and its liquidity support for commercial banks are good examples of such
failures.
Korea's reform of the regulatory and supervisory framework represents a
significant step towards establishing a "safe and sound" banking system, but clearly
further steps are necessary to establish the longevity of appropriate reforms. First, the
new banking regulatory and supervisory bodies (i.e., FSC and FSS) should not control the
Korean banking sector, but rather provide an environment in which the Korean banking
system operates according to appropriate international prudential standards.' 61
 In order to
restructure corporate sector (especially chaebols), the Korean government facilitates
banks with "work-out" programmes as well as directs the restructuring with enforced
swaps ("big deals"). These practices might produce a situation in which the government
controls financial and corporate sectors.' 62
 Furthermore, the Korean government owns a
very large share of the banking system once the recapitalisation of banks is completed
and hence the Korean government needs to denationalise banks for creating a privately
owned banking system. Second, Korea needs to establish a reformed banking system
which systematically precludes or mitigates opportunities for undue political interference.
An important focus is to provide a high degree of transparency in the FSC decision-
making processes, 163
 which can help the FSC to protect its decision making from undue
political interference. Korea's financial restructuring programmes illustrate that, during
the crisis, restructuring programmes should provide certainty of process and transparency
liquid liabilities) / total foreign currency assets.
6I See Chapter Two Section VI and Chapter Three Section II.
'62 See "South Korean Restructuring: The Bigger Bully," The Economist (2 Jan. 1999).
163 See Chapter Two Section VI.
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with clear, realistic timetables. Clear exit policies and rules should be implemented for
removing explicit or implicit guarantees against failure for troubled financial institutions.
There are concerns that the improving economy (in Korea industrial output and the stock
market are close to pre-crisis levels in 1999) may evaporate the restructuring progress.1
By providing clear and realistic timetables for the NBFIs restructuring (e.g., life
insurance companies) and the corporate sector reform, Korea should implement and
apply real reforms. Finally, public support for financial restructuring, including the use
of public sector funds, is necessary. The Korean government firmly established the
principle that in cases of bank insolvency some of the cost would be borne by
shareholders by reducing paid-in capital of the troubled banks.' 65
 Nonetheless, the
Korean government (eventually taxpayers) must bear most the financial sector
restructuring costs, although the government may be able to recoup part of costs from
future bank earnings and sales of its equity positions in banks.
'"See "South Korean Restructuring: More Pam, Please," The Economist (17 Apr. 1999).
t65 See John Thompson, "Reforming the Korean Banking System," OECD Financial Market Trends (1 Feb.
1999).
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE REFORM OF KOREAN BANKING REGULATION
AND SUPERVISION
I. THE NEED FOR REFORM OF KOREAN BANKING
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
The recent Korean financial crisis illustrates that a government-controlled banking system
with lax prudential regulation and supervision inevitably creates significant problems for
banking institutions. A government-controlled banking system, where both the regulators
and the banks are subject to governmental guidance for purposes such as the channelling
of funds to preferred uses, as a means of supporting the national economic development
plans, as in Korea, can be the source of problems such as moral hazard. In turn, these
problems threaten the stability of the banking system. As a result of such distortions,
banks in Korea kept on lending to the chaebols; as the latter were regarded by the Korean
government as pillars of the economy, they received preferential treatment and there was
no objection to banks building large credit exposures to them. The moral hazard
problems also impeded the development of the right set of institutional incentives and
tools for the analysis of credit allocation, the management of risks and the efficient
operation of Korean banks.
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The lack of adequate prudential regulations and supervisory processes aggravated
the risks inherent in the governmental control of the banking system. It is clear that,
without an appropriate framework of prudential regulation and supervision, consistent
with evolving international standards, banking regulatory authorities cannot recognise and
adequately address banking problems. Rapid growth and prudent macroeconomic
policies cannot by themselves guarantee sound economic performance, if a well-
functioning and robust financial system is not in place.'
In order to establish such a banking system, Korea needs to implement reforms in
the areas of:
(1) the institutional structure of banking regulation and supervision; and
(2) the applicable substantive standards of prudential regulation and
supervision, as well as the monitoring and enforcement processes.
II. STRUCTURAL REFORM OF BANKING REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION
A.	 Structural Arrangements for Banking Regulation and Supervision
In general, four types of institutional arrangements for the banking regulatory and
supervisory functions can be distinguished, depending on whether these functions are
carried on by the central bank, the executive branch, an independent agency or a self-
regulatory body.
1 Ramon Moreno, Gloria Pasadilla, and Eli Remolona, "Asia's Financial Crisis: Lessons and Policy
Responses," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Pacific Basin Working Paper No. PB98-02 (1998), p.
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A central bank can be granted authority both for national monetary management
and for banking regulatory and supervisory issues. 2 Even if the goals of monetary policy
and banking regulation and supervision are different, they are closely related to each
other. The two sets of goals cannot be attained independently. The moral hazard and
information problems arising in the context of the lender of last resort function lead
central banks to become involved in the regulation and supervision of banking systems.
On the other hand, conflict of interest problems may arise, where the monetary authorities
also exercise banking regulatory and supervisory powers. For example, 3 in Korea during
the deregulation period (1982-1997), the Bank of Korea pursued, in its capacity as
banking regulatory and supervisory authority, a policy of interest rate deregulation
directed at abolishing policy loans and credit controls over the banking sector. However,
as monetary authority, the Bank of Korea was forced to re-impose interest rate controls,
fearing that higher interest rates might affect the performance of the real economy.
Moreover, in the context of banking crisis management, the central bank's performance
of the function of lender of last resort is limited by the size of available funds, while
taxpayers must eventually pay the final costs of the relevant operations.
Alternatively, the regulation and supervision of banks and other financial
institutions can be delegated to an executive department of government.4 This can be
done directly through the finance ministry or through a separate department, established
either within or outside the finance ministry. The institutional arrangement of banking
regulation and supervision by the executive, however, may not preclude governmental
2 Chapter Two Section II.
See Chapter Two Section II B 2.
' Chapter Two Section III.
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interference with the regulatory process for general economic policy purposes. Indeed,
this form of institutional arrangement may involve a greater potential for direct or indirect
government intervention in major regulatory policy decisions.
An independent agency can also be established to conduct banking regulation and
supervision. 5 The institutional features of such an agency are usually intended to ensure a
neutral environment for regulatory and supervisory activities. Decision making in the
agency could be entrusted to qualified experts, who are non-partisan and know well the
banking area. The structure of an independent agency can maximise the degree of
independence of regulatory and supervisory functions. However, with regard to the
performance of regulatory functions, reliance to the expertness of an independent agency
has its limits. 6 Expertness is more appropriate for the achievement of specific, narrow
objectives than for basic policy formation, which requires long-term planning and the
balancing of various social interests. In addition, the institutional structure of an
independent agency cannot always guarantee its independence. 7 In some cases, a head of
the government concerned with the activities of independent agency may be able to
exercise more influence over the agency than he would over an executive department.
Self-regulation can be an alternative for banking regulation and supervision.8
Self-regulation can allow banks more freedom to run their own affairs as they think fit; it
can transfer the costs of regulation to the regulated banks; it can give banks the ability to
decide the rules of the game; it can utilise industry experts, who know how the regulated
activity works and what types of control are most feasible and appropriate; it can ensure
Chapter Two Section IV.
6 See Chapter Two Section IV B 1.
See Chapter Two Section IV B 2.
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faster regulatory and supervisory decision making than is possible in the case of
governmental bodies; and it can produce greater flexibility in the creation, interpretation
and application of regulatory rules. However, self-regulation has its own limitations.
"Free rider" problems make it difficult for an industry to create an effective self-
regulatory organisation. Antitrust problems also need to be overcome, in order to avoid
sanctions and restrictions by antitrust laws, which are intended to control monopoly
power and anti-competitive activities.
B.	 Structural Reform of the Korean Banking Regulatory System
Until 1997, the Korean banking system was regulated and supervised by the Monetary
Board and the Office of Bank Supervision of the Bank of Korea (BOK), Korea's central
bank. However, the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities were effectively
controlled by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (M0FE), through legal and practical
means. 9 Therefore, the first step in reforming Korean banking regulation and supervision
is to establish a new institutional structure for the performance of banking regulatory and
supervisory functions. The banking regulatory and supervisory authorities should be
structurally independent from governmental and political interference, that is, sufficiently
independent from government's objectives that are inconsistent with prudential regulatory
objectives, aimed at ensuring that banks are "safe and sound". To balance such structural
independence, a reformed and restructured system should include a high degree of
transparency and accountability.
8 Chapter Two Section V.
Chapter Two Section III C.
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Korea must choose between the various possible institutional arrangements
(executive branch, central bank, independent agency and self-regulation), and even
develop its own institutional structure, because in this area there is no theoretically ideal
framework of general application and a lot depends on the practical detail.
First, in the Korean situation, the removal of governmental control over the
banking system can be achieved by making regulatory and supervisory authorities
independent from the government - especially the MoFE - and the politicians.'0
Establishing new financial regulatory and supervisory authorities, e.g. the Financial
Supervisory Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service, is a move towards
creating a market oriented banking system. However, the regulatory and supervisory
authorities do not yet have full legal independence, but only operational independence
under the Establishing Act, since they remain under the jurisdiction of the Prime
Minister. Even statutory operational independence cannot ensure their actual and
practical independence. Therefore, it is necessary for Korea to formulate further practical
and legal measures that would ensure that the new regulatory and supervisory authorities
are truly independent.
Secondly, the new Korean banking regulatory and supervisory authorities should
not be forced to take into account governmental objectives that are inconsistent with
sound prudential regulatory objectives. Structural independence does not guarantee that
the banking regulatory and supervisory authorities actually perform their responsibilities
in pursuance of the appropriate objectives. Therefore, the FSC, as part of the executive
10 To achieve credibility and stability of the banking system, it is essential for the regulatory and
supervisory authorities to be independent from the political process. See Rosa Maria Lastra, Central
Banking and Banking Regulation (1996), pp. 151-52.
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branch, should not become a second MoFE, pursuing the government's economic
objectives and exercising a tight control over the banking industry.
Thirdly, independence does not mean that the banking regulatory and supervisory
authorities should be accountable to no one: it is essential to provide for suitable
mechanisms of accountability. However, these should not open the way to governmental
intervention or control under the guise of accountability. Formally, the Act Concerning
the Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organisations places the FSC under the
jurisdiction of the Prime Minister. However, the Act does not provide for any mechanism
of accountability to the Prime Minister. Therefore, Korea needs to provide for a degree
of accountability of the FSC. One possible step is to require a high degree of
transparency with regard to the actions of the regulators.
Transparency can support and foster the independence and accountability of the
FSC. Transparency in decision making processes and supervision processes should
improve their independence. For example, reporting and publishing the minutes of the
meetings of the decision making bodies would increase the transparency of the
procedures and reduce the possibility of interventions on the part of the government and
politicians." Moreover, the FSC and the FSS need to publish their regulatory and
supervisory decisions, with reasons. Certain types of decisions can be published
immediately or regularly, while others can be published after a specified time lag. This
would increase the accountability of the FSC and the FSS to the public.
11 The Monetary Board of the Bank of Korea is required to publish its minutes. See Revised Bank of
Korean Act art. 24, cl. 2.
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III. REFORM OF THE SUBSTANTIVE REGULATORY
STANDARDS AND THE MONITORING AM)
ENFORCEMENT PROCESSES
A.	 The Appropriate Objective for Korean Banking Regulation and
Supervision
In order to create an adequate banking regulatory and supervisory system, it is essential to
establish an appropriate overall statutory objective for the banking authorities. Financial
institutions over the world have been experiencing extensive deregulation. Deregulation,
particularly in the banking sector, has been linked to increased instability. Furthermore,
financial globalisation and integration have cause a sharp expansion of international
flows (both inward and outward) of funds. Under these circumstances, Korea needs a
new set of objectives for its banking regulation and supervision. Among the current
objectives, "national economic progress" cannot serve as a suitable banking regulatory
and supervisory objective, but can only be employed as a plausible excuse for controlling
the banking industry. Other objectives, e.g., the sound operation of banking institutions,
depositor protection and the maintenance of the order of credit system, can contribute to
the establishment of a safe, sound and effective banking system in Korea. However,
those objectives should be harmonised.
As the Korean banking regulatory and supervisory system relaxes the economic
controls over the banking sector and gives the banks more incentives to act independently
in their market operations, the new approach may cause - at least in the short run -
increased instability in the banking system. Therefore, "financial stability" should be the
primary objective of Korea's banking regulation and supervision. Under the financial
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stability objective, the FSC would pursue the goals of sound operation of banks, depositor
protection and maintenance of the order of the credit system. Furthermore, clear and
objective criteria of regulation and supervision would also reduce the potential for
political interference.
B.	 Substantive Regulatory Standards
Korean banking regulations can be classified under three headings, i.e., as structural,
conduct and consumer protection regulations.' 2 Structural regulations include entry
controls, branching restrictions, restrictions in the scope of banking activities and
ownership restrictions. Conduct regulations include economic, allocative and prudential
regulations. In order to achieve financial stability, Korea needs, in particular, to review
the current banking regulations in the area of prudential regulation, with a view to
establishing an adequate set of regulatory and supervisory standards. Reforms should
seek to achieve two nain aims:
(1) to establish appropriate standards, which would ensure the safety and
soundness of the banking system and prevent regulatory and
supervisory forbearance; and
(2) to ensure that banks carry on their commercial activities in a market,
yet prudent, manner.
Areas that would benefit from new and improved regulatory standards include: capital
adequacy; loan classification; loan loss provisioning; and internal control systems.
12 Chapter One Section IV.
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1.	 Capital Adequacy Requirements
Although Korea has already introduced capital adequacy requirements for commercial
banks that are broadly in line with the Basle Committee's international standards, their
concrete implementation has been inadequate.' 3 Initially, capital adequacy requirements
were introduced to raise Korean banks' credit standing in the international finance
markets, not to improve the prudential standing of their operations. In cases of
deterioration of the balance sheet position of Korean banks, this approach often resulted
in supervisory forbearance.
Inadequate implementation distorted the real status of Korean banks' capital ratios
especially in the context of supplementary capital, leading to bank financial positions
inconsistent with the Basle standards. In particular, Korean banks were allowed to
include in their calculation of supplementary capital general provisions for loan losses, up
to a limit of 1.25 per cent of risk-weighted assets. However, for the most part, Korean
banks' general provisions for loan losses were reserved for their non-performing loans
(loans classified as substandard or worse) and, accordingly, were not available to be used
freely to cover unidentified future losses. The FSC corrected this problem by excluding
loan loss provisions for non-performing loans as supplementary capital in January 1999.
In addition, the Korean capital adequacy standards allow the Korean banks to
count up to 45 per cent of their latent gains on securities holdings as supplementary
capital. Under this standard, banks can utilise securities revaluation gains to adjust their
13 Chapter Three Section H A.
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capital ratios while refusing or delaying to recognise reductions. Therefore, the FSC
needs to either abolish this standard or closely monitor and examine banks' accounting
practices for securities revaluation.
In order to achieve adequate supervisory and examination standards in Korea, the
capital adequacy requirements should employ objective, rule-based criteria. Generally,
the capital adequacy requirements can serve as:
(1) standards for the supervisory enforcement measures, such as prompt
corrective actions,
(2) tools of bank management discipline; and
(3) a means of transparency for Korean banking operations.
2. Loan Classification Standards and Loan Loss Provision Requirements
Complementing the need for more effective capital adequacy standards, Korea needs to
strengthen its loan classification and loan loss provision requirements.
The FSC has enhanced its loan classification and loan loss reserve requirements.
Under the new regulations, Korean banks are required to classif5,' loans which are in
arrears for three months or more as substandard (as distinct from normal) loans, and to
make provisions of two per cent (up from one per cent) against precautionary assets.
However, the current loan classification standards are arbitrarily formulated, based on the
borrower's past or current financial performance, and do not take into account the
expected future performance of borrowers, their projects and prospects for collection of
loans. The FSC plans to implement a forward-looking loan classification scheme. For an
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appropriate loan classification system, the FSC needs to consider whether individual
banks have established their own loan classification standards which reflects the
borrower's past financial performance, its current financial condition and reasonably-
based projections of future performance.
Furthermore, the current loan loss provision requirements are based on default
ratios derived from historical averages ("rule of thumb" approach). This approach can be
misleading as to the true condition of banks regarding credit risk, because differences in
individual banks' loan portfolio characteristics and financial conditions are not
considered. Like in the case of loan loss classification standards, the FSC needs to take
into account individual circumstances by placing the primary responsibility for
establishing and maintaining adequate loan loss reserve methodologies on individual
banks. The FSS should then assess the reasonableness and validity of the methodologies
used.
3.	 Internal Control Systems
The Korean financial system also requires specific measures for the improvement of
internal control systems. The current regulatory programmes implemented or proposed
focus on financial requirements for lending activities, portfolio constraints and public
disclosures, using satisfactory accounting standards. 	 The one exception is the
requirement to set up a financial agreement between the interlinked business group
(chaebol) and the main creditor banks to resolve large loans and political loans that have
been made to chaebols and to monitor the credit worthiness of borrowers.
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To maintain the soundness and safety of the financial system, the regulatory and
supervisory authorities should further require commercial banks to develop a system of
prudent lending policies, set out in writing, specified procedures for loan approval and
administration and appropriate loan documentation practices in their lending functions.'4
To achieve these objectives, Korea's commercial banks need to establish adequate
internal control systems.' 5
 In particular, this requires the establishment of: (1) adequate
organisational structures; (2) lending standards; (3) risk management standards; and (4)
adequate administration procedures.
The organisational structures, composed of the board of directors, bank
management and internal auditor, need to ensure the autonomous operation of banks and
to provide an environments where banks can establish their own prudential standards for
their operations.
For sound bank management, banks need to establish and implement internal
policies and measures governing lending standards and other financial decisions. Such
policies should be explicit and transparent and should be disseminated throughout the
banking organisation.
In the past, Korean banks' risk management practices have been particularly
weak. The effectiveness of internal control systems requires that banks have their own
adequate risk management standards, by means of which they identify and continually
assess all material risks.
14 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (1997), pp.
24-25.
15 Chapter Three Section II C.
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Additionally, appropriate administration procedures are necessary to ensure that
the established policies and measures are followed and that special interests are not
allowed to influence decisions.
C.	 Monitoring Measures and Prompt Regulatory Action
1.	 Public Disclosure Requirements, Supervisory Reporting and Off-site
Surveillance
The supervisory authorities cannot identify potential problems only by means of on-site
examinations. Accordingly, they need to improve off-site surveillance.' 6 Off-site
monitoring makes possible the early detection of problems, and enables the authorities to
undertake prompt corrective actions, before these become too serious.'7
Off-site monitoring requires appropriate disclosure and accounting standards.
Public disclosure requirements utilise market discipline as a complement to banking
regulation and supervision. Timely, accurate, relevant and sufficient disclosure of
qualitative and quantitative information enables the market to reach a proper assessment
of a bank's activities and risk profile.
Of course, the banking supervisory authorities cannot rely only on publicly
disclosed information, but need also additional supervisory information. However, to
avoid imposing substantial costs on banks by requiring the reporting of irrelevant data,
the FSS should consider carefully, whether the supervisory reporting information is
necessary in order to: (1) focus management's attention on its responsibilities for
16 Chapter Three Section III A
1' Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, op. cit., n. 14, PP. 32-33.
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maintaining adequate internal controls and ensuring compliance with laws and
regulations; (2) enable the detection of unsafe and unsound conditions at an early stage;
and (3) facilitate prompt corrective actions.
2. Accounting Standards
It is essential that the information disclosed and reported by banks is based on sound
accounting standards and that these standards are properly applied. Information based on
weak accounting standards may provide a distorted view of a bank's true financial
condition. Thus, weak accounting standards allow bank managers to mislead the users,
for example, by delaying loss recognition for as long as possible.
Applicable accounting standards should be sufficient for reflecting the true
financial situation of banks and providing an early warning sign in the case of troubled
banks. In this context, Korea's enhancement of financial statement accounting standards
is a significant move towards establishing safe and sound banking.
3. On-site Examinations
On-site bank examinations are one of the major supervisory instruments used for
reviewing and assessing the prudential condition of banks. In Korea, however, bank
examinations have become tools for determining whether banks comply with non-
prudential laws, regulations, and other regulatory and supervisory guidelines or
directions. In order to ensure financial stability in the banking sector, the bank examiners
should, instead, concentrate on risk-related issues.
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4. Prompt Regulatory Action
Even with adequate sets of prudential regulations in place, banks are prone to trouble.
Korea's experience demonstrates that, when faced with banks in difficulties, the banking
regulatory and supervisory authorities tend to employ forbearance policies, in the hope
that the situation will eventually improve. However, the recent Korean financial crisis
illustrates that forbearance policies do not succeed and may even aggravate the underlying
problems. A policy of prompt corrective action should therefore be adopted, aimed at
limiting the number and costs of bank failures and reducing the possibilities of regulatory
and supervisory forbearance. Implementing such a policy in Korea would also increase
the transparency of the regulatory and supervisory decisions, by setting criteria for non-
discretionary enforcement actions.
5. Effective Enforcement
In addition to their direct enforcement powers, the Korean banking regulatory and
supervisory authorities have powers: to suspend all or part of a bank's operations; to
suspend a bank's officers from carrying on their duties and to recommend that the general
shareholders' meeting dismiss such officers; and to request bank presidents to launch
disciplinary actions.
In the past, these powers have been exercised for the purpose of ensuring that
banks follow the directions of the authorities. Therefore, the enforcement powers were
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utilised for controlling the operations of the banking sector, rather than preventing future
bank safety problems.
In order to ensure that banks operate in a prudent manner, the exercise of
enforcement powers should be directed at effectively contributing to enhancing bank
safety and soundness. This does not mean that the banking supervisory authorities should
overlook other irregularities, but that they should primarily focus on whether banks
operate consistently with prudential requirements.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
The Korean financial crisis stemmed from the prevalence of the chaebol structure and the
weaknesses of the financial system. The chaebols' highly leveraged financial positions,
with easy credit coming from the financial institutions, and their business overexpansion
resulted in massive non-performing loans. The government's exercise of control over the
banking system and the lack of adequate structures of prudential regulation and
supervision enabled Korean banks and the chaebols to further increase the financial
fragility, which was at the root of the crisis.
Korea's early responses and, in particular, its failure to deal with growing
corporate bankruptcies and financial problems prior to the IMF programme, indicate that
bailing out troubled corporations and financial institutions, without simultaneously
undertaking substantive reforms, is not conducive to resolving the underlying problems or
preventing the continuing deterioration of the overall economic conditions.
Korea's crisis resolution programme provides three lessons:
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(1) The restructuring programmes should provide certainty of process and
be transparent. Without commitment to process, the programmes will
eventually fail. The process needs to be transparent in order to restore
international investors' confidence in the financial market.
(2) The restructuring programmes should provide a clear, realistic
timetable for restructuring.
(3) Finally, the government or the regulatory and supervisory authorities
must refrain from assuring, whether explicitly or implicitly, that the
commercial banks cannot fail. 18 Instead, clear exit policy and rules
need to be adopted, with a view to minimising moral hazard.
18 Ibid., p. 9.
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